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Abstract:
The acceleration of economic globalisation, over the past few decades, has put the role of 
the state, as an important actor in the management of the global economy, in the spotlight. 
The question that continues to dominate the globalisation debate is whether or not 
individual states, operating within a neoliberal paradigm, are in a position to effectively 
regulate the economic activities of powerful multinational capital, manage domestic 
economies and protect labour. The main aim of this thesis is to assess how effectively 
nation states can respond to globalisation and mitigate negative impacts such as the decline 
of domestic industries and local labour markets while maximising the benefits.
Shipping is one of the most globalised industries and one where capital is highly mobile. 
The challenges facing nation states in their attempt to manage domestic economies and 
protect local industries are therefore well illustrated in the relationship between the state and 
multinational shipping capital. The UK, along with other Traditional Maritime Nations, has 
been dramatically affected by the globalisation of the industry. Following a huge decline in 
the UK’s merchant shipping fleet, the UK government has attempted to respond, by way of 
a tonnage tax. This is primarily a tax incentive to encourage ship-owners to register and 
operate their ships in the UK. The tonnage tax regime contains within it a training 
commitment by which the ship-owners undertake to recruit and train UK cadets.
An assessment of the performance of the strategy reveals that, whereas it has boosted 
significant growth in UK registered tonnage, it has achieved little success with regard to 
increasing the number o f qualified junior officers. It is this paradox that comprises the focus 
of this study. Using interview data collected from key stakeholders in the UK shipping 
industry the thesis analyses the form and impact of the tonnage tax. The main conclusion is 
that, having initially committed to the advocacy of the neoliberal agenda and the concept of 
free capital markets, states are no longer capable of effectively responding to globalisation 
and the consequent negative impact on domestic economies. Because of the growing 
influence of corporate capital and the fear of capital flight, the limitations of state policies is 
especially evident in the British shipping industry in relation to the decline of local 
seafaring labour.
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CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
1.1 Thesis
This thesis is about economic globalisation and how states have responded to, and tried 
to mitigate the impact o f some of its negative impact on domestic economies while 
attempting to maximise the benefits of its more positive aspects. The main point of 
emphasis in the analysis is the state’s capacity to effectively manage domestic 
economies and protect local industries, especially labour, from decline. In order to 
develop this analysis I have singled out the shipping industry, and, specifically, the UK 
shipping industry as the focus o f the study. The analyses and discussions are developed 
within the theoretical framework of economic globalisation and the political economy 
of skills and employment.
The thesis proceeds from the premise that globalisation is an active, continuous and 
dynamic process of deterritorialisation (Scholte, 2000) and economic liberalisation 
(Khor, 2001) where national barriers to cross-border socio-economic activities have 
been largely removed or greatly minimised (see also Stiglitz, 2002). This, as argued by 
Giddens (2002) has happened largely as a result of advanced transport and 
communication technologies. A situation has developed thus whereby multinational 
businesses operate freely from country to country with few restrictions from national 
governments. The thesis also posits that, due to increased international mobility, global 
capital has acquired great ‘political’ influence over national governments so that global 
corporations are in a position to influence national government policies and ensure easy 
exploitation of production factors around the world, for example labour. Furthermore, 
deterritorialisation and the growing international mobility of global capital have 
accelerated because of the neoliberal political paradigm adopted by states around the 
world to create and promote a global free market economy (see Harvey, 2005; Chomsky, 
1999; Hall, 2003; Newton, 2004).
Developments in the global political economy over the past three to four decades have 
raised questions about the relationship between states and markets and the relevance of 
the nation-state in a globalised world order (Hirst and Thompson, 1999; Ohmae, 1990;
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Bhagwati, 2004; Wolf, 2005). Some authors have strongly argued that the state has 
withdrawn and effectively let capital markets take over the management of state 
economies (e.g. Strange, 1996). A more radical argument presented by globalists is that 
states have lost their relevance as managers in the emerging global economic order 
(Ohmae, 1990) while a more moderate argument is that states and markets are engaged 
in an active and continuous process of power reconfiguration in which the concept of 
state capacity and power vis-a-vis markets is continuously being negotiated and 
reconfigured (Beck, 2005; Wolf, 2005). This thesis however argues that the important 
point is not whether the state’s capacity to manage the economy has declined, rather, as 
Short posits:
The real question is not whether the state is being replaced [by markets], but 
how the nation-state is responding to the new geo-politico-economic 
realities [of the emerging world order] (Short, 2001:11)
The main focus of this thesis, therefore, is the impact that globalisation has had on 
domestic economies and how states have responded. The thesis will engage with these 
arguments in its analysis and discussion of the developments in the UK shipping 
industry and the changing relationships between the state and multinational shipping 
businesses.
The shipping industry perhaps offers one of the best illustrations of the extent to which 
global corporate capital effectively operates across international boundaries without 
restriction from states. It also offers a clear demonstration of neoliberalism in practice 
and free capital markets at work in the fluidity of its international structure and 
organisation. In the introduction to his book, Nathan Lillie, remarks of the shipping 
industry:
The global maritime shipping business has often been portrayed as the 
archetype o f unbridled free-market capitalism, burst free from the 
constraints o f government and trade union regulation (Lillie, 2006:1).
In these few lines, Lillie captures aptly the nature of shipping markets and the type of 
relationship that exists between states and shipping capital. Although one might argue 
that this is a characteristic specific to shipping by virtue of its international nature, it 
does represent a unique illustration of economic globalisation. Because of the mobility 
of shipping’s core capital assets and labour, shipping companies have managed, within 
the space of three decades, to attain a higher level of footlooseness than those in many
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other sectors. Globalisation has therefore had a particular impact on the shipping 
industry and provoked a particular response from states, especially in Traditional 
Maritime Nations (TMN) like the UK. As a highly globalised industry, shipping is 
therefore an appropriate exemplar of the relationships between states, capital and labour 
in a globalised world.
Shipping is an important industry because of its central role in international trade and its 
value-added services to global production and supply chains. For advanced economies 
like the UK, which are also generally Traditional Maritime Nations, the industry not 
only guarantees greater access to international trade but also generates a lot of 
government revenue. Similarly, smaller developing nations with the capacity to develop 
a shipping industry recognise its commercial value and strive to increase their stake in it. 
However, due to developments in recent years, there have been many changes, in the 
structure and organisation of the industry world-wide leading to the decline of maritime 
clusters in many industrialised countries like the UK, the Netherlands, Denmark, 
Germany and France. The term maritime cluster is used to refer to a collection of core 
maritime related firms including shipping, finance, marine survey, marine insurance, 
dispute resolution, ship-brokers and agents firms and ports and harbours. The decline is 
partly the result of accelerated globalisation and the increased international mobility of 
shipping capital in the past three to four decades leading to changing patterns of 
international ship registration, administration and management.
The global shipping industry is organised into flag-states whereby, in order to engage in 
commercial activities, ships are required by international law to register with a 
recognised flag-state thus acquiring the nationality of the registering state (UNCLOS 
Art. 91; Coles, 2002). Although ships do not have to be registered in the countries of the
th •owners’ nationality, most ship-owners until the beginning of the 20 century registered
ththeir vessels in their home flag-states. However, the early decades of the 20 century 
saw the emergence of new commercial registers offering ship registration and 
administration services to ship-owners from all over the world for a fee. Flag-state 
regimes operating these registers imposed few restrictions on entry and exit and 
exercised little regulation on the corporate activities of the companies operating the 
ships they registered. They were therefore different from traditional registers which 
imposed tighter conditions on admission of ships and regulations on their corporate 
operations. These traditional flags may also be known as ‘closed registers’. The new
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registers, known as Open Registers (OR) are, in some cases, referred to as Flags of 
Convenience (FoC), a term coined by the International Transport Workers Federation 
(ITF) in the 1970s to refer to those Open Registry flags with no link between place of 
registration and place of economic benefit or ownership.
Although the pioneer Open Registers were established between the 1920s and 1960s, it 
was after the mid-1960s that many countries started ‘flooding’ this new, and clearly 
lucrative, ship registration market. Some of the earliest ones include Panama, Liberia, 
Cyprus, Honduras, Bahamas and Malta. It is because of the growing popularity of these 
new flags among many ship-owners that the fleets of TMNs in Europe and elsewhere in 
the OECD block rapidly declined (Metaxas, 1985; Alderton and Winchester, 2002; 
Lillie, 2004; 2006; Sampson and Bloor, 2007). Figure 1 below illustrates the changing 
ship registration patterns between 1960 and 2000. It clearly shows that from the mid- 
1970s the proportion of the world fleet registered with Open Registers surpassed that of 
traditional flags and proceeded to grow steadily and rapidly during the last quarter of the 
20th century.
Figure 1: Ship registration trends; top six OR Nations and TMNs
Ship Registration Trends 1960 - 2000 Top six OR Nations and
TMNs
300
250
200
150
100
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Year
TMNFoC
Note: The six FoCs include Bahamas, Honduras, Cyprus, Liberia, Malta and Panama while the TMNs 
include the top European Maritime nations like UK, France, Germany, Norway, Netherlands and Italy
Source: Lloyd’s Register -  Fairplay: World Fleet Statistics (1960 -  2000)
Because ORs are mostly located in developing countries there has been a big change in 
the distribution of the world fleet in terms of registration with the largest percentage of 
the world fleet being registered in developing economies since the mid-1970s. Figure 2
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below illustrates this changing distribution of tonnage between developed and 
developing economies.
Figure 2: World Fleet Distribution between Developed and Developing Economies 
1980-2005
World Fleet Distribution by registration 
1 9 8 0 -2 0 0 5
o) 800 
n
£ 600 
~  400 
I  200
1 0
■  Dev'd countries ■  Devp'ing Countries
           !---
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
Source: UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics, 2006
Between 1980 and 2005 the tonnage registered in developing countries went from 47% 
to 66% of the total world tonnage while developed country tonnage fell from 53% to 
34%. The importance of this changing distribution of the world fleet by flags and 
economies is that while certain countries have benefited from the globalisation of 
shipping in terms of fleet capacity, by setting up ORs as commercial ventures and 
attracting large fleets, some, particularly high-cost developed countries, have lost out. 
This analysis also helps to set the stage for a more in-depth discussion on how the 
economies of the countries in the latter category have been adversely affected by the 
loss of fleets and the response measures they have introduced in an attempt to mitigate 
this negative impact.
The decline in TMN fleets had an extensive and far reaching impact on the maritime 
clusters o f these states. Being the core industry and central catalyst within the cluster, 
any decline or growth in shipping automatically leads to a ripple effect of growth or 
decline in all the other parts of the maritime cluster. For this reason, in many of these
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countries, including Germany, France and the Netherlands, the shore-side maritime 
cluster of firms experienced decline (Klikauer, 2003). Furthermore, in many of these 
countries the maritime sector is a major revenue generator and an important catalyst in 
national economic growth. In the UK, for example, shipping is ranked as the third 
highest generator of government revenue. The UK maritime cluster contributes around 
£1.3 bn in overseas earnings in addition to inward investment and tax revenue annually 
(Shipping Network, October 2007).
Another way in which the globalisation of shipping negatively impacted on states, 
particularly industrialised ones, and one which is of particular relevance to this thesis, is 
the ‘erosion’ of local seafaring labour. One of the main reasons that ship-owners from 
TMNs sought the convenience o f Open Registers was the freedom to employ low-wage 
foreign seafarers from low-cost developing countries. The decrease in TMN fleets 
therefore also meant loss o f employment for seafarers in these countries and 
diminishing training opportunities for cadets. The combined effect of employment loss 
and decline in training created a situation of incessant deterioration in the number of 
qualified seafarers. The total number of qualified seafarers working on-board British 
vessels, for example, declined from about 99,000 to 27,000 between 1970 and 1993. 
The number of officers reduced from a total of 45,600 to 17,000 between 1970 and the 
late 1990s (McConville, 1997 -  2003; House of Commons, 1993; Obando-Rojas, 1999). 
The decline in the British pool o f seafarers not only affected the supply of qualified sea- 
staff but also diminished the supply of essential technical skills to the shore-side 
maritime cluster. Shore-side maritime operations, like technical ship management, 
marine survey, marine insurance, ports and harbours and ship-building and repairs, 
require people with seafaring skills and experience to work in sensitive technical 
positions. In a 1996 study it was determined that the demand for such skills was rising 
but the supply was diminishing, thus creating a shortage which had the potential to drive 
many of these firms to offshore locations (Gardner and Pettit, 1996). This development 
raised concerns about the future of UK shipping, both at sea and ashore.
It is against this background o f globalisation and decline that the UK government 
initiated a process of response in the mid-1990s. In 1997 the government set in motion 
the process of developing a strategy by which it could stop and reverse the decline in 
the shipping industry, both in terms of the fleet and the skills-base. The process 
culminated in the introduction of the UK tonnage tax in 2000. The tonnage tax was
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designed to meet three main objectives: to rebuild the UK registered fleet by creating a 
more predictable, capital-friendly and virtually tax exempt atmosphere for ship-owners; 
to rebuild the seafaring skills-base by making ship-owners recruit and train more British 
cadets through the Minimum Training Obligation (MTO); and to boost growth in the 
shore-side maritime cluster of firms through a requirement that all participating owners 
strategically and commercially manage their vessels from the UK (see; DETR, 1998; 
Brownrigg et al, 2001; Selkou and Roe, 2004).
The strategy has impacted on the shipping industry in a specific way, which raises 
questions about the adequacy and effectiveness of the state in responding to the negative 
aspects of globalisation. For example, while there has been significant success in 
recovering the British-flagged fleet, the number of qualified British officers has not 
increased leading to important questions about the government’s ability to, and 
commitment towards, recovering the seafaring labour force and maritime skills-base. 
An important point is whether this outcome is due to ineffective implementation or to 
inadequacy in the design of the strategy itself. There is therefore an important question 
about how effectively the state can respond to issues affecting highly globalised 
industries like shipping whose corporate capital wields immense influence.
Through this qualitative study I have tried to understand why the government chose the 
particular response strategy that it did and I have analysed the possible reasons for the 
kind of impact that its strategy had on the British shipping industry. This study therefore 
critically examines the globalising developments highlighted here and analyses the 
design and form of the government’s response strategy in order to develop a thesis 
about the state’s capacity to effectively respond to globalisation and protect domestic 
industries, especially labour, from decline. Using data collected from major 
stakeholders in the shipping industry through qualitative interviews and policy 
document analysis, it critically examines the Tonnage Tax Minimum Training 
Obligation, the main response strategy to increase seafaring labour in the UK, with 
particular attention to its design, implementation and impact.
1.2 Aims and Research Questions
As I have stated earlier, the overall aim of the thesis is to assess the state’s ability to 
protect domestic industries and local labour from decline as a result of economic 
globalisation. In this era of increasing globalisation in which many states have pursued
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economic strategies within a neoliberal paradigm, there are important questions to be 
asked about how effectively individual states can protect local industries, and especially 
labour, from decline. This thesis is concerned with the decline of national seafaring 
labour in Traditional Maritime Nations and the recovery strategies adopted by these 
countries in response. The analysis in the previous section has shown how high-cost 
industrialised states like the UK experienced a reduction in national merchant fleets and 
pools of seafaring labour between 1960 to the late 1990s. Like many of the affected 
countries, the UK within the past decade has introduced policy measures in an attempt 
to protect and rebuild the industry. Using the UK shipping example of globalisation, 
decline and state response, the thesis seeks to achieve the following aims:
i) To understand the ways in which globalisation has impacted on the domestic 
shipping industries of Traditional Maritime Nations like the UK, especially in 
relation to labour.
ii) To examine the form, adequacy and effectiveness of state response to the 
negative impact o f globalisation on domestic shipping industries, especially in 
relation to seafaring labour.
iii) To examine and assess the general capacity of the state to effectively respond 
to globalisation and protect domestic industries, especially in relation to labour, 
from decline, within a neoliberal paradigm.
In order to achieve these aims the study addresses a number of key research questions. 
Arising from the analysis and discussion in chapters two and three are a number of 
questions concerning the ability of the state and its effectiveness in responding to 
globalisation and implementing policies which effectively protect domestic industries 
and local labour from decline. Chapter two specifically examines the changing 
relationship between states and markets and concludes that there is a continuous process 
of reconfiguration between these two, in which the position of individual states and 
their ability to protect local industries depends on the choices that they make vis-a-vis 
capital markets (Wolf, 2005). The discussion also suggests that, far from the widely 
held view that states, in the neoliberal era, act the way they do because of corporate 
pressure, many governments have specifically promoted the free capital market project 
through supply-side economic policies in an attempt to maximise the benefits of
- 9 -
globalisation (Jessop, 2002; Beck, 2005). At the same time however, the ambiguity of 
the neoliberal state’s position vis-a-vis capital and labour is highlighted, leading to the 
suggestion that in the attempt to promote free capital markets the state’s ability to 
protect local labour has been greatly compromised, with the consequence that many 
domestic labour markets have become vulnerable and declined due to corporate 
exploitation.
In light of this ambiguity this thesis, using shipping and seafarer labour as an example, 
examines the extent to which the state, operating within a neo-liberal paradigm, retains 
the capacity to effectively manage the domestic economy and intervene on behalf of 
labour. Because of the globalised nature of shipping and the highly mobile character of 
shipping capital, many Traditional Maritime Nations adopted policies which led to a 
situation of extensive deregulation in order to prevent loss of fleets. The deregulation of 
the shipping labour market led to a particularly acute decline in the number of qualified 
merchant navy officers in countries such as Britain, Germany and The Netherlands.
The reason for choosing shipping to illustrate state response to globalisation is because 
it is one of the most globalised industries and one which aptly illustrates the impacts of 
globalisation on domestic industries. As pointed out in chapter two, it is described as the 
exemplar of a globalised industry (Klikauer, 2003; Sampson, 2003; Alderton et al, 2004; 
Sampson and Bloor, 2007). As one of the major maritime nations that have experienced 
drastic decline in fleet and seafarer labour, the recent history of UK shipping provides a 
clear example of the way TMNs may address the implications of key aspects of 
globalisation, as well as the outcomes. The main objective of the thesis is to examine 
the strategies adopted by the UK as a response to the erosive impact of globalisation in 
the UK shipping industry, namely, the decline in the UK registered fleet and the UK 
pool o f qualified officers.
From the discussion presented in the earlier sections of this chapter it seems that, in 
spite o f the government’s efforts through the tonnage tax strategy, there has been little 
improvement in the output of qualified British junior officers. The UK fleet has grown 
however and, by extension, the shore-side maritime cluster is expanding and cadet 
intake levels have improved significantly. Using this study of decline in UK shipping 
and the nature and effectiveness of state response, this thesis will examine the extent to 
which nation states retain the capacity to respond to globalisation and mitigate some of
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its negative impacts like loss of employment and depletion of skills. The specific 
questions to address in the build-up to the main thesis include:
(i) How has government responded to the globalisation of shipping?
Through this question I specifically examine the form of the government’s response and 
the process leading to its design and adoption. In order to determine the effectiveness or 
adequacy of the response the thesis needs to explore its design, adoption and 
implementation. I will therefore use a detailed content analysis of the policy documents 
detailing the process of designing the state response in order to understand the nature of 
the response.
(ii) What shaped the government response?
Through this question I explore the factors and forces which shaped the government’s 
strategy. In other words I seek an explanation on why the state responded as it did. I 
therefore expand the analysis by critically examining the factors that influenced the 
design of the strategy and how the government worked with the various, and often 
conflicting, interests of the maritime stakeholders in order to arrive at a consensus with 
regard to the strategy. Thus the focus is on the interests of labour on one hand, and 
capital on the other. The discussion of neoliberalism in chapter two and the analysis of 
the changing relationship between states and capital raise questions about how national 
governments design policies for economic intervention. Through this question the study 
will examine the process of designing and adopting the tonnage tax and how the context 
of conflicting interests may have shaped it and influenced its adequacy and/or 
effectiveness.
(iii) How effective has the government response been?
The study, through this question, critically examines the performance of the tonnage tax 
strategy in order to determine how effective or adequate the government’s response has 
been in its attempt to protect the shipping industry, and especially seafaring labour, 
from decline. The analysis particularly considers the paradox in the outcome of the 
response. That is, success in fleet recovery on the one hand but failure to increase the 
number of seafarer officers on the other.
(iv) How could the response have been more effective?
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After determining the impact of the tonnage tax the study further examines the likely 
reasons for its impact (or lack thereof) and explores some o f the possible alternatives 
that the government might have considered. This question therefore has two parts to be 
addressed: why the strategy failed and what might have been done to ensure success. At 
the same time this question focuses attention on some of the possible constraints on 
effective and adequate state response in light of the discussion in chapter two about 
globalisation and the influence of capital markets.
To answer these questions the study follows an elaborately designed research plan 
which involves the collection and analysis of data through interviews, documentary 
content analysis and secondary data analysis as described in chapter four on methods 
and methodology.
1.3 Thesis Structure
The thesis is organised into nine broad chapters. Chapter two is the first of two literature 
review chapters. This chapter considers the relevant literature on globalisation, states 
and markets and it sets the background and platform for the discussions in subsequent 
chapters about globalisation and the role of states in the management of domestic 
economies in the emerging global economic order. The chapter also reviews literature 
on changes and developments in the shipping industry over the past four decades 
against the background of economic globalisation and examines the impact of 
globalisation on nation states, using the shipping industry as an illustration.
Chapter three, the second literature review chapter, specifically discusses the decline of 
British shipping and the design of the tonnage tax as the main government response 
strategy. It traces out and maps the history of modern-day globalisation in the shipping 
industry and assesses the role of Open Registers in this process. It also reviews a 
number of relevant government policy documents which trace the history of the 
government response to the decline. Finally it reviews analyses of the performance of 
the UK tonnage tax.
Chapter four provides an outline of the methods and a discussion of the methodology 
employed in the research. It outlines the methodological paradigm within which the 
research is located and presents the research design including a discussion of the various
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data sources, the methods of collecting and analysing data and the limitations and 
challenges of the research design and fieldwork, including ethical considerations.
Chapters five, six and seven present an analysis of the empirical data collected in the 
course of the study; through an analysis and discussion of the research data these 
chapters critically consider the design and implementation of the tonnage tax strategy. 
They trace the development and adoption of the strategy, examining in chapter five how 
the government worked with key stakeholders in the maritime sector to design a 
comprehensive policy and recovery strategy for UK shipping. This chapter also 
examines and discusses the government’s diagnosis of the decline in seafaring skills and 
the main motivation behind its response. The difficult position of the government in 
responding to the skills decline is highlighted in a brief discussion of the tripartite 
consultative approach adopted in which the other two main parties, that is, the corporate 
industry and the unions, presented different and conflicting interests.
Using (mainly) interview data from corporate shipping industry managers, chapter six 
examines and discusses company recruitment and employment policies and the main 
factors which influence companies’ policies on sourcing and developing seafaring 
labour. The chapter also examines the impact of company strategies on cadet 
recruitment and training in the UK. Chapter seven explores the cadet training process in 
the UK. It examines the training programme and the structure of the cadet courses but 
also analyses the wider organisation of the training establishment and the role that 
shipping companies, training agencies and training colleges play in the process. It 
mainly relies on interview data from people directly involved in the cadet training 
process, that is, cadet college training administrators and staff. More importantly it 
presents the ‘first-person’ accounts of individual cadets on the training programmes and 
the general training atmosphere in the UK. The main concern of the chapter is to 
determine the reasons for the failure of the government strategy to increase the number 
of British junior officers. In order to do this the chapter examines three different views: 
the shipping corporate industry view, the training establishment view and the ex-cadet 
view, in an attempt to establish what the main obstacle to increasing the number of 
junior officers might be.
Chapter eight presents the main assessment and discussion of the research findings 
bringing together the main themes in the empirical chapters in order to address the
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research questions. The chapter examines how the government has responded to 
globalisation in the shipping industry and the shape that this response has taken. In 
assessing the effectiveness of the strategy the chapter examines the main factors which 
influenced its nature and form. The final section of the chapter looks at how the 
response might have been more effective and examines some of the main obstacles to 
effective state intervention in the management of globalised industries like shipping.
The final concluding chapter applies the analysis of UK shipping as an example of 
globalisation, decline, and attempted recovery, to the main questions of the thesis. In 
particular, it addresses the extent to which national states retain the capacity to 
effectively mitigate some of the negative impacts of globalisation. This chapter 
considers the wider issues of globalisation and its impact on states, capital and labour. 
In other words, having examined the empirical evidence in chapters five, six and seven, 
the thesis concludes by explaining what the data may tell us with regard to the capacity 
of states and their potential to protect domestic economies in a globalised context.
- 1 4 -
CHAPTER TWO
Globalisation and Shipping 
Introduction
The shipping industry is, undoubtedly, one of, if not, the most internationalised 
industries today. Its international nature and structure has been discussed and analysed 
by many authors including Goss (1989), Alderton and Winchester (2002), Roe, (2002), 
Klikauer (2003), Alderton et al (2004), Selkou and Roe (2004), and Sampson and Bloor 
(2007) who all agree that the shipping industry is uniquely globalised. Some of the 
features which give it its international shape and structure include the international 
mobility of its primary assets and its labour force, the international nature of its 
operations, its role as the main vehicle for international trade and the fact that it has 
developed a specialised satellite management component which has greatly enhanced its 
globalised profile and cross-border economic activity. Furthermore, shipping capital 
enjoys a higher level of global ‘buoyancy’ than in any other industry. This is largely as 
a result of the Open Register system whereby ship-owners can register their ships in any 
flag-state in the world depending upon their preference.
This chapter is an exploration of globalisation in the context of shipping. The aim is to 
use shipping to illustrate the way economic globalisation, in the past three to four 
decades, has affected the capacity of nation states to effectively manage and protect 
domestic economies. Shipping may, indeed, be described as the globalised industry par 
excellence (Sampson and Bloor, 2007) but also, as the main vehicle for international 
trade and the essential link in global production and supply chains, it is a vehicle and 
facilitating factor in the process of economic globalisation. The chapter will trace key 
developments in the industry in recent years and analyse the dynamic relationship 
between shipping and nation states.
As suggested in chapter one, shipping is considered an important industry by many 
nations. For countries with an embedded maritime history, shipping has, over the years, 
attained social, historical and economic significance because of its role in supporting the 
growth and prosperity of a large cluster of shore-side maritime firms and as a major 
employer. Shipping, in these countries is also closely linked with long histories of
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economic prosperity. For the emerging New Maritime Nations (NMN) the industry is 
important in as much as it presents commercial opportunities which generate revenue 
through ship registration and administration and via employment. As Alderton and 
Winchester (2002) observe, the revenue that some of these countries earn from ship 
registration makes a big difference to their small economies. It is for this reason that the 
New Maritime Nations (NMNs) have engaged TMNs in fierce competition for the ship 
registration market in the second half of the 20th century. This competition is largely 
responsible for the restructuring of the global shipping ‘landscape’ and the decline of 
fleets and seafaring labour in many formerly strong maritime nations.
What is remarkable about the shipping industry is that although its history of 
globalisation, as defined in this thesis and supported by Scholte (2000), Giddens (2000, 
2002), and Stiglitz (2002), started in the early decades of the 20th century, it has a long 
history of internationalisation whereby shipping companies, though locally based have 
always operated internationally and occasionally used foreign flags and employed 
foreign seafarers (Metaxas, 1985; Alderton and Winchester, 2002). As early as the 18th 
century, ship-owners were able to register their ships in, and operate them from, 
countries other than their own for both economic and political reasons. At the same time, 
ship-owners have been able to employ foreign labour in order to reduce operations costs 
in an attempt to maximise profits. British ship-owners started using foreign seafarers as
i L  i L
early as the mid 19 century (Coles, 2002). It is in the 20 century, however, with the 
advent of Open Registers that shipping transformed into a fully globalised industry in 
the sense that companies were able to operate freely across national borders.
Due to the momentum of the pre-twentieth century internationalisation, globalisation in 
the shipping industry, in the twentieth century, has been both distinct and quick. As the 
main vehicle for international trade, from the 1940s to the 1970s, the industry grew as 
part of the rapid and steady growth in world trade in the post World-War-Two era 
(Stopford, 1997; Hirst and Thompson, 1999). Most significantly, shipping capital has 
been able to break down national barriers and obstacles to cross-border mobility and 
operations in a way unequalled by many other industries (Sampson and Bloor, 2007; 
Sampson and Kahveci, forthcoming).
The chapter examines the globalisation of shipping in light of the key definitions and 
descriptions of globalisation and argues that it is primarily a process of economic
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liberalisation. A process by which national economic barriers are gradually eliminated 
to create an economic environment that frees capital, finance and labour from the 
confines of national economic and geo-political territories (Scholte, 2000; Stiglitz, 
2002). It is a process in which shipping is not only an excellent example but also the 
main driver, being the central vehicle for cross-border production and supply chains. As 
Alderton and Winchester (2002:36) observe, it is not only pivotal to world trade, but 
also the only example of a fully globalised industry”. One of the key points in this 
definition of globalisation which influences the tone of the thesis is that it is a dynamic, 
current and continuous process rather than an outcome (see Sampson and Kahveci, 
forthcoming).
In order to meet the objectives set out, the chapter examines developments in the 
shipping industry over the past three to four decades in the context of socio-economic 
relationships which constitute the impetus for globalisation. It lays particular emphasis 
on Giddens’ (2000, 2002) argument that globalisation is a phenomenon of the last forty 
years, mainly influenced by advanced revolutions in communication technologies. At 
the same time, it examines the complex relationship between states and markets, and the 
transformation of the state and its role in the emerging global economic scene.
The chapter is organised into five sections. Section one explores the nature and 
character of shipping and highlights some of its unique features as an international 
industry. Section two introduces a definition of globalisation through a critical 
consideration of the main debates about economic globalisation, examines and discusses 
its growth in modem times and assesses its impact on the capacity of nation states in 
relation to economic management. Section three extends the discussion on economic 
globalisation by exploring the evolving relationship between states and markets over the 
past four decades and critically examines the rise of the neoliberal state and its impact 
on this relationship. Finally, section four examines how shipping labour markets have 
changed as a result of globalisation and the emergence of global satellite ship 
management companies.
2.1 The Nature of Shipping
The shipping industry possesses a set of features which make it an appropriate focus for 
globalisation debates. It is because of these features that it stands out and has been 
described by many analysts as one of the most globalised industries (Sampson, 2003;
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Selkou and Roe, 2004; Sampson and Bloor. 2007; Sampson and Kahveci, forthcoming). 
Some of these features include the mobility of its primary assets, an internationally 
mobile labour force and a unique system by which ship-owners may freely choose and 
change the nationality o f their ships without restriction from the home country (Paixao 
and Marlow, 2001; Alderton and Winchester, 2002; Coles, 2002). Furthermore, 
shipping stands in a privileged position as the main vehicle for international trade which 
also means that the nature and scope of its commercial operations is international.
Goss has described shipping as:
An industry which, of necessity, operates internationally, selling its services 
in many countries and, correspondingly, buying such factors of production 
as insurance, fuel and the ships themselves on a world market (1989:75).
This industry is characterised by an internationalised pattern of organisation, reflected in 
its national composition. Helen Sampson’s (2003) example of ‘The Santos Sunset’ 
below diagrammatically represents the core of this intricate arrangement:
Figure 3: The Santos Sunset
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Belgium, UK
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Brazilian
Manning 
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Source: Sampson, 2003:260 (see also DeSombre, 2006 for a discussion of this 
international organisation of the industry)
What this diagram illustrates is a complex international structure in which ships are 
often owned in one country, registered in another, managed from yet a different country,
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staffed by crews from different parts of the world and operate all over the world 
carrying cargo belonging to different merchants, of different nationalities. Three aspects 
of this arrangement require further attention because of their significance in the overall 
analysis of international shipping: ownership, registration and crewing.
The largest percentage of the total world fleet, in terms of ownership is attributable to 
only thirty countries which largely comprise OECD countries and the newly emerging 
maritime nations of Asia. In terms of dead weight tonnage (DWT), as of 1st of January 
2005, the distribution of world tonnage in percentages is as shown in the chart bellow:
Figure 4: World Fleet by Ownership
W o r ld  F l e e t  b y  O w n e r s h i p  D W T %
□  OECD
■  New Asian 
Maritime 
Nations
□  Others
Note: The Institute o f Shipping Economics and Logistics (ISL) analyses the ownership patterns o f the 
world merchant fleet yearly, namely the national and foreign flag fleets of leading shipping nations.
Source: ISL Market Analysis 2005.
In comparison, as of 1st January 2005, 65.1% of the total world fleet was registered with 
foreign flags while only 44.9% of the tonnage was registered in the country of 
ownership. OECD countries had the largest percentage share in ownership but 73% of 
this tonnage was registered in foreign countries. 67.4 % of the total EU owned fleet was 
foreign registered. This has created a situation whereby both the TMNs and the new 
flag-states are unable and/or unwilling to exercise effective regulation over the 
economic activities of shipping companies. In such a situation many companies operate 
with little interference from states.
The issue of staffing the global fleet, for example, has been a contentious one since the 
middle of the 20th century and has played a significant role in shaping the current
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intemational ‘terrain’ of the industry. The main reason why many ship-owners in the 
1970s and 1980s opted to register their ships in Open Registers was to escape the 
stringent crew nationality regulations of their home countries, that is, the traditional 
maritime countries of the OECD. However, over the years most of these countries have 
responded by ending these requirements and allowing ship-owners to employ crews 
from any part of the world. The following figure shows where the crews for the world 
fleet come from:
Figure 5: World-Wide Supply of Seafarers by Region
BOECD
■  E. Europe
□  Africa/L.
America
□  Far East
■  Indian 
Subcontinent
Note: BIMCO and ISF run a joint annual survey o f the demand and supply o f seafarers and analyse the 
structure o f the global seafaring labour force.
Source: BIMCO/ISF Manpower Survey 2005
The chart shows that although the OECD countries continue to contribute significantly 
to the total worldwide supply of seafarers, the contribution of the new labour supply 
countries is much bigger. Currently the international structure of the industry is such 
that the largest percentage of the world fleet is owned in the OECD states; the highest 
percentage of this is registered in Open Registers. The largest number of seafarers 
comes from low-wage labour supply countries of Asia and Easter Europe who, in many 
cases, neither own nor register a significant percentage of the global fleet.
The features of the industry, described above, have evolved over a long period of time. 
The industry, although always international in nature, was not always as globalised as it 
is now. But before I move to an in-depth analysis of globalisation, states and the 
shipping industry, I will first examine the concept of globalisation and analyse the
Worlwide Supply of Seafarers
25%
30% 18%
13%
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major theoretical debates surrounding this highly contested subject. The questions to 
ask here include: what essentially is globalisation? How does the shipping industry fit 
into the wider cauldron of global economic processes? What is it, which makes the 
shipping industry an exemplar of globalisation amongst all the others?
2.2 What is Globalisation?
Globalisation is certainly one of the most discussed topics in modem times (Scholte, 
2000; Giddens, 2002; Stiglitz, 2002). It is a highly contentious subject that has 
generated much debate, many theories and definitions. The term is used, if not misused, 
by many. As Scholte (2000) observes it is a concept which applies to, and caters for, a 
diverse variety of perspectives: cultural, political, social and economic. Therein lies the 
complexity of its definition. Wolf (2005:14) notes that the term is ‘unimaginably broad’ 
while Hirst and Thompson (1999:xiii) describe it as the ‘grand narrative of social 
sciences’ which deals with ‘often very different cultural, economic and social processes’. 
The main focus of this thesis, however, is economic globalisation.
Even from a purely economic perspective different people or schools define 
globalisation in distinct ways (Held and McGrew, 2002 and see Scholte, 2000 for a 
detailed discussion). Simply put however, and to borrow from Wolf, economic 
globalisation is ‘the integration of economic activities across borders, through markets’ 
(Wolf, 2005:14) and it involves a process of eliminating obstacles to such cross-border 
economic integration. There are many variations in the views, opinions and theories on 
the nature and extent of these processes which are shaping the contemporary global 
economic world.
The two main positions on what comprises globalisation are held by globalists, on one 
side, and anti-globalists, on the other (see Held and McGrew, 2002). These may be 
further divided into ‘extremes’ and ‘moderates’ whereby extreme globalists are those 
who argue that not only is globalisation inevitable but it is desirable with beneficial 
effects around the world (Wolf, 2004; Ohmae, 1990, 1994, 1996; Giddens, 1998, 2002). 
Giddens (2002), for example, argues that the extent of globalisation in the modem era is 
demonstrated in the unequalled levels of international trade, involving a much wider 
range of goods and services and a much higher level of finance and capital flows. This, 
he argues, is enhanced by advanced telecommunications technology which enables easy 
and unrestricted transfer of large sums of money around the world. The extreme anti-
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globalists equally acknowledge the irresistibility and influence of globalisation but find 
it undesirable and malevolent, indeed, some anti-globalists have equated economic 
globalisation to colonisation (Khor, 2001; Ling, 2000), and Westernisation or 
Americanisation (Taylor, 2000; see Scholte, 2000 and Held and McGrew, 2002 for 
amore detailed analysis).
There is, however, much more convergence of the basic views among the ‘moderates’ 
of both sides as opposed to the extremes. Moderates acknowledge the irresistibility and 
influence of globalisation but are more inclined to critically analyse its benefits. The 
general view is that globalisation has brought both good and bad but the extent of each 
depends on the theoretical stance taken. Moderate globalists like Scholte (2000), Short 
(2001), Stiglitz (2002), Sorensen (2004) and Beck (2005) argue that, whereas 
globalisation has a measure of negative impacts and outcomes in many parts of the 
world, its benefits to many economies and societies have been immense. They believe 
that the economic face of the world could be and, in some cases, has been positively 
transformed through economic globalisation. Stiglitz for example observes that:
.... globalisation -  the removal of barriers to free trade and the closer 
integration of national economies -  can be a force for good and that it has 
the potential to enrich everyone in the world.... (2002:ix)
He however continues to stress that for this potential for good to be harnessed it needs 
proper management, thus indicating that globalisation can be for good or for worse 
depending on how it is managed by both states and global businesses.
Moderate anti-globalists, on the other hand, while acknowledging some positive 
economic outcomes, insist that globalisation only benefits a small fraction of the world 
population while impoverishing the rest. They highlight the inequitable distribution of 
the benefits of globalisation between developed and less developed countries -  the north 
and the south (Holton, 1998; Hurrell and Woods, 1999; Held and McGrew, 2002).
One important, albeit contested, aspect of this analysis is the historical context within 
which globalisation may be considered (see Giddens, 2002). This comes out of the 
argument about the cyclical nature of economic processes over centuries (see Scholte, 
2000) and a suggestion that the current phase of globalisation is not necessarily novel 
but follows from earlier and equally influential phases (Hirst and Thompson, 1999). 
Although contested this theory seems to apply to the case of shipping because the
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current state of globalisation in shipping is preceded by a long history of 
internationalisation (Metaxas, 1985). In the context of shipping, therefore, one might 
say that ‘modem’ glob alisation, which dates back to the early decades of the 20th 
century, and marked by the emergency of Open Registers, is an advanced phase of an 
earlier, milder, phase of globalisation. The current phase, however, has developed 
within a cauldron of wider globalising economic processes which, according to some 
authors (e.g. Giddens, 2002), increased in momentum in the mid-20th century. Although 
the pre-20th century phase of internationalisation forms an important element for the 
analysis of the industry in the present phase, the focus here is on the process of 
deterritorialisation in the second half of the 20th century during which businesses like 
shipping companies have been able to break through national economic barriers and 
engage in unrestricted transborder commercial operation. Consequently there has been a 
greater integration in the world economy and enhanced interaction at a global level 
facilitated mainly by advanced transport and communication technology (Scholte, 2000; 
Giddens, 2002; Stiglitz, 2002).
For the purpose of this thesis, therefore, globalisation is defined as a process of 
deterritorialisation which facilitates free and unrestricted movement of capital thus 
allowing easy cross-border economic activity and greater international economic 
integration. It is this definition which forms the basis for discussions and analyses of 
impacts and state response throughout the thesis.
2.2.1 Globalisation in Historical Context
As explained in the previous section, globalisation stimulates much debate and has been 
the subject of many theories regarding its form, nature and impact. One theory is that 
globalisation is a process which has been going on and growing steadily over the past 
several centuries (Hirst and Thompson 1999; Scholte, 2000). The purpose of this brief 
discussion of the historical context of globalisation is to try and put into perspective the 
developments in shipping in the centuries before the 20th century which, as explained 
earlier, are important in understanding the rapid globalisation of the industry in the past 
four decades. The current phase, which has seen a relatively faster and greater growth,
thin the scale of its socio-economic impact, however, only dates back to the mid-20 
century (Short, 2001; Scholte, 2000; Wolf, 2005). Indeed the verb “globalize” was 
coined in 1940s by Oliver Raiser and B. Davies (1944:39) to refer to the concept of
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universalisation. The point is that globalisation has both a recent aspect to it and an 
older provenance.
Scholte (2000:62-63) has identified three periods in the chronological development of 
globalisation, namely, the global conscious period which started 1000 years ago, the 
supraterritoriality period which started in the mid-19th century and gradually grew 
through the space of a century, and finally the global relations period, which started in 
the 1960s and has, within the space of three and a half decades, propelled global 
economic relations to a totally new level (see also Beck, 2005; Wolf 2005). It is this 
latest period that most analysts refer to while they largely ignore previous and equally 
significant periods in the chronological development, as noted by Hirst and Thompson 
(1999).
It is important to add that although the process of supraterritoriality, as described by 
Scholte (2000), runs through the three periods; it is only from the mid-20th century that 
extensive transborder economic activity and international economic integration occurred. 
The fast growth in telecommunications and transport technologies and the resulting 
increased trans-border communication and interaction has led to an unprecedented level 
of international interaction and transborder economic activity (Hirst and Thompson, 
1999; Giddens, 2002; Stiglitz, 2002). Scholte’s outline of the three phases of 
globalisation is particularly important for the analysis of the globalising processes in the 
shipping industry since, as we shall see in later sections, these processes have their roots 
in developments during the 18th and 19th centuries, developments such as the use of 
foreign seafarers and foreign flags (Metaxas, 1985).
Hirst and Thompson’s (1999) analysis of globalisation is also relevant in this respect. 
According to these authors the history of international economic activities dates back 
many centuries: They cite developments in the 14th century, that is, the emergence of 
organised German iron and agricultural merchants, British cotton and wool merchants 
and Italian international banking companies. In the 17th and 18th centuries colonial 
expansion opened many countries worldwide to a lot of economic activities and many 
international trading companies may be identified such as the Dutch and British Indian 
Companies; the Muscovy Company; the royal Africa company and the Hudsons Bay 
company. These companies expanded trade and investment activities during the colonial 
period and are possibly the origin of the now widely applied concept of Foreign Direct
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Investment (FDI) (Dunning, 1993). FDI is defined, by the United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) as investment made to acquire lasting interest 
in enterprises operating outside of the economy of the investor (see also Dunning, 1993).
The industrial revolution between the late 18th and early 19th century introduced the 
concept of international manufacturing and, according to Hirst and Thompson (1999:20), 
‘presents the earliest precursor to the modern-day MNC\ During this time international 
companies sought favourable investment opportunities abroad, especially in North and 
South America and later Africa and Australia and carried out overseas explorations for 
minerals and raw materials. In this way the concept of FDI was expanded as 
manufacturing companies sought to supply their products abroad through domestic 
manufacturing (Dunning, 1993).
Hirst and Thompson therefore argue that there was growing economic activity in the 
form of trade and foreign investment between the 17th century and early 20th century 
such that by 1920s manufacturing multinationals appeared and were well established. 
The rapid growth in international trade was only broken by the depression of 1930s and 
1940s but picked up after the Second World War leading to the fastest and greatest 
growth in international trade ever experienced (Stopford, 1997).
With regard to migration and international labour markets, these authors identify three 
phases. First, there was the involuntary slave labour migration in the pre-1850 phase 
(see also Castels and Miller, 1993). This was followed by the voluntary post-1850 mass 
migration from Europe to ‘new lands’ like America, Africa, and from Russia to central 
Asia and Siberia, the Far East to South Asia and from India to Africa (see Segal, 1993). 
This phase ended during the mid-war years due to the economic slump and the 
introduction of anti-immigration policies by recipient countries like America. The third 
phase started in the post-war era and initially involved Europe and America but soon 
included large numbers of migrant workers from developing countries. In the 1970s and 
1980s, it took the form of controlled migration of workers to developed countries. This 
is the latest and, by far, the largest migration phase.
This adumbration of the history of globalisation is important in the discussion of 
processes and developments in the shipping industry. We shall see in later sections how 
the OR concept was developed as early as the 18th century and how the use of foreign
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seafarers started evolving from around the same time. These changes took place 
alongside the general processes of economic globalisation as identified above.
The current phase of globalisation represents a complex, dynamic and often antagonistic, 
set of relations revolving around states and markets which has produced three 
significant outcomes in the past three and a half decades: increased interaction and 
interdependency among states, reduced national barriers to cross-border trade and 
investment and the emergence of a three-level international regulatory system, namely, 
national, supranational and international levels (Selkou and Roe, 2004). This structure 
has evolved as a result of state responses to the growing influence of mobile global 
capital (Beck, 2005).
Globalisation, as defined earlier, is basically a socio-economic process and, in the tone 
of Marxist political economy, it is primarily a process through which ‘capital by its 
nature drives beyond every spatial barrier [and] conquer[s] the earth for its market’ 
(Marx, 1857-8: 524, 539, cited in Scholte, 2000). The central features of this process are 
trade, finance and capital operating internationally and mainly driven by multinational 
enterprises under the enabling conditions created by the ‘competition state’ (Dunning, 
1993; Cemy, 1990, 1997) in the effort to attract and retain global capital (Beck, 2005; 
Scholte, 2000). Perhaps the greatest distinguishing feature of modem globalisation is 
the nature and role of the state. Whereas the various international economic activities 
were state-controlled in the earlier phases of globalisation, increasingly the state has 
retreated to a more administrative role while markets have become dominant (Strange,
1996). This feature calls for a consideration of the role of the nation-state in modern-day 
globalisation. It is necessary to assess, in the remaining sections o f the chapter, the 
extent of its retreat in the evolving global economic setting.
2.2.2 Nation States in Modern-day Globalisation
In considering the impact of globalisation on the nation state I consider a number of 
definitions of economic globalisation which portray the changing relationship between 
states and markets. Wolf (2005:14) describes globalisation as ‘the integration of 
economic activities across borders, through markets’. Scholte describes it as:
...a  reconfiguration of [socio-economic] geography, so that social space is 
no longer wholly mapped in terms of territorial places, territorial distances 
and territorial borders (Scholte, 2000:16).
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Held et al (1999:16) also describe it as ‘a process (or set of processes) which embodies 
a transformation in the spatial organisation of social relations and transactions’ while 
Beck (2005:127) sees it as a process of power struggle between states and capital 
markets.
These definitions highlight certain key elements in the process of globalisation and the 
position of the state: economic interaction, power struggle, international space, 
territoriality and transformation. There is also the important element of international 
spatial transcendence and economic integration. All these elements indicate a specific 
impact on the nation state. There is a strong suggestion of deterritorialisation and 
economic integration through which the position and role of the state is undergoing 
extensive transformation. The question to address here is how this process affects the 
capacity of the individual nation state with regard to national and international 
economic planning and development.
Just as in all matters relating to globalisation, the ‘floor’ here is sharply divided into 
those who predict the decline and ultimate extinction of the state (Ohmae, 1995; 
Bhagwati, 2004; Wolf, 2005), those who think that the state grows stronger and even 
more significant in relation to international economic governance (Hirst and Thompson, 
1999; Saul, 2004) and those, in the middle, who acknowledge the growing influence of 
capital markets and the consequent transformation of the state but also see a sustainable 
metamorphosis of states into entities with new but equally important roles in global 
economic regulation (Beck, 2005; Sorensen, 2004). These three positions are 
represented by the weak-state; the strong-state and the adaptive-state arguments 
(Hobson and Ramesh, 2002; Held et al, 1999, 2005).
The weak-state argument suggests that nation-states and their borders are not relevant in 
the emerging global economic order. They celebrate the growing influence of markets 
and proclaim the ultimate demise of the nation-state (Holstein, 1990; Ohmae, 1990; 
Naisbitt, 1994; Wolf, 2005). The strong-state argument, on the other hand, posits that 
the state still remains strong and may even become stronger as the primary and most 
essential player in the regulation of international economic activities. The proponents 
argue that global markets, which are purported to undermine the capacity of the state are, 
in fact, highly dependent on state machinery and infrastructure to guarantee the success 
of their commercial operations (Zysman, 1996; Doremus et al, 1998; Hirst and
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Thompson, 1999). Hirst and Thompson argue that, contrary to the weak-state argument, 
the role of states is becoming even more significant with the growth of this process 
which, for this reason, they choose to describe as internationalisation of national 
economies rather than globalisation.
The adaptive state or the transformationist state is a more cautious and analytical 
approach which opts for a more critical assessment of the processes and events shaping 
current global economic trends. It suggests that while significant socio-economic 
changes are taking place which are altering the nature and role of the state, it is 
premature to proclaim the demise of the state as a regulatory actor (Sorensen, 2004). 
They instead see globalisation as a process of realignment and active renegotiation of 
power relations between states and markets (Beck, 2005). The main issue, according to 
the adaptive state theory, is not how the state has strengthened or weakened but, instead, 
how it has changed and to what effect, both locally and internationally (Cox, 1997; 
Scholte, 2000; Short, 2001; Sorensen, 2004).
The argument in this thesis pre-supposes that the deterritorialisation (Scholte, 2000) 
theory of globalisation and the moderate, adaptive state view of the modem state offer 
the most helpful understanding of the situation. Whilst national economies have opened 
up leading to increased international integration, this does not necessarily render the 
nation state irrelevant or powerless as a player in the global economy. In the process of 
responding to new economic realities the state is inevitably transformed, but as Wolf 
observes:
... the economic processes will not compel the death of state... The policies 
and capacities of states remain central to how economic globalisation works 
(2005:16).
According to Beck (2005) globalisation is a process of power struggle in which the state 
is being challenged to respond to the growing influence of capital mobility in order to 
retain its capacity for economic management. He argues that:
...the coercive character [of capital] might be capable of awakening the 
mercantile spirit even in belligerent states, and tempting them onto the 
rugged path of political self transformation (2005:127).
He continues to argue that states have the potential capacity to effectively respond to the 
‘coercive character of capital’ but whether or not this happens depends on the choices
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that each state makes vis-a-vis economic globalisation. This argument will be re­
examined in the analysis, in subsequent chapters, of the UK’s response to the impact of 
globalisation on domestic shipping.
The next section continues this examination of globalisation and its impact on national 
economies by looking at the globalising developments in the shipping industry over the 
past four decades. It discusses the changes that have taken place in the organisation of 
shipping labour and capital and analyses the ways in which these changes illustrate a 
particular form of globalisation. Most importantly it presents the industry as a good 
example of economic globalisation. The mobility of seafarer labour and the general 
‘buoyancy’ of capital are core features of the industry and indicative of the form and 
extent of its globalisation. These aspects have been largely omitted from the main 
literature on economic globalisation.
2.3 Globalisation in the Context of Shipping
From the perspective of the shipping industry globalisation takes on a particular and 
unique form. There is a set of features, as discussed in earlier sections of this chapter, 
which give globalisation in the context of shipping a distinct and unique ‘flavour’. 
Some of the features which influence this difference include the mobility of its capital 
assets and the highly deregulated international business atmosphere which has evolved 
because of the establishment and rapid growth of the Open Register system. Another 
important aspect of the globalisation of shipping is the emergence of a unique global 
labour market for seafarers (Wu, 2003, 2004, 2005; Winchester et al, 2006; Wu and 
Morris, 2006) as a result of shipping companies going overseas in search of cheap 
labour and setting up global satellite recruitment and crewing agencies (Klikauer, 2003).
In most of the globalisation literature the shipping industry is presented and discussed 
simply as a ‘node’ in the complex chain of global production and supply of goods. 
Rarely is it discussed as an industry in its own right. Its complex international 
organisation and the mobility of its capital is largely lost in the literature and 
overshadowed by the manufacturing, finance and service industries. It is often discussed 
and presented as part of the globalising processes rather than a globalised industry in its 
own right (see Stiglitz, 2002; Dunning, 1993). This is perhaps because the definition of 
a ‘globalised industry’ has so far concentrated on, and given prominence to, the size, 
global spread and extent and impact of the international activities of its companies
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rather than the ‘mechanics’ of it. The point is that even the smallest shipping company, 
which might appear localised, is often highly globalised by virtue of the mobility of its 
capital and extensive business operations across national borders.
Interestingly, even in texts like Castree et al (2004) where cross-border capital 
movement and labour mobility are extensively discussed, the shipping industry and 
seafaring labour are not mentioned, even though these two lend themselves as examples 
of how capital and labour can move freely, between states, in a world without barriers 
as postulated by extreme globalist analysts (e.g. Ohmae, 1990, 1995). It is, instead, 
mostly studied as an integral auxiliary service to the manufacturing industry. Shipping 
is a critical example of globalisation (Sampson and Bloor, 2007), not necessarily 
because it is by definition global, though it is, but because shipping capital possesses a 
high capacity for global mobility and companies operate freely across borders. It is also 
an industry which, in its role as the main link in, and principal facilitator of international 
production and supply chains, has become an integral part of that growth.
In recent years, however, there has been a growing body of literature in the area of 
globalisation and shipping (e.g. Goss and Marlow, 1993; Roe, 2002; Selkou and Roe, 
2004; Sampson and Bloor, 2007) which has helped to highlight the extent to which 
shipping has globalised since the 1960s and the resulting policy complexities and 
challenges for nation states. Most importantly, this literature shows the extent to which 
globalisation in the industry has placed states in an ambiguous position with regard to 
the regulation of capital thereby necessitating increased reliance on regional and 
international regulatory structures in an attempt to reassert regulatory control over 
shipping activities. Even at these regional and international levels, the industry still 
presents complex regulatory difficulties and dilemmas for the individual nation state 
(Sampson and Bloor, 2007).
Historically, shipping was always an international industry, often comprising small 
companies which operate within a wide international area. Because of the importance of 
the maritime sector for economic and strategic reasons, states controlled and regulated 
most aspects of shipping with many states, for example China, actually owning and 
controlling the shipping sector. Even in ‘open market’ countries like the US the federal 
government strictly controlled the industry through the US Shipping Board (Metaxas, 
1985; Goss, 1989; Alderton et al, 2004). The state, for example, dictated the nationality
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of the crew on-board its vessels and ownership and registration were linked so that ships 
were registered in the country of the owner’s nationality (Metaxas, 1985; Goss, 1989; 
Naess, 1972). The organisational dynamics, however, changed in the post-war decades, 
due to the emergence of Open Registers which influenced the transformation of the 
global ship registration ‘landscape’. Shipping companies henceforth ceased to be simply 
‘local and operating internationally’ and transformed into ‘truly’ globalised business 
entities with the ability to move capital and operate freely across national borders. In the 
process even the state lost its hitherto firm control on the economic activities of 
shipping companies. Ships were no longer necessarily nationally owned, crewed or 
registered because ship-owners were free to decide on these matters without state 
interference (Alderton et al, 2004). The nationality link in shipping business has, 
therefore, been systematically undermined and eliminated by the developments of the 
past five decades.
The highly globalised nature of shipping is mostly lost in the literature because of the 
tendency, by some authors, to present and equate globalisation with ‘being global’. 
Dunning (1993) for example defines global industries as:
Those that are dominated by large corporations with diverse national 
origins, producing and marketing in all of the world’s largest economies 
(1993:40)
This presents a ‘globalist’ view and implies that the criteria for globalisation include 
size and global spread. As I indicated earlier, however, the definition of globalisation 
that this thesis promotes relates to transborder economic activity without state 
restriction (Scholte, 2000) and represents an on-going process rather than an outcome 
(Sampson and Kahveci, forthcoming).
The thesis, therefore, contests the tendency to define globalisation in terms of globalism 
and universalism as in Reiser and Davies (1944:39). More accurately, the suggestion 
here is that globalisation should be considered and defined as a highly complex and 
dynamic socio-economic process driven by the transborder activities of business 
enterprises and the power struggle between markets and states (Beck, 2005; Wolf,
2005). Globalisation is a process of deterritorialisation of economic activities as defined 
by Scholte (2000) and Held et al (1999) rather than the outcome of it (see Sampson, 
2003; Sampson and Schroeder, 2006), as implied by Dunning’s (1993) globalism
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definition. If we take globalisation as a theory of current and on-going changes in the 
world economy rather than an outcome then it becomes easier and makes sense to 
analyse the evolving and changing relationship between states and markets over the past 
four decades which, Scholte identifies as the latest and most radical phase of economic 
globalisation, and which, coincides with the period of rapid growth in the transborder 
activities of multinational enterprises (2000).
The omission of shipping from the globalisation literature, though surprising, is not 
intentional but seemingly due to the prevalent globalism view taken by many 
globalisation commentators (e.g. Reiser and Davies, 1944; Ohmae, 1990; Dunning, 
1993). This view is, however, distinctly different from that taken by commentators 
within the maritime sector; many of whom view globalisation and developments in 
shipping as part of the wider on-going processes shaping the world economic order 
(Goss, 1989; Alderton and Winchester, 2002; Klikauer, 2003; Sampson, 2003; Veiga et 
al, 2004; Sampson and Bloor, 2007).
It is important, at this point, to closely examine the features described above which 
foreground shipping and make it one of the most globalised industries. It has been 
pointed out previously that the three developments, in the 20 century, which catapulted 
the industry to great heights of globalisation, within the short period between 1950s and 
1990s include; the growth of Open Registers, growth of the Seafarers’ Global Labour 
Market (Wu, 2004), and, the establishment of global satellite ship management 
companies (Klikauer, 2003). Sletmo and Holste (1993) have demonstrated that the 
definitive globalising development is the advent of ORs, as early as the 1920s (See also 
Metaxas, 1985). It is this feature that accelerated the deregulation of both shipping 
capital and seafaring labour world-wide and intensified the industry’s transborder 
operations (Goss, 1989; Sampson, 2003; Sampson and Schroeder, 2006; Sampson and 
Bloor, 2007). Giddens (2002) and others (see Stiglitz, 2002) have argued that the 
process of globalisation took a decisive shift in the second half of the 20th century due to 
enhanced telecommunication technologies which boosted transborder economic 
integration and economic activity. In the shipping industry the establishment of Open 
Registers as an additional globalising element meant that the process was clearer and 
quicker than in other, land-based, industries (developed further in the next chapter).
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As said earlier, another important part of this process of globalisation in shipping has 
been the emergence of a distinct Seafarers Global Labour Market (Wu, 2003, 2004) as a 
result of companies’ acquired ability to develop, organise and move labour across 
national borders using satellite crew management companies (Klikauer, 2003). 
International, third-party management companies, which emerged in the mid-1990s, 
have helped propel the global activities of shipping companies even further. Because of 
these companies, which include, commercial, technical and manning agencies (Spruyt, 
1994; Klikauer, 2003), even the smallest shipping company anywhere in the world is 
able to effectively operate in the global shipping market. They have provided ship­
owners with an effective global management solution to labour supply, and commercial 
and technical management, by introducing and refining the concept of offshore 
management whereby companies rely on offshore companies to staff and manage their 
companies. Many of these offshore management companies are located in low-cost 
countries, for example, Cyprus (Klikauer, 2003). By this development, shipping 
corporations have become even more detached from national states than those in land- 
based industries, like manufacturing, whose management is still largely in-house. 
Shipping companies therefore enjoy a unique kind of freedom from states and national 
borders because of these three prominent features which do not exist in many other 
industries (Klikauer, 2003; Sampson and Schroeder, 2006).
This brief analysis of globalisation suggests that, in the context of shipping business, 
globalisation has been, and continues to be, a dynamic and continuous process of power 
negotiation between shipping corporate business and states. Shipping capital has, over 
the years, effectively broken through the confines of state economic barriers and, 
because of the socio-economic importance attached to shipping, as described earlier, 
states have been forced to reconfigure their position and renegotiate the relationship in 
order to gain and/or retain the benefits of global shipping. This is evident in the way 
states have responded to the growing mobility of capital and the subsequent decline in 
national shipping industries using various policy strategies.
2.4 States, Markets and Labour in a Globalised Economy
The discussion in the preceding sections has set the stage for a more in-depth analysis of 
the relationship between states, capital and labour which forms the subject of this 
section. The analysis of the shipping industry as a unique example of globalisation
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raises important questions about what globalisation is and how it impacts on national 
states. In this section I will examine the relationship between states, capital markets and 
labour and discuss how it has changed as a result of globalisation over the past three to 
four decades.
The relationship between national states and markets has been transformed over the past 
four decades as a result of globalisation. In pursuance of neoliberal ideologies and the 
promotion of free markets and due to growing pressure from global corporate capital, 
many states have eliminated most of the economic barriers which formerly restricted the 
free movement of capital, trade and finance globally (Hall, 2003; Harvey, 2005). 
Whereas in the first half of the 20th century many countries used protectionist tactics 
and saw import substitution as the most effective way to accumulate wealth and build 
their national economies, the second half saw a changed ‘playground’ on which global 
capital markets grew in power and, in turn drove the development agenda of most states 
(Chomsky, 1999; Harvey, 2005). The state today is therefore very different from the 
state half a century ago which was in control of, and effectively exercised regulation 
over, economic activity within its borders. The state today appears to have lost much of 
its regulatory capacity as borders have become increasingly porous.
2.4.1 Neoliberalism, States and Capital
Neoliberalism is a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well­
being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills 
within an institutional framework characterised by strong private property rights, free 
markets, and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional 
framework appropriate to such practices (Harvey, 2005).
Harvey continues to say that, beyond creating the necessary structures to guarantee the 
security and freedom of markets, the state should not intervene because any such 
intervention would distort the market. The neoliberal ‘era’, beginning in the 1970s, has 
been largely characterised by deregulation, privatisation and a near total withdrawal of 
the state from key aspects of the marketplace (Jessop, 1994; Fairbrother and Rainnie, 
2006). In this scenario, the state has increasingly become more of a facilitator of capital 
market expansion and less of a market regulator. Essentially, neoliberalism seeks to free 
national resources from social ties for easy exploitation by global capital corporations 
(see Chomsky, 1999).
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The relationship between states and capital is characterised by complexity and 
ambiguity: clearly states need capital because within the neoliberal paradigm, national 
economic growth can only be effectively achieved through practices that promote free 
markets and allow global corporations to organise, develop and exploit resources 
globally in order to generate and accumulate wealth. It is therefore, perhaps, as Beck 
(2005) argues, a negotiated partnership in national development but one in which the 
two parties are engaged in a constant and continuous game of domination and power 
struggle. National governments, for example, seek to capture and maintain the gains of 
global capital. For this to happen they are forced to succumb to the demands of 
corporate businesses with regard to developing policies and introducing legislation 
which enable them to effectively exploit national production factors cheaply and freely.
The relationship is, on one hand, very much a symbiotic one, especially where powerful 
states within the OECD are concerned but, on the other, one of market dominance and 
intimidation. According to Beck (2005), there are two types of neoliberal state: first, 
those where international agencies actively promote neoliberal projects and ideas, 
mostly in the developing world, and second, those that actively and voluntarily adopt 
and promote neoliberal projects, mainly developed countries. Along the same lines, 
Chomsky (1999) argues that the concept of free markets applies differently to different 
states: powerful advanced states as well as weak and developing ones. The argument is 
that advanced states, unlike developing ones, are in a better position to benefit from the 
gains of global corporate capital businesses (Holton, 1998; Beck, 2005). In as much as 
these corporations have great influence over states, they need states, especially 
advanced ones, to provide the security and infrastructure to develop policies and enact 
legislation which guarantee and ensure their freedoms. States, on the other hand, need 
multinational businesses because of their role in wealth accumulation and national 
economic development.
In this respect, it is important to note that the neoliberal ‘project’ and the concept of free 
markets have been positively and actively promoted by the governments of strong states 
like America and Britain. Over the past four decades these states have actively 
supported the concept of a free market economy and thereby facilitated the global 
expansion and growth of corporate capital by providing enabling infrastructure and 
security (Dunning, 1993; Holton, 1998; Harvey, 2005). Such states have effectively 
facilitated the corporate exploitation of resources around the world with the knowledge
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that profits are repatriated back ‘home’. In this way, corporations guarantee the 
prosperity and continued world economic dominance for these ‘home’ countries. These 
states, in turn, provide the conditions for the successful and profitable operations of 
corporations. It is no wonder, therefore, that over three quarters of the most powerful 
global corporate giants are located within the most powerful states of the OECD 
(Holton, 1998; Hirst and Thompson, 1999).
Generally, however, the impact of growing capital influence over states, as a result of 
increased global mobility and the threat o f capital flight has been remarkable. From the 
1970s to the present, the influence of corporate capital on the policies of national 
governments all over the world has increased. During this time many governments, led 
by America and Britain, have adopted some form of neoliberal ideology to drive their 
development agenda (See Chomsky, 1999; Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb, 2002; 
Jessop, 2002; Hall, 2003; Jonathan and Sally, 2004; Peck, 2004; Harvey 2005; Bohle, 
2006).
In the process many key government economic policies are influenced more by the 
capital agenda and less by the social agenda in what is viewed, by some globalisation 
analysts, as the retreat of the nation state (Wallace, 1994; Strange 1996). These analysts 
suggest that governments have lost authority over their societies and economies to 
global corporate capital. Holton (1998), for example, argues that the state is no longer in 
a position to effectively perform its traditional duties like protecting domestic 
employment and guarding state sovereignty. Some analysts, on the other hand, view this 
development as a negotiated arrangement in which governments and capital are in a 
mutually beneficial relationship (Beck, 2005; Wolf, 2005).
Whether a ‘retreat’ or ‘negotiated arrangement’ the nation state has certainly undergone 
tremendous change and its capacity to regulate corporate business activities has 
declined. What comes out clearly in the literature is the fact that state policy, for 
example in Europe, in the past three decades, has been more pro-capital and less pro­
labour (Hall, 2003; Harvey, 2005). This has, for example, led to the so called 
‘modernisation of the welfare state’ which has transferred many traditional functions of 
the state to the private sector hence, further enhancing the power of private corporate 
capital. Susan Strange (1996:4), for example, observes that “where states were once the
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masters of markets, now it is the markets which, on many crucial issues, are the masters 
of the governments of states” (see also Clarke, 2005; Clark et al, 2006).
The UK shipping industry example is of interest in this analysis because it highlights 
the way in which states have over the years responded to the globalisation of industry 
and growing capital mobility with policy measures. The consequence of such responses 
has been to create a situation of deregulation in both capital and labour markets which 
has further enhanced what Beck (2005:127) refers to as the ‘coercive character of 
capital’. During the second half of the 20th century, for example, the ability of shipping 
capital to influence state policies in favour of cross-border business activities grew 
tremendously with the consequence that shipping companies have been able to 
influence a process of deregulation unequalled in any other industry. The government’s 
response to declining tonnage and seafaring labour, and the form of its strategy and its 
impact, provide a good illustration of the state’s effectiveness in controlling the trans- 
border activities of Transnational Corporations and protect domestic industries.
2.4.2 Neoliberalism, States and Labour
One of the consequences of adopting neoliberal ideologies, as I have pointed out, is that 
the state has been pushed back from the front-line of economic management and social 
provision so that markets have gained a free hand to organise and develop production 
resources. Beck (2005: xv) observes that “what is taking place (...) is a creative self 
destruction of the nation-state-dominated ‘legitimate’ world order” in which there has 
been, as Harvey (2005:3) adds, “much creative destruction ...o f prior institutional 
frameworks and powers ... [and] divisions of labour, social relations, welfare 
provisions” etc.
One particular socio-economic function from which the state has completely withdrawn 
and let the market take over, is the protection of national employment. The strength of 
organised labour has been systematically dismantled at the insistence of capital in a 
process whereby, according to the neoliberal thesis, markets intervene to free labour 
from traditional strangulations of organisations such as unions (Harvey 2005). In the 
process of promoting free markets, or ganised labour obviously presents a problem 
because it empowers workers and makes them both expensive and difficult to exploit. 
Being one the most important production factors, labour has ‘had to be’ contained as, 
such a situation could not be tolerated by corporate capital. Therefore, one of the first
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tasks for capital in the neoliberal era was to dismantle all forms organised labour. This 
has been achieved by exerting pressure on national governments to adopt pro-capital 
policies and introduce the necessary legislation (Harvey, 2005; Hall, 2003). What this 
means is that it has not been enough for strong states to simply supply the conditions to 
‘harbour’ Transnational Corporations (TNC), they also need to encourage 
manufacturing and production via the provision of cheap labour (see Chomsky, 1999).
Neoliberal states like the UK, under Thatcher, actively supported such policies as a 
means of encouraging growth in capital investment. To facilitate easy exploitation 
workers had to be under the absolute command and control of employers rather than 
unions hence, such governments, since the 1970s, withdrew support for workers and 
unions and introduced legislation which undermined organised labour and the power of 
workers (Chomsky, 1999; Hall, 2003; Harvey, 2005). Those countries which already 
had strong labour laws and powerful labour movements like the UK systematically 
dismantled them while those that did not were never given the chance to develop any 
(see also Smith, 1995; Jessop, 2002, 2003; Clarke, 2006). In the case of the latter, 
corporate capital eliminated such possibility by tactically employing the threat of capital 
flight (Clarke et al, 2006). In this way labour all over the world has been left open to 
capital exploitation without the protection of national governments. The decline in the 
British labour movement since late 1970s presents a good example which demonstrates 
how a combination of growing employer power and the withdrawal of state support led 
to a drastic decline in union power and the subsequent decline in the UK labour market 
as a result of being left open to uneven international competition (Famham and Giles, 
1995; Wood et al, 2002).
In general terms trade unions in the UK were undermined in the late 1970s under 
Thatcher’s policy of abandoning full employment and deregulating labour markets in 
pursuance of the neoliberal ideology (Fairbrother and Yates, 2003; Hall, 2003; Hyman, 
2005a and b). Their decline, both in membership and bargaining capacity was 
accelerated by the recession of the 1980s and by the fact that, as from the 1970s, many 
manufacturing industries such as steel, automobile, coal, as well as those in the 
transport sector like shipping, were in decline resulting in employment loss (Cully et al, 
1999; Famham and Giles, 1995; Machin, 2000; Dundon, 2002; Wood et al, 2002).
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Unions at this time also faced pressure from an increasing anti-union environment that 
was promoted by employers utilising their increasing capacity to influence government 
policy. Fairbrother and Yates (2003:1) observe,
Employers in all five countries [USA, UK, New Zealand, Canada and 
Australia], albeit in varying degrees, have responded to the economic 
instability beginning in the early 1970s and continuing into the 1980s by 
shifting the balance of power in their favour, thus taking the opportunity 
either to rid their workplaces of unions or undermine union influence. 
Employers have been helped in these endeavours by governments choosing 
to restore economic competitiveness through the advancement of neo-liberal 
policies, in part aimed at restricting union political and economic influence.
This is the situation that seafarers’ unions were facing in the 1970s and 1980s. In 
response to massive flagging-out by British ship-owners and the decline in the UK 
register, the government, keen to prevent further decline, facilitated the shift in the 
balance of power from seafarers to owners. The government further succumbed to 
pressure, especially from ship-owners, and introduced legislation which deregulated the 
seafarer labour market in the UK and guaranteed ship-owners freedom to employ 
foreign crews (Brownrigg et al, 2001; Selkou and Roe, 2002).
Thatcher’s declaration that her government had ‘tamed the unions’ is important because 
it signalled the pro-corporate capital/anti-labour government stance that has prevailed 
since then and led to the decline in local labour markets in the UK (Schifferes, 2004). 
With the coming to power of the New Labour government, however, open attacks, on 
unions, have decreased and union recognition is being encouraged through the 
introduction of the statutory union recognition procedure in 2000 (Wood et al, 2002). 
However, the 1990s unions are very different and far less powerful than the 1970s 
unions (Fairbrother, 2000; Levesque and Murray, 2006; Waddington, 2006). In the 
seafarer labour case, for example, whereas unions like Nautilus-UK have gained favour 
with the labour government within the past decade, they certainly have not gained the 
capacity to effectively influence favourable policy (see Levesque and Murray, 2002). 
However, the seafarers’ union case is special because of the existence of elaborate and 
largely effective global collective bargaining machinery through the International 
Transport Workers Federation (ITF) which presents a united and strong front against 
companies with FoC vessels in the fight for better wages and living and working 
conditions for seafarers (Lillie, 2004, 2006). At local levels though, seafarers unions are 
also caught in the same situation of limited capacity and influence as all the others and,
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although the ITF presents a good example of global collective bargaining, its functions 
are clearly different to those of local unions hence it is not in a position to provide the 
answer to the problems facing individual local unions.
The limitations facing unions in the neoliberal era seem to have given rise to a new 
‘breed’ of union which work in partnership with corporate employers rather than 
opposing their exploitation of labour because, essentially, their continued existence in 
the current, highly capital dominated atmosphere is guaranteed by the corporate 
community (Hyman, 1994; Kelly, 1997; Gall, 2003). Gall observes that although “the 
issue of union recognition has returned to the top of the industrial relations agenda in 
Britain, so too has the issue of employer opposition to it” (2003:79). A good example is 
the statutory union recognition procedures, referred to above, whose legal design 
suggests that, without corporate endorsement, unions cannot achieve any meaningful 
recognition. According to union analysts (e.g. Kelly, 1997) unions have largely been 
integrated into the neoliberal system, through partnership with corporate employers, 
such that they no longer possess the militancy necessary to effectively mobilise and 
oppose employer exploitation or challenge anti-labour government policies (Hyman, 
2005a).
Instead of fighting the corporate community in order to protect and promote local labour 
markets, it seems as if unions, since the late 1990s, have been more concerned with 
consolidating their existing membership and capacity. This is partly because of the 
overwhelming strength of capital and the lack of government backing for local labour 
markets.
One way in which unions are trying to enhance their capacity is through cross-industry 
mergers and cross-border consolidation (Fairbrother, 2000; Waddington, 2006; 
Fairbrother and Rainnie, 2006). There has been an increasing trend towards union 
merger since the late 1990s both regional and across sectors. Examples of this include 
the merger between the National and Provincial Building Society Staff Association 
(NAPSA) and the Banking, Insurance and Finance Union (BIFU) in July 1997 (Gilman,
1997). A survey of trade union mergers in the UK and Germany found that the number 
of individual trade unions in the two countries has significantly reduced since the late 
1990s as a result of mergers (Waddington et al, 2003). The study also indicates that the 
main reasons presented by proponents of union restructuring through mergers include:
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...the reductions in inter-union competition, the possibility of greater 
influence with employers and the state, and the better membership services 
that result from post-merger economies of scale (p. iv).
Membership decline is also given as one of the major factors influencing unions to 
merge. Because of this the report concludes that the move is largely defensive:
The merger processes examined here were dominated by defensive issues 
rather than the search for potential benefits. For the majority of the unions 
involved in the four merger processes, membership decline was a central 
factor. Also, despite the introduction of extensive cost-cutting measures, 
several unions were unable to reduce costs to match the decline in income 
from members. Financial difficulties were widespread (p. iv).
In the same way, increasing seafarer employers’ power over seafaring labour, seemingly 
backed by government, has forced unions into a generally defensive rather than 
offensive mode which makes it difficult for them to influence the kind of policy and 
strategies that might benefit British junior officers and ensure an effective recovery of 
the pool of British officers. The on-going negotiations towards a merger between 
NUMAST of UK and the Netherlands’ officers’ union, which has so far led to the 
formation of the Nautilus Federation (NF) and a change of name for the UK union to 
Nautilus-UK, is a good example of this process of cross-border capacity consolidation. 
According to Nautilus-UK officials, this is the beginning of a process which is intended 
to culminate in the formation of a single union of officers and maritime professionals -  
Nautilus -  in 2009. The ultimate objective, according to union officials, is to create a 
single union covering the EU region. According to one union official participating in 
this study:
The aim is to build a bigger and stronger front capable of countering the 
growing influence of employers in the shipping labour market-place” 
[Union Interview].
The ITF is, perhaps, the best example of how individual national unions find strength in 
international collective bargaining in the way it has attempted to organise and 
consolidate the otherwise fragmented ‘voices’ of seafarers working on-board FoC 
vessels in the fight for better wages and working conditions for seafarers (Lillie, 2006).
Cross-border union mergers are, however, not yet common, which makes the Nautilus 
experiment unusual. The problem with this approach is that, whereas it might succeed in 
consolidating and expanding membership and increasing ‘asset base’, it does not
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necessarily translate into increased influence for local seafarers with employers and the 
state. Also although the cross-border collective bargaining approach may attempt to 
address seafarers’ issues at an international level such as wage rates and working 
conditions, it is not able to tackle country-specific issues like loss of employment and 
declining local labour markets, or even declining memberships. This is because the 
focus is regional rather than national. Moreover, it does not enhance the capacity of 
individual local unions to influence government policies and legislation favourable to 
seafarers in their individual countries. According to the Anglo-German Foundation 
Report cross-industry mergers do not seem to provide the answer to declining union 
capacity at the national level:
[There is] little evidence to suggest that mergers are a satisfactory response 
to such changes. More radical strategies are required if the British and 
German union movements are to extend unionisation throughout the 
expanding private-sector services (Waddington et al 2003 :iv).
Because the ITF, for example, attempts to represent national unions from all over the 
world, some of which have conflicting interests to each other in terms of wage 
expectations, the federation is not in a position to effectively address local union- 
specific problems. Some of the issues that the ITF finds difficult to address include 
declining labour markets in some countries because it represents unions in developed as 
well as developing countries. To try and protect employment for the OECD countries 
that are faced with prolonged decline would mean working against the interests of new 
labour supply countries and their local union affiliates. A move by the federation, in the 
1970s, to standardise global crew wages using the OECD wage scale was interpreted by 
unions from developing countries, notably India and China, as a deliberate attempt to 
protect OECD seafaring jobs. This led to a crisis whereby the affiliates in Asia 
threatened to pull out of the federation, a move that would have destroyed the ITF (see 
Lillie, 2004). The ITF case therefore not only illustrates the possibilities of effective 
global unionisation but also demonstrates the complex inter-union politics which 
present a big challenge to international union organisation (Lillie, 2006).
2.5. Conclusion
The shipping industry provides a good case for study as an example of a truly globalised 
industry. The historical developments within the industry and the global dynamics of its 
operations present a good narrative of the changing relations between states, capital and
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labour. It demonstrates the extent to which globalisation has influenced changes in the 
state’s capacity to regulate economic activity and clearly demonstrates the dynamic and 
continuous power struggle between states and capital markets.
The decline in UK shipping and the response of the British government presents an 
excellent illustration of the state’s ambiguous position vis-a-vis capital and labour. The 
next chapter examines the UK shipping industry in light of the processes of 
globalisation discussed in this chapter. It traces the systematic deregulation of shipping 
labour and capital as part of the wider neoliberal project but also highlights some of the 
resulting challenges for both the state and the industry. The conception of the tonnage 
tax, as the main strategy for responding to the decline in the industry, its design and 
impact suggests that the government is in a dilemma. Having discussed the withdrawal 
of state support for labour in this chapter, the question, with regard to the government’s 
response to declining capital and labour in the UK shipping industry, is whether or not 
the tonnage tax was designed to increase and protect the pool of qualified British 
officers.
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CHAPTER THREE
The UK Tonnage Tax: A State Solution to Industry Problems 
Introduction
Chapter two introduced the subject o f decline in the shipping industries of Traditional 
Maritime Nations (TMN) and briefly discussed the impact of globalisation on the 
capacity of states to effectively manage domestic economies and protect local industries 
and labour. In this chapter I will take a closer look at the impact of globalisation on 
nation states with regard to the state’s response to the globalisation of the shipping 
industry. I will specifically examine the decline of the UK shipping industry, between 
the mid-1970s and late 1990s, and how it relates to the general processes of economic 
globalisation and deregulation. I will also discuss the government’s response - the 
tonnage tax - and assess its adequacy and effectiveness. Via the consideration of this 
example the thesis will shed light upon the extent to which the state retains the capacity 
to influence economic activities notwithstanding the process of economic globalisation.
The wave of decline in the shipping industries of TMNs was largely a consequence of 
the growing mobility of shipping capital and the increasing popularity of Open 
Registers among European ship-owners. This, as explained in chapter two, started with 
the establishment of low-cost Open Registers with lax regulatory regimes in developing 
countries around the world. The flags charged only a small registration and 
administration fee, very low or no corporation tax and, more importantly, allowed ship­
owners to employ cheap foreign crews (Metaxas, 1985; Alderton and Winchester, 2002; 
Marlow, 2002; Alderton et al, 2004). For this reason many owners moved their vessels 
to Open Registers. Faced with this kind of competition and the threat of losing all their 
tonnage to Open Registers, many TMNs went about systematically eliminating some of 
the legislation associated with their own flags and opposed by shipping companies. 
Countries like Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands and the UK, for example, established 
‘second registers’ providing a more lax regulatory environment but operating as 
subsidiaries of the parent register (Alderton et al, 2004). These countries also 
systematically eliminated legislation which protected local seafarer employment like the 
crew nationality requirements, which required that a certain percentage of crew must be
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nationals. In this regulatory race to the bottom, as Desombre (2006) describes it, 
shipping labour and capital became deregulated worldwide. It also led to a rapid and 
drastic decline in the pools of seafarer labour in TMNs. As fleets declined, employment 
opportunities for national seafarers declined because ship-owners preferred to employ 
cheaper foreign crews. This also meant that training opportunities for cadets in these 
countries declined.
The chapter will assess how the UK, as one of the states affected by this decline, has 
responded by examining the design and nature of the UK tonnage tax as the main 
government strategy for the shipping industry. The analysis will cover the conception, 
design and implementation, of the strategy and examine its impact, to date. However, 
before considering these themes, it is important to establish the appropriate contextual 
background to all these developments. The chapter thus begins with a general analysis 
of the process of deregulation in shipping labour and capital in the 1970s and 1980s.
There are four sections in this chapter. Section one discusses the growth and influence 
of Open Registers, their growth and role in the globalisation of shipping. Section two 
briefly introduces and discusses the consequence of the decline in UK shipping between 
the mid-1970s and late 1990s and examines its impact on the British maritime skills 
base. The UK’s response to this decline is analysed in section three which details the 
design and adoption of a comprehensive policy for British shipping and describes the 
UK tonnage tax. It also provides a brief assessment of the impact of the strategy and 
examines whether or not the government has been able to effectively respond and bring 
about a reversal of the decline. Finally, section four concludes the chapter with a brief 
conclusion.
3.1 Globalisation and Deregulation in the Shipping Industry
The three decades immediately following the Second World War -  1945 to 1972 are 
often described as the golden age of economic growth and prosperity (see Stopford, 
1997; Holton 1998). This period was characterised by, not only a steady growth in 
international trade and expansion in the economies of industrialised states but also, as a 
period of strong economic regulation by national states, economic protectionism and 
strengthening o f labour by states committed to promoting ‘full employment’ policies 
(Armstrong et al, 1991; Kahveci and Nichols, 2006). However with the acceleration of 
transnational interaction and transborder economic activity driven by the growth of
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Transnational Corporations, since the 1960s, the global economic arena started 
changing. States started competing to attract global ‘footloose’ capital thus setting in 
motion a process of deregulation whereby states sought to offer the most attractive 
business atmosphere to multinational corporations (Modelski, 1972; Mckenzie and Lee, 
1991; Dunning, 1993; Vogel and Kagan, 2004).
The process of deregulation was largely driven by the uneven economic development 
between countries and regions and an uneven international regulatory terrain whereby, 
advanced economies maintained stringent economic regulations whereas developing 
countries less so. In the face of rising production costs and growing competition for 
corporate enterprises, following the 1973 oil crisis and the economic crises of the 1970s, 
many companies sought ‘commercial refuge’ in those countries with less stringent 
regulations where they could reduce their operating costs by employing cheaper labour 
and where they were required to pay less corporation tax.
Thus, from the mid-1970s, and progressively, until the end of the 20th century, advanced 
states, in a bid to stop the flight of capital to the less regulated developing countries, 
eliminated most of their strict employment regulations and introduced legislation which 
undermined and reduced the power of organised labour (Harvey, 2005; Fairbrother and 
Rainnie, 2006). In part, these policies aimed to stop many industries from shifting to 
less regulated, low-cost countries. Some of the measures introduced by nation states 
included the reduction of corporation tax rates, relaxation of immigration laws to allow 
immigrant labour, introduction of legislation to facilitate easy transfer of finance 
globally and a reduction of restrictions on the international mobility of capital. In 
pursuit of neoliberal economic ideologies, which were taking root during this period, 
many of the states abandoned social welfare and dropped their ‘full employment’ 
oriented policies (Chomsky, 1999; Harvey, 2005). Thus, by the turn of the century, 
developed economies, such as America, Britain and France, had shifted from demand to 
supply-side strategies and actively promoted capital accumulation and a market driven 
economy at the expense of social welfare and full employment (Chomsky, 1999; Hall, 
2003; Harvey 2005).
In this respect, the shipping industry lends itself to the analysis of the uneven global 
regulatory field and the consequent economic deregulation of the 1970s and 1980s. The
threlationship between states and shipping capital since the beginning of the 20 century
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provides an excellent illustration of the impact of globalisation and the growing 
influence of capital markets and the consequent, extensive, deregulation in what has 
been termed, in some sections of the literature as a “race to the bottom” (Mckenzie and 
Lee, 1991; Vogel and Kagan, 2004; DeSombre, 2006).
3.1.1 States and Shipping
For the purposes of analysing the international structure and dynamics of the shipping 
industry, I categorise states into three broad types, namely, owner/flag states; flag-states 
and labour supply states. The first category comprises, largely, Traditional Maritime 
Nations (TMN). These are states whose shipping tradition goes back many centuries 
and which dominated shipping, in terms of ownership, registration, manning and 
operations, until the emergence of Open Registers in the early 20th century. They have 
also been referred to as ‘embedded’ maritime states because of their extensive and 
‘deep’ maritime regulatory structures and tradition (Alderton and Winchester, 2002). 
Although since the mid-1970s these states have gradually lost most of their fleets to 
foreign flags, as described in chapter two, the largest percentage, that is, over 68%, of 
ship-owners are nationals of OECD countries which includes most TMNs (see figure 4, 
ISL Market Statistics, 2005).
The second category o f flag states consists largely of Open Registers. As I have already 
explained in chapter two, this category emerged in the early 20 century with the 
establishment of Panama and Liberia in 1922 and 1948 respectively. They are often 
established in small developing economies with little international, political or 
economic, influence and, in some cases, no prior existing maritime tradition (Metaxas, 
1985; Alderton and Winchester, 2002; Coles, 2002). The countries establishing them do 
so for largely commercial reasons and aim to attract as many vessels as possible in order 
to maximise the amount o f revenue they can collect through the registration and 
administration fees they charge and in some cases, the little corporation tax they impose. 
Circumstances during the mid-war years and immediately following the Second World 
War period created ‘fertile’ ground for the mushrooming of Open Registers and their 
rise to prominence as popular destinations for, hitherto, TMN tonnage. Some of the 
factors responsible for this include: an oversupply of ships from the war; rising 
operating costs for ship-owners; increasing competition among operators, and; 
restrictive state regulations. These factors prompted many owners to ‘flag out’ their
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ships from traditional registers to the new Open Registers in order to cut costs and 
remain competitive (Metaxas, 1985; Alderton and Winchester, 2002; DeSombre, 2006; 
Kahveci and Nichols, 2006; Lillie, 2006).
The final category consists of states which, though neither Open Register nor TMN, 
play some role in ship registration but mostly they have, in the past three decades, come 
to play an important role as the main source of seafaring labour for the global fleet. 
They include countries like China and India which have large national fleets but are not 
considered TMNs possibly because, although they have long maritime histories, their 
ownership and control of a significant proportion of global shipping capital is both 
recent and limited as compared to, for example, the maritime nations of the OECD. 
They are however mostly known for their role as sources of seafaring labour and they 
rose to prominence, in this role, in the mid 20th century when ship-owners from around 
the world, especially from industrialised high-cost countries, were searching for cheaper 
sources of seafaring labour in order to reduce ship operating costs. The answer was 
found in low-wage developing countries with abundant skilled labour such as India and 
the Philippines. The category has since expanded to include most of the developing 
world, including Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe.
The emerging global structure of the industry is, therefore, one in which ships are 
largely owned in the advanced OECD states while registration and manning functions 
are shared between developing countries though not exclusively because TMNs still 
continue to play an important albeit reduced role in ship registration. Although there are 
states which have almost exclusively specialised in the registration market, like Panama, 
Liberia and Bahamas, there are some that specialise in both registration and crewing 
markets like the Philippines which, just like China and India, has a large national fleet 
but is not considered a TMN. The implication of this international organisation of the 
industry on the capacity o f the state to effectively regulate and control the activities of 
shipping multinational businesses will become clear later in the chapter as I continue to 
examine and discuss the deregulation of shipping capital and labour. Shipping plays a 
central role in international trade and by extension the prosperity of all nations but, 
while its significance in this respect is seldom acknowledged and easily taken-for- 
granted by many nations o f the world, its importance borders on nostalgic reverence for 
those nations with embedded maritime traditions, that is, the Traditional Maritime 
Nations. The importance of the industry, long after the wars and the conquests, derives
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from not just trade and economic prosperity, but also national pride. To the New 
Maritime Nations, however, the relationship is purely economic.
Many states therefore harbour an interest in the shipping industry because of its 
commercial benefits such as the revenue it generates and the employment opportunities 
it creates within the economy. The method that states use to protect and enhance their 
interests in any valuable industry is, and has always been, some form of state protection. 
It is however a method which, as McConville (1999) argues, in the shipping industry, is 
inherently problematic. This is because of the international ‘buoyancy’ of shipping 
capital and the fear of ‘tonnage flight’ by maritime states. This has become more 
pronounced in the past few decades due to increasing economic globalisation. The 
problem arises from the dilemma which McConville (1999:78) describes as ‘the 
juxtaposition of competing interests of an international service industry and its 
operation within the system based on nation-states’ whereby states would like to contain 
the gains of shipping businesses within their economies by limiting their ability to freely 
move capital and finance internationally but are prevented by the fear of capital flight 
(see also Kovats, 2006).
Unlike other industries, shipping is, and has always been, international. Over the years it 
has evolved and developed a set of complex global relationships which make it one of 
the most globalised industries. This complex international character has implications for 
the capacity of individual states to effectively manage the transborder activities of 
shipping companies and maximise the retention of their benefits domestically. This is 
made even more difficult by the fact that the nationality of ships and shipping 
companies is often vague and fictitious (Alderton et al, 2004; DeSombre, 2006; Lillie,
2006). As Kahveci and Nichols (2006:18) observe, ship-owners can change the 
nationality and, effectively, the relevance of a regulatory regime by “engaging in 
fictitious capital export [and] altering the registration of their vessels”
The relationship between states and transnational shipping companies is a complex one. 
It clearly illustrates Beck’s argument that states and capital are engaged in a continuous 
process of power reconfiguration (Beck, 2005). Clearly ships need states to register 
them and give them the legal identity necessary for international commercial activity 
(Coles, 2002) hence shipping companies seek those states which offer the friendliest 
commercial atmosphere. At the same time states need the companies for the commercial
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and economic benefits which come with large national fleets and strong domestic 
shipping industries. Inevitably, therefore, the two are caught in this complex web of 
negotiation.
3.1.2 20th Century Open Registers
The practice of operating ships under foreign flags existed long before the 20th century. 
Changing ships’ flags can indeed be traced back to the beginning of the eighteenth 
century (Metaxas, 1985; Coles, 2002). However, the practice differs significantly 
between the pre and post 20th century in terms of purpose and motivation. Flagging out 
in pre-20th century was mostly for political and military reasons rather than economic 
ones (Alderton and Winchester, 2002). Ship-owners were then interested in forging 
close alliances with powerful states for strategic reasons. Furthermore, the change of 
ships’ flags then was mostly influenced by the states, because of the military and 
economic might that came with command of large national fleets (Metaxas, 1985).
In contrast, the reasons for changing flags in the 20 century, are purely economic and 
the decision no longer lies with the state. Modem Open Registers grew as part of the 
process of globalisation in the shipping industry. The practice of changing flags is now 
solely market driven. Instead of seeking the protection of states, now shipping 
companies aim to escape the rigid and commercially strangulating control of the state 
(Naess, 1972; Carlisle, 1981; Metaxas, 1985; Alderton and Winchester, 2002; Alderton 
et al, 2004). From being a strictly regulated and state protected industry, shipping has 
therefore transformed into a globalised industry with highly mobile and deregulated 
capital.
Open Registers, therefore, form an important part of the history of the shipping industry 
and are a significant feature of its international structure and dynamics. Looking at the 
history and role of Open Registers in shipping, it is correct to say that globalisation in 
the shipping industry precedes that of other industries in the sense that shipping capital 
and labour started enjoying the freedom of cross-border mobility as early as the first 
two decades of the 20th century (Carlisle, 1981; Metaxas, 1985; Kahveci and Nichols, 
2006). Furthermore, the primary defining features of a globalised industry, that is, the 
international mobility o f capital, finance and labour, which, in many shore-based 
industries emerged after the 1960s, existed, in the shipping industry, long before the 
20th century.
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There are many ways of defining Open Registers depending on one’s view of their role 
in global shipping. The International Transport Workers Federation (ITF), for example, 
has a particular way of defining them which has influenced the industry’s view of these 
flags for the past three decades. The federation, in its fight against the growth of flags 
which promoted seafarer exploitation in the 1970s, coined the term Flags of 
Convenience (FoC) to promote the idea that they played the role of harbouring 
unscrupulous ship-owners and their ships which would not be accepted in any ‘decent’ 
register because of their poor record on safety, crew wages and working conditions. The 
ITF’s defines Flags of Convenience as:
[Where] beneficial ownership and control of a vessel is found to be 
elsewhere than in the country of the flag the vessel is flying (ITF, 1999).
This definition has influenced the way in which others define them. For example, 
although Metaxas (1985) takes a more economic view of the role of 20th century Open 
Registers, his definition is similar to that of the ITF. He defines them as:
National flags of those states with whom shipping firms register their 
vessels with a view to maximising their private benefits and minimising 
their private costs by avoiding the economic and other regulations and the 
conditions and terms of employment of factors of production that would 
have been applicable if their vessels were registered in the countries of their 
national origin.
Similarly, Kahveci and Nichols (2006: 18) define them as “where there is no genuine 
link between the flag state and the ships on its register”.
Another influential definition of Open Registers which preceded that of the ITF is 
offered in the Rochdale Report (1970:51). The report offers a description of ORs in 
which it identifies some o f their key features. It states that Open registers are those 
where:
(I) The country of registry allows ownership and/or control of its merchant vessels 
by non-citizens.
(II) Access to the registry is easy. A ship may usually be registered at a consul’s 
office abroad. [Transfer to other registers is not restricted at all]
(III) Taxes on income from the ships are either not levied locally or are low. A 
registry fee and an annual fee, based on tonnage, are normally the only charges
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made. A guarantee or acceptable understanding regarding future freedom from 
taxation may be given.
(IV) The country of registry is a small power with no national requirements under 
any foreseeable circumstances for all the ships registered, but receipts from very 
small charges on a large tonnage may produce a substantial effect on its national 
income and balance of payments.
(V) Manning of ships by non-nationals is freely permitted; and
(VI) The country of registry has neither the power nor the administrative machinery 
to effectively impose any government or international regulations; nor has the 
country the wish or power to control the companies themselves.
The definitions offered here highlight and emphasise the disparity between TMN and 
Open Registry regimes with regard to cost and regulatory strength. The features 
highlighted in the definitions form an important part of the discussion about 
globalisation in shipping and the shape and effectiveness of state response.
As stated earlier, Open Registers in the 20 century started with the establishment of the 
Panamanian flag in 1922 followed by the Liberian flag in 1948. The establishment of 
the first, ever, official open register -  Panama -  can, actually, be accredited to the 
United States and its prohibition laws in the inter-war period. The Volstead Act passed 
in October 1919 banned the manufacture, transportation and consumption of any 
alcoholic beverages in the US, including ships flying the US flag (Carlisle, 1981; 
Metaxas, 1985). In 1922 United American Line switched flags to Panama in order to 
circumvent the Volstead act and continue to sell alcohol on-board their ships (Johnson, 
1996; Kahveci and Nichols, 2006) as did many other American owners. Labour costs in 
the US were also high due to strict manning laws, but the greatest attraction to the 
Panamanian register came with the signing of a joint treaty between the US and Panama 
exempting shipping profits from taxation in Panama (Metaxas, 1985; Alderton and 
Winchester, 2002; Carlisle, 1981). The “road to Panama” was soon joined by European 
ship-owners led by Spanish ship-owners who flagged out in protest against social 
reforms which had increased operating costs in Spain (Carlisle, 1981; Coles, 2002).
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Another boost to the Panamanian flag came with the US Ship Sales Act of 1946 by 
which 1,113 Liberty ships were sold to owners operating under foreign registers. The 
US authorities felt that it was strategic to sell the ships to US ship-owners operating 
under the Panamanian flag because the ships would continue to be available to the US 
in case o f need (Metaxas, 1985). The Panamanian register was then considered an 
extension of the US national register because all the ships registered in the Panamanian 
flag were owned by US companies (Carlisle, 1981; Metaxas, 1985; Alderton and 
Winchester, 2002; Coles, 2002). Liberia, the second Open Register, joined the ‘flag 
race’ in 1948 by introducing laws which made it easier and cheaper for ship-owners, to 
register and operate vessels under its flag by creating an atmosphere of reduced 
registration conditions, reduced taxes and the freedom to employ foreign crews (see 
Carlisle, 1981). In the 1970s and 1980s Open Registers mushroomed and grew 
everywhere, facilitating a massive shift in ship registration from TMNs such that, from 
6% in 1950, the percentage of the world fleet, in terms of tonnage, under ORs sprang to 
23% in 1983, 31% in 1985, 42% in 1990 and 50% in 1995. By 2000 56% of the total 
world fleet, in terms o f tonnage, was operating under Open Registers (UNCTAD, 2006).
A series of factors contributed to this development: first, the collapse of international 
trade in 1930s reduced the amount of cargoes transported internationally and triggered a 
recession in shipping. In order to survive the recession ship-owners started seeking 
cheaper ways of running ships (Viner, 1937; Sturmey, 1962; Stopford, 1997). Second, 
the closure of the Suez Canal in 1967 meant that bigger ships were required to traverse 
round the Cape of Good Hope. Many ship-owners rushed to place orders for such ships, 
especially crude oil tankers, such that, by the time the canal reopened in 1975, there was 
an oversupply of tonnage. Third, the oil crises of 1973 and 1979 led to the overloading 
of the ship ‘order book’ for big oil tankers because many of the oil companies decided 
to acquire their own ships thus making the prevailing situation of oversupply worse. 
Unfortunately, the 1979 oil price-rice also triggered a deep recession in sea-trade 
causing the most severe decline in trade volume of the century (Stopford, 1997).
The fourth factor which facilitated the rapid growth of Open Registers during this 
period was the availability of credit from banks. American and other western banks had 
convinced some of the oil rich OPEC countries to channel their oil money through their 
accounts (Harvey, 2005; Perkins, 2005) hence they found themselves with large sums of 
surplus money. Since shipping was one of the industries growing steadily many
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flnancial speculators obtained cheap loans and invested in ships. Some of the banks also 
decided to invest in their own ships and there was a general rise in speculative 
investment in shipping. At the same time, many maritime nations, in the 1960s and 
1970s, were providing large loans and other financial incentives to shipping investors as 
a way of boosting national shipping industries (Marlow et al, 1997; Stopford, 1997; 
Marlow 2002).
All these developments exerted pressure on the shipping industry by creating an 
oversupply of tonnage, particularly, in the 1970s and 1980s. Ships were being delivered 
faster than they could be scrapped. Indeed, as Stopford (1997) observes, in some cases, 
ships came straight from the building yard to the scrap yard because in the 
circumstances of declining shipping markets prevailing at the time, it was more 
profitable for the owner to scrap the new ship than entering the overcrowded market. 
Unfortunately, the scrap market was also in decline due to a slump in the steel market 
and the increase in the demand for scrapping (Stopford, 1997). Soon after the oil crisis 
in 1971 oil companies also decided to dispose of their owned fleets and rely on the open 
market which was much cheaper than operating own ships. The industry was stuck with 
more tonnage than required (Stopford, 1997). Hence, from the mid-1970s to mid-1980s 
there was a huge oversupply of tonnage which triggered a drastic decline in shipping 
markets that pushed many operators out of business. Those ship-owners who survived 
desperately needed to reduce operating costs in order to survive and remain competitive 
(Marlow, 2002). Open Registers offered this opportunity because, through them and 
their lax regulatory regimes, ship-owners could manipulate and reduce cost to their 
advantage. As an increasing number of European ship-owners sought cost refuge in 
ORs, the fleets of European maritime countries rapidly declined. By the mid-1990s 
TMNs registered only a very small percentage of the total world fleet as shown earlier. 
The following graph show the huge decline in TMN fleets between early 1950s until the 
late 1990s:
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Figure 6: Top Eight TMNs 1948 - 2000
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While the fleets of the top ten TMNs were in rapid decline, the fleets of the top seven 
Open Registers were rapidly expanding, as shown in the figure below:
Figure 7: Top Seven Open Registers 1948 -  2000
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Source: Lloyd’s Register-Fairplay: World Fleet Statistics (1948 - 2000)
Clearly, by the 1990s, the largest percentage of the world fleet operated from 
developing country-ORs. This had huge implications for the regulation of shipping.
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3.1.3 The Deregulatory Impact of Open Registers
The establishment of Open Registers, in the early decades of the 20th century, was, 
clearly, a significant turning point in the history of the shipping industry world-wide. It 
triggered a process which, within four decades, completely transformed the international 
face of shipping. At the beginning of the 20th century, the industry was largely 
concentrated in a few industrialised flag-states (discounting the largely local and 
traditional industries of a few developing countries like India and China). Within a few 
decades, however, it had transformed into a highly complex and globalised one. 
Throughout the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s many countries set up ORs as the competition 
for the ship registration market intensified and many ship-owners responded by flagging 
out increasing amounts of tonnage from traditional flags. By the late 1990s, ORs were 
home to more than 51% of the total world fleet in tonnage terms (Alderton and 
Winchester, 2002; Kahveci and Nichols, 2006).
The main reason behind the exodus of tonnage from traditional flags to ORs, especially 
in the 1970s and 1980s, was, as suggested previously, a combination of increasing ship 
operation costs, growing competition and the rigid regulatory regimes of traditional 
flag-states which made it difficult for ship-owners to compete with their counterparts 
operating under ORs (Goss, 1989; Stopford, 1997; Marlow, 2002; Alderton et al, 2004).
One particular aspect of regulation which influenced many ship-owners’ decision to 
leave traditional flags, such as the UK, was the requirement that crews should comprise 
nationals of the flag-state, that is, the crew nationality requirements imposed by most 
TMNs. Until the mid-1990s, the requirement by the Danish, German and Italian flags, 
for example, was that all seafarers working on-board their ships must be nationals. 
Before the introduction o f mechanising innovations on board ships, shipping was a 
highly labour intensive business and up until the 1980s ships still required a large 
number of people on-board. Crewing costs therefore formed one of the largest cost 
items for ship-owners. At the same time, it was the most variable of all cost items and 
therefore provided a way for ship-owners to adjust their costs; the chance to reduce this 
heavy bill by employing cheaper crews from low wage countries was a life-line for 
many companies who were struggling in the international market (Marlow, 2002).
Since the strict regulatory regimes of most traditional flags did not allow ship-owners to 
utilise this advantage, many ship-owners saw re-registration with Open Registers as the
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best available option. Furthermore, by choosing to operate under ORs, ship-owners 
avoided paying most, if  not all, social security related costs thereby reducing non-wage 
crewing costs. Generally, these flags enabled ship-owners to reduce their total operation 
costs through:
Tax avoidance, transfer pricing, trade union avoidance, recruitment of non­
domiciled seafarers and passport holders for very low wage rates , non­
payment of social security contributions for their crews and avoidance of 
strictly applied safety and environmental standards (ITF, 1999:72 cited in 
Kahveci and Nichols, 2006).
What the open registry system, therefore, did, and still continues to do, is to allow 
shipping multinationals to successfully avoid the state regulatory machinery of TMNs 
and render the barriers to unlimited international labour mobility imposed by national 
governments ineffective. It allowed ship-owners to freely choose the nationality of their 
ships and operate freely across national borders.
The establishment and rapid growth of ORs intensified competition between flag-states 
and placed traditional flag-states in a highly ambiguous position and under pressure. In 
the face of declining national fleets these states were faced with the dilemma of whether 
to maintain their strict regulatory approach and lose all their fleets to ORs or relax their 
regulations, especially on crew nationality, registration conditions and taxation rates, 
and retain some of their fleets. Many TMNs were forced to carefully reconsider their 
options and gradually relaxed their rigid regulatory stance in order to counter the rapidly 
growing advantage o f their competitors. Some of the regulations that were either 
abandoned or relaxed included crew nationality requirements, strict registration 
conditions and a reduction in taxation on shipping profits.
Many of the traditional flag-states relaxed the requirements on register entry and exit 
that formerly distinguished them (‘closed’ registers) from open registers. Furthermore, 
many of these states tried to create a more attractive business atmosphere by introducing 
‘friendlier’ tax regimes as demonstrated by the various ‘tonnage tax clones’ which have 
been in operation around the world since the 1970s. With regard to crew nationality, 
which was perhaps the biggest ‘bone of contention’ between ship-owners and flag states, 
some states, like the UK, completely eliminated the requirement that crews be (British) 
nationals while others, like Germany, Denmark, Holland and Norway reduced the
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requirement for nationals and made it applicable to either only the master or most of the 
senior officers.
Another significant development which transformed the global shipping ‘terrain’ was 
the establishment of second and international registers. As stated earlier these registers 
were established by countries such as the UK, Norway, Denmark and Germany either 
within their national borders or in an offshore location in countries with which they had 
political and historical ties. The regulatory conditions imposed by these registers 
resemble those of Open Registers, with regard to crew nationality requirements, 
taxation rates, and entry and exit conditions. They are, however, governed by the laws 
of the ‘parent’ flag-state and operate in parallel with the ‘first’ register. Their ships fly 
the flag of the ‘parent’ flag-state. Examples of such registers include the Isle of Man 
which was created by the UK and operates in parallel with the British (first) register, 
the Danish International Register of Shipping (DIS), the German International Register 
of Shipping (GIS), the Netherlands Antilles, the Norwegian International Register of 
Shipping (NIS), and the Canary Islands (see Alderton et al, 2004). The aim of 
establishing these alternative registers was to divert the flow of tonnage from Open 
Registers so that, through them, TMNs could retain more vessels which would 
otherwise go to ORs. These registers grew popular because they effectively offered the 
‘best of both ship registration worlds’. In such a competitive atmosphere where stronger 
national regulations undermine the competitiveness of domiciled businesses, the 
possible consequence is a regulatory race-to-the-bottom (Wolf, 2005). Where this 
pattern is evident, it can lead to the gradual watering down of national regulations in a 
downward adjustment process. The 1970s and 1980s in the shipping industry is perhaps 
the best example of such adjustment which culminated in a situation whereby shipping 
multinationals operate in a near regulation free atmosphere. It has also led to the growth 
of a highly deregulated Global Labour Market for seafarers (Wu, 2004) in which 
employers have unrestricted access to a wide range of seafarers from many different 
nationalities at very low prices determined by ‘open’ market forces.
3.2 Decline in the UK Shipping Industry
The UK experienced a significant decline in its shipping industry, between the mid- 
1970s and late 1990s. The UK registered fleet fell from 33.1 million GT (3,822) in 1975 
to 3.4 million GT (1,391 ships) by 1997 as evident from the figure below:
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Figure 8: UK Gross Registered Tonnage 1970 - 1999
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During the same general period the number of British qualified officers dropped from 
28,000 in 1980 to 17,000 in 1998 according to UK Chamber of Shipping data (1996) 
and House of Commons Fleet and Manpower Inquiry (HoC, 1993, see also Obando- 
Rojas, 1999).
By the mid-1990s it was clear that this decline was threatening the entire UK maritime 
sector. The decline in the UK fleet combined with the decline in the number of qualified 
British officers threatened the shore-side maritime cluster of firms which rely on the 
transfer of essential skills from the sea to fill sensitive technical positions in shore-side 
operations like ports and harbours, ship surveying and insurance, ship management, and 
maritime law (Gardner and Pettit, 1996; 1999). The possibility that some of these firms 
could cease trading while others could shift their operations to overseas destinations, as 
a result of skills shortage, became real by the mid-1990s. Furthermore, the decline in the 
fleet also meant that the country’s training capacity was reduced since seafarers were 
traditionally trained by domiciled shipping companies.
3.2.1 Impact on British Maritime Skills
Diminishing skills in the UK maritime sector came as a direct consequence of the many 
years of decline in the UK fleet and local seafaring labour. Within the maritime sector, 
the shipping industry forms the core thrust and basic catalyst for all the other maritime 
related industries. Growth or decline in shipping activities, therefore, automatically 
influences fluctuations in the entire sector.
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Traditionally, seafaring training in the UK followed an informal system of 
apprenticeship whereby trainee seafarers were attached to, and worked with, master 
mariners and chief engineers, at sea, to acquire the necessary skills and experience. 
Even with the changes in the training structure into the modem, formal cadet schemes 
involving phases of theory-based classroom instruction and advanced training models 
and simulators, the basic concept of ship-board apprenticeship continued and the ship­
owner still carried a significant responsibility in the training of cadets. In the traditional 
system, therefore (the basics of which the UK still maintains), ship-owners not only 
recruited cadets but also financially supported their training and provided training berths 
for practical sea training.
The impact of the declining fleet on cadet training was that the UK’s training capacity 
reduced drastically because British ship-owners operating under foreign flags were not 
obliged to train British officers and therefore there was a reduction in training berths 
and general sponsorship for cadets. British ship-owners relied on cheaper foreign crews 
and therefore reduced their training facilities. Gardner et al (2001) observe:
....many British shipping companies have reduced or given up altogether 
their former commitment to cadet and junior officer training in order to save 
costs and remain competitive... (2001:353).
Pettit et al (2005) explains the impact of this trend of sourcing foreign labour on cadet 
training as follows:
As the shipping industry has adapted to the global labour market 
the UK has increasingly sourced its seafarers from other nations.
This has in turn led to a significant decrease in the number of UK 
nationals training as seafarer cadets and following a career path 
through to Unlimited Certificates of Competence as either Masters 
or Chief Engineers (2005:521).
Gardner’s observation suggests that the use of foreign crews by British ship-owners 
affects cadet training in the UK in that it reduces the training potential by diminishing 
the number of training sponsors. It also, supposedly, reduces the number of British 
nationals willing to train for, and follow, a long seafaring career path. It is therefore 
seen as a direct consequence of the decline in tonnage and increased deregulation. 
Certainly in line with this argument the decline in the number o f qualified British
- 6 0 -
seafarers, and the fall in cadet recruitment and training levels, followed the decline in 
the UK tonnage (see figure 10).
Figure 10: UK Cadet Recruitment 1970 - 1997
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By the 1990s the decline in the maritime skills base had become critical and many 
argued that this required effective and immediate attention (Obando-Rojas et al, 1999; 
Selkou and Roe, 2002). Seemingly, it was due to recognition that the decline was 
having a negative impact on the maritime cluster that the government intervened rather 
than concern for seafarer jobs per se. Intent on protecting shore-based marine related 
industries, the government sought to bring together all maritime stakeholders in order to 
find a way of reversing the situation. After a few years of deliberation the government 
adopted its first ever comprehensive policy for shipping outlined in the government 
White Paper British Shipping: Charting a New Course in 1998. It is this policy which 
laid the ground for the main instrument for the recovery of shipping -  the UK tonnage 
tax.
3.3 The Tonnage Tax Strategy
The history of the UK tonnage tax does not date back to the adoption of the government 
shipping policy. It is instead part of the wider European Commission’s push towards a 
common European response to the decline in European Union (EU) shipping. 
Furthermore, the strategy is not unique to Europe because the tonnage tax approach 
adopted in the EU is just another version of a strategy that had been practiced in many 
countries around the world and is not very different from the system used by Open
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Registers. Whereas the tonnage tax strategy adopted by the ORs was proactive, however, 
the EU states adopted it as a reactive measure to counter a decline in fleets and labour.
3.3.1 The EU Tonnage Tax
After many unsuccessful attempts, by individual European shipping nations, to stop and 
reverse the decline in their shipping industries, the European Commission, in the mid- 
1990s, decided to call for a common EU approach which would harmonise EU member- 
state shipping policies and encourage the adoption of a common strategy for a recovery 
and growth in EU shipping (Haralambides, 2006). Progress towards an EU tonnage tax 
began with the paper; ‘Towards a New Maritime Strategy’ published in March 1996 
(EC, 1996). This paper highlighted two important points. Firstly, that the decline in 
European shipping had come about as a result of increasing uneven competition caused 
by the protectionist practices of third countries with maritime ambitions, the open 
registry flag-states. Secondly, that a common European approach was required to 
counter this uneven competition while, at the same time, strengthening the EU stance on 
safety and the protection of the environment. It argued that, in order for EU shipping to 
prosper, there had to be a more competitive maritime business environment for EU- 
flagged ships. Legislation was therefore needed to:
1. Promote the EU-flagged maritime industry
2. Strengthen safety and environment legislation
3. Develop third-country relations and
4. Improve overall competitiveness and general conditions for EU shipping (EC, 
1996)
Although there are common overall aims and objectives for the EU tonnage tax, each 
member state is allowed to design its own version tailored to individual situations and 
circumstances, subject to approval by the European Commission. The overall aim is to 
develop a unified and, hopefully, more effective response to the forces causing the 
decline in their individual national shipping industries. In other words, the European 
Commission recognised the fact that no single member-state possessed sufficient 
capacity to effectively respond to the decline. A European version of the Tax was, 
therefore, proposed as the common strategy needed to address the problems of falling
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fleets and declining employment. Over the years, it has been progressively adopted by 
member-states including the Netherlands, 1996 and Germany and the UK in 1999 
followed by other member states as shown in the table below.
Fig. 11: The Adoption of Tonnage Tax in the EU
Member State Date of Introduction
The Netherlands 1996
Germany 1999
United Kingdom 1999
Finland 2001
Denmark 2002
Spain 2003
The Republic o f Ireland 2003
Belgium 2003
Italy 2003
France 2004
Sweden Under consideration
Source: Selkou and Roe (2004) and The Transport Institute website, 
http://www.trans-inst.org/EuropeanMaritimePolicies.htm
Of all the EU states Greece is distinctive and does not fit in with the wider EU agenda 
because it had introduced a tonnage tax proactively as early as 1975. It is possible that 
having studied the open registry model and having observed the rapid expansion of the 
OR fleet, Greece decided to strategically position itself as a destination for European 
ship-owners disgruntled with their national flag regimes but unwilling to risk the 
negative implications of being associated with the FoC image. As a consequence of the 
tonnage tax regime introduced in 1975, Greece managed to maintain her own fleet while 
other European countries were losing theirs. As of 2006 when the EU initiated a 
coordinated approach to the decline, the Greek fleet was 27.5 million GRT strong as 
compared to other European flags like Germany (5.8m), Netherlands (3.9m) and the UK 
(3.8m).
In the remaining sections of this chapter I will focus on the UK tonnage tax and 
examine how it was conceived and the impact it has had on British shipping in the six 
years it has been in operation.
3.3.2 Towards a New Strategy for UK Shipping
Following the production of the government white paper in March 1999, the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer commissioned, from Lord Alexander of Weedon, an independent
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inquiry into the case for, and the design of, a tonnage tax regime for shipping. The 
Alexander Report concluded that the UK should introduce a tonnage tax as an essential 
element of UK maritime policy in order to create a positive fiscal environment for 
shipping in line with other major maritime countries like Germany and Netherlands 
which had introduced a similar strategy (Alexander Report, 1999:10). Unlike these 
other countries, however, where the tonnage tax is simply a deferral of tax until a 
business leaves the system, the UK system aims to achieve a real and permanent 
reduction in the tax liability of participating businesses (DETR, 1998; Watson et al, 
2006).
The UK legislation enacting the tonnage tax was introduced by the adoption of the 2000 
Finance Bill, on July 28th. This law gave effect to the immediate application of the 
strategy to British shipping and companies. They were allowed to opt in for accounting 
periods starting on, or after, 1 January 2000.
3.3.3 The Design of the UK Tonnage Tax
As stated in the previous subsection, the tonnage tax was introduced as an essential 
strategy for the recovery of British shipping which would create a ‘friendly’ atmosphere 
for shipping business. Considering the extent to which the industry had declined, the 
UK tonnage tax was required to be an ‘all-inclusive’ strategy to address all the aspects 
of the decline, that is, the size of the registered fleet, the maritime skills base and the 
shore-side maritime cluster of industries.
In order to bring about recovery in the UK registered fleet, the tonnage tax was offered 
as a more favourable alternative system of calculating corporation tax for shipping 
companies based on fixed rates and with reference to a companies’ total operating 
tonnage per year rather than its total income. The shipping activities subjected to this 
system are tightly ‘ring-fenced’ so as to make sure that only genuinely shipping-related 
activities fall under this tax system and that companies do not have the chance to abuse 
the system by bringing company activities which do not qualify under the system 
(Selkou and Roe, 2002). Some of the benefits of the tonnage tax to shipping companies 
include:
• A simple, fixed-rate and low tax regime for shipping
• Certainty as to the level of taxation on a companies’ shipping activities
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• Reduced annual tax for Single-ship or group companies engaged solely in 
shipping business
• Deferred tax liabilities for public companies will be phased out under the 
tonnage tax, hence increasing their reported earnings per share.
• Encouragement to commercially driven as opposed to tax driven ship investment 
(see DETR, 1998; Alexander Report, 1999; Selkou and Roe, 2002)
All this was meant to create a relatively low-cost and user-friendly business atmosphere 
for shipping companies with the aim of attracting more ship-owners to register and 
operate their ships from the UK. Furthermore within the regime, there is a requirement 
that all vessels operating under the system must be strategically and commercially 
managed from the UK. This approach was designed to encourage growth in shore-side 
maritime activities (Brownrigg et al, 2001; Selkou and Roe, 2002).
At the same time a recruitment and training commitment -  the Minimum Training 
Obligation (MTO) -  was built into these requirements. This commitment obliged all 
those ship-owners opting into the tonnage tax to recruit and train UK cadets. These 
companies must submit a training plan to the Department of Transport (DfT) 
demonstrating a commitment to provide officer training places (or make a payment in 
lieu of training in proportion to the crewing complement of the ships operated by the 
company). The MTO is made up of three main elements:
(i) The Core Training Commitment (CTC), an annual plan produced by the 
company, and subject to DfT approval, setting out the company's training 
obligation and how it will be met.
(ii) The End of Period Adjustment (EPA), a retrospective update of the MTO, 
made three times a year in respect of the preceding four-month period, to 
account for actual training performance against the CTC and any incremental 
training obligation arising as a result of a net increase in the number of vessels 
entered in the tonnage tax regime.
(iii) Payments In Lieu Of Training (PILOT), by the company to the Maritime 
Training Trust (MTT), where necessary to meet their training obligations. The 
MTT is a company established by the Chamber of Shipping, the National Union
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of Marine, Aviation and Shipping Transport Officers (NUMAST), now known 
as Nautilus UK, and the National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport 
Workers (RMT) to hold and allocate monies contributed by companies for the 
purpose of promoting the training of seafarers (see DfT, website).
The Minimum Training Obligation is a key ingredient in the tonnage tax system meant 
to ensure a quick replenishment of qualified officers for future use in the UK fleet and 
the wider shore-side cluster of maritime related firms.
The training commitment requires that every participating company train one UK cadet 
for every fifteen officer positions entered in the effective officer complement of all 
participating vessels irrespective of nationality plus a notional 50% to cover back-up 
officers. The effective officer complement is calculated as the number of relevant 
officers entered on the Safe Manning Document (SMD) for all vessels entered in the 
tonnage tax regime, adjusted to include back-up officer provision. This commitment is 
for an initial period of three years after which the ratio of cadets to officers will reduce 
to one cadet for every five officer positions.
Under the PILOT option, a company may, in exceptional circumstances, opt to make a 
payment of £550 per head per month in lieu of training (HMSO, 2000 and, for more 
discussion and critical analysis of the Tonnage tax, see Brownrigg et al, 2001; Gardner 
et al, 2001; Selkou and Roe, 2002; Leggate and McConville, 2005). The circumstances 
are strictly assessed and mainly relate to the company’s capacity to directly recruit and 
train cadets. This is to ensure that all participating companies, even the smallest single­
vessel ones contribute to skills development. Eligibility for cadetships under this 
arrangement is not restricted to only British nationals. Other nationals within the 
European Economic Agreement (EEA) may benefit but, for them to be eligible, they 
must ordinarily be resident in the UK. Since most are not, ship-owners contemplating 
entering the tonnage tax regime should assume that they will be recruiting 
predominantly UK citizens as trainees.
The training obligation is strict and failure to implement or comply with the training 
programme is a criminal offence. In serious cases of repeated failure, the company will 
be prevented from renewing its election to remain within the regime until it has 
complied properly with its training obligations (HMSO, 2000). Considering that such a
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failure is considered ‘criminal’ this penalty seems too light which further indicates the 
soft stance that the state takes towards shipping corporate capital.
3.3.3 Entry into the Tonnage Tax System
Entry into the system is by means of election which is for a period of ten years and can 
be renewed at any time before the expiry of the initial period. This means that it can be 
renewed annually on a ‘rolling basis’ so that, at any point in time, there may be an 
election in place for the succeeding ten years. First of all, however, participating 
companies must be ‘qualifying companies’. They must be companies operating 
‘qualifying ships’ which are ‘strategically and commercially’ managed from the UK 
(HMSO, 2000).
There are strict criteria for selecting ships which qualify for the tonnage tax. A ship 
must be over 100 tons gross tonnage and must be ‘sea going’. Such ships include any 
vessels that are certified for international trading by virtue of a load line certificate or an 
international load line certificate, even though they may not trade internationally. 
Furthermore, with regard to the concept of ‘ring-fencing’ mentioned earlier, not all the 
activities of a shipping company qualify for the tonnage tax: Those that qualify include:
(i) Core qualifying activities - These are those activities directly related to the 
business of sea transport. They include: the carriage of passengers or cargo; 
towage, salvage or other marine assistance; and transport in respect of services 
necessarily provided at sea. They also include general management of a tonnage 
tax company’s own ships, for example, public relations and technical 
management activities like ship management and crewing.
(ii) Qualifying secondary activities - These activities cover a range of 
commercial activities that are naturally part of the process of operating ships on 
a commercial basis, although not necessarily inherently maritime in nature for 
example, selling travel tickets, some linked holidays / transport on land and 
gambling on cruise ships.
(iii) Q u a lify in g  in c id e n ta l  ac tiv itie s  - These are any activities not covered by the 
above two categories, to the extent that they do not exceed 0.25% of the 
taxpayer’s turnover from its ‘core qualifying activities’ and ‘qualifying 
secondary activities’ (only up to the ‘permitted level’, where relevant).
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(iv) Dividends - Dividends are within the scope of tonnage tax if they are paid 
to a tonnage tax company by a foreign subsidiary which would itself have been 
eligible for tonnage tax if its business activities had been based in the UK.
(v) Interest receipts - The interest must be an integral part of the shipping 
company’s trade in order to qualify (HMSO, 2000).
Initially the UK tonnage tax did not insist that participating ships be UK, or indeed, EU 
registered. Rather, it operated on a ‘flag-free’ basis so that ship-owners could bring 
foreign registered ships into the tonnage tax as long as all the other conditions of 
nomination were met. This condition has since changed with the revision, in 2004, of 
the EC Guidelines on State-Aid to Maritime Transport to include a requirement that any 
ship that benefits from the tonnage tax system must be registered in a European Union 
member state. This requirement was introduced in the UK by the Finance Act 2005 and 
it applies to all ‘new’ ships, that is, those that come to be operated by a tonnage tax 
company for the first time (HMSO, 2005). The law requiring that all ‘new’ UK tonnage 
tax ships be EU registered came into force on the 1st of April 2006.
However, these flagging requirements apply only when all the conditions set out in the 
act are met. These are:
(i) That the ship comes into the system in a financial year that has not been 
accepted, hence the requirements apply; that less than 60% of the company’s 
tonnage tax ships are EU flagged.
(ii) That the percentage of the company’s total tonnage that is Community- 
flagged is less than the percentage that was Community-flagged when the 
company first entered tonnage tax (HMSO, 2005; Watson, Farley and Williams, 
2006).
3.4 The Performance of the Tonnage Tax to Date
A performance evaluation o f the strategy, by the Department of Transport and the 
Inland Revenue, four years after its introduction, indicates a positive score on all but 
one of the three main targets set when establishing the tonnage tax. With regard to 
increasing the fleet and boosting growth in the shore-side maritime cluster, the strategy 
has shown a high level o f success. According to Department of Transport (DfT) data,
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the number of vessels participating in the tonnage tax steadily increased from 134 in 
2000 to 816 in 2005. Because of the ‘strategic and commercial management location’ 
requirement, many British and foreign companies participating in the tonnage tax 
regime have relocated a large amount of their ship management operations to the UK.
It must however be remembered that until the 1st of April 2006, this increase in tonnage 
tax vessels did not necessarily mean an increase in UK flagged vessels since the regime 
allowed companies the option of retaining vessels in foreign registers while operating 
under the tonnage tax. With the enactment of law requiring that all new tonnage 
entering the scheme be EU registered (HMSO, 2005; Leggate and McConville, 2005), it 
is expected that the UK national register will quickly grow as a result. Already, by June 
2004, there had been a big positive response in this direction; the UK registered fleet, 
according to World Fleet Statistics (2000 - 2006) has grown from 5,531GT in 2000 to 
12,149,988 GT in 2006.
With regard to increasing the numbers of qualified British junior officers, however, the 
strategy has not registered the success that was initially expected. This is in spite of the 
fact that, according to DfT statistics, all the tonnage tax participating companies are 
either directly training UK cadets or making the required payment in lieu of training 
under the minimum training commitment. Cadet training levels are still far lower than 
initially projected and the number of qualified British officers has continued to decline. 
According to the 2006 UK Seafarers Analysis (Glen, 2006), the number of all UK 
officers has remained largely unchanged being 13,100 in 2000 and 14,370 in 2006 while 
future projections show that, at the current rate, by 2021, the number will have dropped 
to 6,190. Although annual cadet intake rose by about 20%; from 450 in 2000 to 630 in 
2006, the number of cadets in training has remained low, being 1,020 in 2000 and 1,090 
in 2006. This indicates that the annual output of qualified junior officers has not 
improved since the introduction of the tonnage tax. This paradox has stimulated the 
empirical data collection behind the thesis.
3.5 Conclusion
The analysis in this chapter and in chapter two raises a number of important questions 
about globalisation and its impact on the nation state’s ability to effectively manage the 
domestic economy and protect local industries and employment from decline. The 
implementation of the UK tonnage tax and its impact says something specific about
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whether or not the state can effectively respond to globalisation and the growing 
influence o f global corporate capital.
The questions arising from this discussion and driving this study and the discussions in 
the remaining chapters have been discussed in chapter one. Fundamentally they are:
(i) How has government responded to the globalisation of shipping?
(ii) What shaped the government response?
(iii) How effective has the government response been?
(iv) How could the response have been more effective?
The analysis in this chapter suggests that the tonnage tax strategy has not delivered the 
kind of results that were expected by all the stakeholders involved in the design. 
Seemingly, it has had more success with regard to recovering the UK fleet but failed to 
effectively address the issue of declining seafarer numbers and general maritime skills 
base. The task is to try and understand why the response has not been effective and this 
is achieved through a critical qualitative analysis of the strategy, its design and 
implementation. The analysis will include an assessment of how the contextual factors 
discussed in the chapter shaped the government response and influenced the outcome.
The chapter has shown that the shipping industry has undergone great transformations 
in the past few decades and that it is now characterised by highly mobile multinational 
capital, trans-national labour and a highly deregulated ‘playground’ for both capital and 
labour. It is upon this platform that the government sought design its response and it is 
against this background that the thesis examines the state’s ability to manage 
globalisation and harness its benefits while mitigating its negative impacts.
The questions guiding this study will be addressed through detailed research whose 
design is documented in the next chapter. Chapter four describes and discusses the 
methods employed in the study.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Methods and Methodology 
Introduction
The broad aim of this study is to investigate the impact of globalisation on nation states 
and their capacity to manage domestic economies and protect local industries and 
employment. In order to do this the thesis critically examines the effectiveness of the 
UK government’s response to the decline in the shipping industry, with particular 
emphasis on the preservation of a pool of qualified merchant navy officers. The 
methods that I have employed in the collection of data for the project include qualitative 
semi-structured interviews, policy document analysis and an analysis of statistical 
secondary data.
The focus of the study is the tonnage tax as the government’s main strategy for the 
recovery o f both the UK national fleet and the pool of qualified merchant navy officers. 
The research relies on views collected from various relevant persons and organisations 
in the industry including government policy officials, shipping industry managers, 
seafarer union officials, cadet college administrators and staff, training company 
managers and individual ex-cadets. At the same time the thesis relies on the rich 
information contained in the various relevant policy documents which detail the design 
and adoption of the tonnage tax. The main objective is to critically assess the strategy; 
its design and implementation, and try and understand why it has not succeeded in 
increasing the number of qualified British junior officers as originally anticipated.
The study involved a detailed investigation of officer recruitment and employment 
policies of UK-based shipping companies and their views on, and attitude towards, the 
tonnage tax as the main recovery strategy for British shipping. It also involved a 
detailed study of the process o f designing, adopting and implementing the government’s 
response and the motivation behind the response. The views of training agency 
managers and college staff provided important data on how well the strategy has been 
working in terms of increasing cadet recruitment and training, while, interviews with 
individual ex-cadets provided valuable, ‘first person’, accounts about the training 
process and training experiences.
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This chapter is therefore a discussion of the research design and it describes the research 
process, including an outline and discussion of the methods used both for the data 
collection and analysis. It is organised into six broad sections. Section one presents an 
account of how I came to do the study and provides a brief justification for my 
preference of qualitative research methods. Section two presents a detailed description 
of the research process and the methods that I used in the data collection. Section three 
contains a description of the various sources for my data and presents an analysis of 
each source and its appropriateness as an important data source for the study. Section 
four briefly explains and justifies the process of data analysis and the methods used. 
Section five presents a discussion of the challenges, limitations and ethical 
considerations in doing the research and provides a critical assessment of the research 
process. Finally section six presents a brief view of the methods vis-a-vis the research 
questions they are intended to help answer.
4.1 My Trajectory in relation to Social Science Research
I believe that knowledge is socially constructed and that social phenomena are better 
understood through active social interpretation. The meanings of stories depend on who 
is telling them, the social-historical context and the intention. It is therefore of utmost 
importance to consider the social-historical setting when extracting meaning from social 
phenomena. Crotty (1998:67) argues that social reality and meaning are ‘socially 
derived and historically situated’.
Growing up in rural Kenya and listening to the oral narratives told by my grandmother 
was very interesting and influential in my social outlook and general understanding of 
society and life. Each evening as we got ready to go to sleep, I always found my heart 
pounding in anticipation of the next evening story. There were many narratives about 
the community and community life. This, I believe, ignited my interest in the literary 
arts and therefore influenced my decision to take Literature as my major at university. A 
deeper and more extensive exploration of the same stories, later in my studies revealed 
that those stories had rich and practical social meaning woven into them, and that there 
was always a message, a teaching, in every story.
I also discovered that the same stories were duplicated, with interesting modifications, 
in several neighbouring communities. I thus realised that folklore was the society’s way 
of explaining social and natural phenomena in the absence of scientific explanations
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apart from being a form of education and entertainment. There were stories about work, 
witchcraft, wars with neighbouring clans, marriage, death, religion, etc, and each story, 
as told differently in the various communities, revealed the different perspectives from 
which the communities viewed and understood various social activities and natural 
occurrences. Thunder was understood differently in different communities and so was 
death, religion, and marriage but, in the dissimilarity, there was always interesting 
similarity.
It is this interesting marriage of similarity and dissimilarity in the interpretation of social 
and natural phenomena that influenced my first research project. It was a study towards 
my bachelor’s dissertation and it focused on social meaning and interpretations in oral 
narratives. It involved collecting, and analysing the various stories that existed and were 
told similarly in various communities in Kenya in order to determine patterns of 
similarity and difference in meaning. The intention was to understand how the various 
communities interpreted certain aspects of their social and natural world, what 
influenced any differences in interpretation and how these meanings and interpretations 
were conveyed in folklore.
Through this project I confirmed my earlier suspicions that oral narratives were devised 
to explain the composition of social and natural environments. The project also revealed 
that these stories formed a body of reference for society as to what was ‘right’ and what 
was ‘wrong’; ‘good’ and ‘bad’. This body of reference influenced the lives of 
generations down the line as they were passed from generation to generation. What was 
also interesting to note was the fact that the variations in the stories were not only across 
communities but also along time. Different generations told the same stories with slight 
variations indicating that societies’ interpretations of social and natural phenomena 
changed from place to place and with time.
In one of my educational philosophy modules at the university titled ‘Philosophy and 
Social Development’, I was formally introduced to the various theories of knowledge; 
objectivism, subjectivism and constructivism (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998). We analysed 
and critically examined the arguments that go with each, and I was greatly impressed by 
the theory of the social construction of knowledge; that truth and meaning do not exist 
in some external world, that they are not handed down as replicas of a reality that exists
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out there but are constructed through a dynamic, continuous and active interaction 
between people and their environment within a natural social setting (see Gray, 2004).
Shortly afterwards, another research opportunity came in the form of a qualitative 
linguistic research project in which I participated as a research assistant. It was research 
project on the phonology and syntax of my own native language conducted on behalf of 
Bayrueth University, Germany by Dr. Jellehart Cammenga. We collected words, 
phrases, their pronunciation and meanings, and analysed the syntactical and 
phonological structure of the language. I greatly enjoyed these two projects because it 
was interesting to go out and talk to different people and learn things about their lives 
and languages. I did not know it then but now I look back, in the light of my entry into 
social science research and realise how much these brief research experiences influence 
my thoughts about societies and the nature of knowledge.
Although I would have preferred to proceed with further education immediately after 
my undergraduate degree, I found that I was unable to raise the funds required for a 
Masters’ degree programme and therefore had to settle down to a government teaching 
appointment. It was not until 2003 that I was able to continue with studies but by this 
time I had developed an interest in commercial shipping and studied for a diploma in 
ship-broking such that, when I applied to do a masters’ degree at Cardiff University, it 
was in International Transportion rather than the study of people and societies.
The opportunity to study for a Ph. D in the social sciences came purely by chance at the 
end of my masters’ programme but the fact that the focus of the Nippon Fellowship was 
to develop a sociological approach to studying the maritime industry appealed to me 
greatly. I saw it as a chance to marry my three kinds of academic and professional 
interest and experience, that is, teaching, shipping and sociology. Although there was no 
clearly mapped out path to my eventual entry into social science research, all the 
necessary ingredients were there, that is, the drive for academic and professional 
excellence and an interest in societies, people and their ways of life.
The above trajectory might perhaps explain my inclination towards the constructivist 
theory of knowledge and the qualitative methods approach which I have used in this 
study. This stems from my strong belief that meaning is socially constructed and 
therefore the best way to ‘discover’ social meaning is by observing, interacting with,
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and ‘interrogating’ people within their natural social setting (Fontana and Frey 1998; 
Rubin and Rubin, 1995). Through their accounts the researcher is able to arrive at an 
understanding of how the society works. For this reason I have employed predominantly 
qualitative interviews in my study although complemented with document analysis and 
secondary data analysis as described in the next section.
4.2 The Research Process
As I have already indicated in the introduction my data was collected using three 
different but complementary methods, semi-structured interviews, policy document 
analysis and secondary data analysis. The main method was, however, semi-structured 
interviews. The main study lasted 12 months; between November 2005 and October of 
2006, followed by continuous follow-up during the data analysis and write-up period 
(see appendix eight for research time-table). My choice of methods was influenced by 
the type of data that I was looking for. I wanted to collect qualitative data from key 
stakeholders in the UK shipping industry which would help me describe and critically 
examine the adequacy of state response to the decline in the shipping industry.
In this section I describe each of the methods that I used, how I used them and to what 
effect.
(I) Semi-Structured Interviews
Considering the kind of data I was looking for, the interview approach came across as 
the most suitable because it is an effective tool for collecting qualitative data. 
Furthermore it is a simple and highly practical tool to use in social and professional 
settings of all kinds. It is an easy method to use because it is built upon every person’s 
natural find basic conversational and social interaction skills. Fontana and Frey (1998:47) 
describe interviewing as “...both the tool and the object; the art of sociological 
sociability...” because it is the natural tool for social communication and is therefore 
best suited for this type o f social research (see Lofland, 1971; Denzin and Lincoln, 1998; 
Arskey and Knight, 1999; Hostein & Gubrium, 2003). What this means is that after 
considering all other types of qualitative research methods, interviewing came across as 
the most suitable for my research and one which would ensure rich and appropriate data.
With specific reference to the semi-structured interview the main advantages include 
effective time management and the fact that it is ‘structured’ enough to provide a
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reasonably defined scope of exploration but ‘open’ enough to allow a reasonable depth 
and breadth of exploration of the set topic (see Holstein and Gubrium, 1997, 2003; 
Denzin and Lincoln, 1998; Fielding and Thomas, 2001; Hopf, 2004). After careful 
assessment of the other qualitative interview approaches, including in-depth and 
structured interviews, the semi-structured interview was the best for my kind of research 
considering the need to balance reasonable structure and substantial flexibility in the 
exploration of my research topic. What this means is that as a researcher using semi­
structured interviews I am in a position to determine how wide and deep the exploration 
goes within the appropriate parameters of the research. By carefully guiding and 
controlling the interviews using appropriate probes and prompts, I would therefore 
ensure that I achieve suitable depths and widths of exploration.
I conducted interviews with various people within the shipping industry in the UK and 
some of the bodies, institutions and organisations I visited included training colleges, 
ship owning and operating companies, ship management companies, cadet training 
agencies, government departments and seafarers unions. I also interviewed individual 
ex-cadets. The aim was to explore the participants’ understandings of the decline in 
British shipping and get their views on the government response with regard to its 
design, adequacy and impact on UK shipping. By the end of the fieldwork I had 
conducted interviews with: 25 Human Resources (HR) or Operations Managers from 25 
UK-based shipping Companies; training administrators and staff from two cadet 
colleges; Four training company managers; and 15 ex-cadets. In addition I carried out 
two interviews with government policy officials and two interviews with seafarer union 
officials. In total I conducted 50 interviews. From the ex-cadets, I specifically sought to 
extract ‘first-person’ accounts of the training process and training experiences, both in 
college and at sea. I asked industry managers about their officer recruitment and 
employment policies and the determining factors in their choice of seafarer sources as 
well as their views on the adequacy of the tonnage tax in tackling the problem of 
declining numbers of seafarers in the UK.
With the training agency managers and cadet college staff I explored the training 
process and the difficulties and challenges involved in recruiting and training cadets 
both in college and at sea. Government policy officials provided useful information on 
the design of the government strategy and the constraints to effective response from the
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state’s perspective while union officials provided the union perspective on state 
response, effectiveness and adequacy.
Every interview initially started with a lengthy process of access negotiation involving 
phone calls, e-mails and formal (postal) letters. With the exception of cadet interviews, 
all the other interviews were held within the premises of the institutions where the 
various interviewees worked. Three o f the interviews were, however, conducted via 
telephone because circumstances made face-to-face meetings impossible. Most of the 
cadet interviews were conducted in hotel rooms, restaurants, and coffee shops.
The interview sessions were, in all cases, by ‘diaried’ appointments and involved the 
use of a combination of tools. I kept a notebook in which I would jot down notes 
reflecting my observations and thoughts about the surroundings and the ‘atmosphere’ of 
the interview setting. I also used the notebook to write down notes during the interview 
sessions about things that struck me as interesting and of possible relevance to the study 
-  things that might tell a story about the person and the organisation. These notes 
included observations about the interviewee’s reactions, including body language and 
the apparent attitude and response to various questions.
During the interview, and with the express consent of the interviewee, I recorded the 
session on a small, non intrusive, digital voice recorder because I could not rely on my 
memory to capture, accurately, the whole interview. There were two occasions, 
however, on which the interviewees did not wish to be recorded in which cases I used 
my notebook to take down notes in the form of main ‘aide memoire' key points. In such 
cases, I always found a quiet place, immediately after the interview to expand the notes 
into comprehensive text. Each interview lasted approximately one hour.
Alongside the notebook I maintained what I call my ‘after-session’ note-book which I 
used to record every detail about the day relevant to the research. Some of the things I 
recorded in this book included the journey to the premises, the reception, the 
surroundings and the general atmosphere within the premises, the journey back and any 
difficulties faced during the whole process. I also wrote down some of my preliminary 
observations and conclusions deduced from each interview.
I used short-point-format interview guides to structure each interview (Appendix five). 
The interview guides were only structured sufficiently to provide the main boundaries 
for the exploration while allowing sufficient flexibility for an exhaustive, meaningful
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and productive discussion (see Holstein and Gubrium, 1997; Fielding and Thomas, 
2001; Hopf, 2004). Before the beginning of every interview session I asked the 
interviewees to read and sign a Research Informed Consent Form to confirm that they 
were taking part willingly and were happy for the session to be recorded digitally 
(Appendix three). I also gave them a Research Participant Information Sheet containing 
the main facts about the research so that they knew what it entailed. It also served to 
inform them about how their identities would be protected and the use to which the 
information they provided would be put (Appendix two). This only served as a formal 
notice since most of these issues had already been discussed during the period of access 
negotiation. Both of these procedures are part of the SOCSI Ethical Committee’s 
requirements to ensure that the research is conducted within the accepted and necessary 
ethical boundaries.
After collecting all the data and running the initial preliminary analysis in the month of 
November, it was necessary to conduct a few more follow-up interviews in order to 
clear-up certain issues which arose in certain areas. Most of this follow-up exercise was 
either by e-mail or telephone although four ‘second round’ face-to-face interviews were 
conducted. The follow-up process, for the purposes of updating the data and 
information, however, continued through-out the analysis and write up stages of the 
project.
(II) Policy Document Analysis
Since the main objective of the thesis is to assess the adequacy and effectiveness of the 
tonnage tax as the state’s strategy to reverse the decline in shipping, it has been 
necessary to review and examine the process by which the strategy was designed and 
adopted. There is a detailed and rich history of the process contained in various 
government documents such as government policy papers and House of Commons 
Committee reports. Some of the documents that I analysed included:
(i) The European Commission paper, Towards a New Maritime Strategy 
published in 1996 setting out objectives for the recovery of EU shipping.
(ii) The March 1998 report of the Shipping Working Group (SWG) set up by 
the government in 1997 to deliberate on ways of addressing the decline in 
shipping.
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(iii) The government White Paper: The Future o f Transport, published in July, 
1998 following the SWG report.
(iv) The Government White Paper: British Shipping - Charting a New Course, 
published in December 1998 and containing the government’s first ever 
comprehensive policy for British shipping.
(v) The Alexander Report of August 1999, commissioned by the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer commissioned from Lord Alexander of Weedon to look into 
the case for introducing a tonnage tax for UK shipping.
(vi) The Finance Acts o f 2000 and 2004; the earlier one enacted the tonnage tax 
into British law while the latter amended the same.
This part of the research involved a rigorous and in-depth ‘interrogation’ and analysis of 
the content of these various documents in order to determine the government’s 
diagnosis of the problem of decline, its motivation to intervene and the process of 
designing the strategy. Of particular importance, apart from the actual content in such 
documents, is the tone and language used which often communicates seriousness, intent 
and conviction on the part of the designing party -  the state. Most importantly, the 
information collected from the documents usefully complemented interview data from 
government policy officials and provided a comprehensive ‘picture’ of the shape of the 
state response and the factors behind it.
The approach I adopted for analysing the documents was one of cross-thematic content 
analysis (see Strauss, 1987; Strauss and Corbin, 1998) whereby I identified and isolated 
a number of key themes and studied them closely in order to understand the 
government’s motivation, intentions and approach. I started by reading the documents 
and familiarising myself with the contents. It was during this reading phase that I 
identified the main themes. I then loaded the documents onto the computer-based 
qualitative data analysis programme, NVivo, and proceeded to bisect the scripts into 
several paragraphs which I dragged and pasted into designated ‘codes’ representing the 
various themes previously identified (see Bazeley, 2007). Some of the themes included 
government diagnosis, motivation, intentions, fleet loss and officer decline. After this 
initial process of coding I proceeded to cross-analyse the various themes in order to 
identify details such as what motivated the state to respond, what the objectives were,
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how the government interpreted the situation of decline and what obstacles there were 
to government response.
(Ill) Secondary data analysis
I believe in the strength of a mixed methods approach to social science research because 
it enables thorough and exhaustive exploration of research topics (See Denzin and 
Lincoln, 1998; Creswell, 2003). In this case, a combination of quantitative (secondary) 
statistical data analysis and qualitative approaches provide a better understanding of the 
situation of industry decline and government response. In order to analyse, discuss and 
illustrate trends in officer numbers and ship registration, I analysed statistics kept by 
various research institutions like the London Metropolitan University Centre for 
International Transport Management which produces an annual analysis of UK Seafarer 
numbers, UK Chamber of Shipping Data on fleets and manpower, Seafarers 
International Research Centre Data on the Seafarers’ Global Labour Market and 
Department of Transport data on shipping fleets and seafarers.
The study was structured with document analysis first, between November 2005 and 
January 2006 - to establish the general background - followed by the interviews for the 
rest of the period, until October 2006. In this way my discussions with the various 
interviewees about government policies and state strategy were direct and focused 
which helped to ensure that the data collected was relevant, detailed and rich. The 
secondary data analysis came in-between and during the course of these two main 
research exercises (document analysis exercise and interviews) and provided figures and 
trends on fleet capacity, the number of officers, and cadet intake and training levels.
4.3 Data Sources
The maritime sector is highly complex and is made up of many different industries and 
firms. Shipping is however the core of the cluster and forms the mainstay and major 
catalyst for all maritime activity. It is also one of the major revenue earners for the 
government and acts as an important stimulant to economic growth. The decline, which 
has been experienced in the UK shipping industry over the past thirty years is, therefore, 
of great concern to many stakeholders including the government, the corporate shipping 
industry (which consists of owners, operators, ship managers and, training agencies), 
ports and harbours, seafarer labour and labour unions, cadet training agencies and
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institutions, and a host of other maritime related firms, commonly known as ‘the shore- 
side maritime cluster of firms’. All these industry stakeholders are either directly or 
indirectly affected by the decline, both in tonnage and seafaring skills.
In order to understand the decline and assess the government’s response and its 
adequacy I collected and critically examined views from personnel in some of the main 
industry bodies and organisations. The main organisations which I targeted included 
relevant government departments, the shipping corporate community, cadet training 
colleges and seafarer trade unions. In the following section I am going to briefly 
describe each of these and explain how and why they were important as data sources for 
the study.
(i) The shipping corporate community
The shipping corporate community comprises a variety of firms which engage in 
commercial operations directly related to the ownership, operation, management, and 
crewing, of ships. Apart from being the potential employers of seafarers trained in the 
UK, UK-based shipping companies are also the main sponsors of the recruitment and 
training of British cadets. The importance of the corporate community as a major source 
of data for the study can, therefore, not be overstated. It was important to examine 
companies’ officer recruitment and employment strategies and assess their attitude 
towards the tonnage tax, and the training commitment, in order to engage in a 
productive and meaningful discussion of the impact of the tonnage tax recovery strategy. 
This is because company recruitment policies and strategies determine the prevailing 
patterns of seafarer demand and supply globally. Whether the government strategy 
works, or not, depends on how companies respond to it and how their recruitment 
strategies change as a result o f it. The data collected from company managers was 
therefore vital in reaching an understanding of industry attitudes towards the tonnage 
tax and its effectiveness. Furthermore, company recruitment policies determine the 
success of the Minimum Training Obligation.
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For this reason I sought access to companies and interviewed the Human Resources 
and/or1 Operations Managers of several different shipping companies based in the UK. 
As one of the major traditional shipping nations (home to a significant shipping centre -  
London) the UK is the base for a variety of shipping companies and of different forms 
and sizes. I was able to visit a reasonably wide range of these companies with the aim of 
reaching as many relevant categories as possible.
The form and shape that shipping companies take is often complex; the difficulty with 
categorising most of them is that they are often multifunctional and, although they are 
based in the UK, many of them operate internationally such that classification by 
nationality is often vague, inaccurate and potentially misleading. Many of the ship 
management companies that I visited, for example, were international outfits which 
manage ships for owners and operators from all over the world. The same is true for the 
UK’s main training companies which have international affiliates which recruit and 
train cadets in many different locations around the world. This complexity is inherent in 
the shipping industry.
Very few of the companies I visited had all their ships registered in the UK register 
since many tended to spread their vessels across a number of flags. Some of the 
companies had already opted into the tonnage tax, with varying percentages of their 
vessels participating, while some had chosen not to participate at all. Another 
complexity was presented by the fact that there was a lot of overlap in business 
functions, especially with operator, owner and management companies. It is not 
uncommon to find management companies which also own ships or owning companies 
which also offer management services for other ship-owners and operators.
In undertaking the research it was important to explore how different companies 
approached the recruitment and employment process, examine their sources of officers 
and try to determine how factors such as size and capital base, business type and 
company history influenced officer recruitment and attitude towards government
1 My preference was to interview HR managers but not all companies had dedicated HR managers and 
therefore where these posts did not exist I interviewed ORs whose duties, in such cases, generally 
includes HR management.
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response to the decline. The table below shows a summary of the characteristic features 
of the companies whose managers I interviewed.
Figure 12: Summary of Company Features
Company Code
Company 1
Company 2
Company 3
Company 4
Company 5
Company 6 
Company 7
Company 8
Company 9
Company 10 
Company 11
Company 12
Company 13
Business Function Size History Ships’ Flag
Owner/Operator 11 vessels. 
Information on 
staffing not 
available
Incorporated in 
2002
Mixed-flag fleet
Management/ 15 vessels. Old family Mixed-flag fleet
Owner/Operator Information on 
staffing not 
available
company
Management/ Crew Large international Incorporated in Mixed-flag fleet
management fleet and 7,500 
crew members. 
Global
1974 and giant 
network
Management 20 vessels. 
Information on 
staffing not 
available
Information not 
available
Mixed-flag fleet
Owner/Operator 52 vessels; 1000 
sea staff and 400 
shore staff (UK). 
Global
Started in 1909 Mixed-flag fleet 
and giant 
network
Managers Information not Information not Information not
available available available
Recruitment and Trains for a wide Information not Information not
training range o f clients 
including Maritime 
London and Trinity 
House
available available
Manning Provides manning 
solutions for 
companies 
worldwide
Over 20 years 
experience
N/A
Training Ave. 700 cadets in 
training each year; 
51% o f  UK’s cadet 
recruitment.
Established in 
1981
N/A
Owner/Operator 336 ships; 1200 sea 
staff. Global
Started in 1977 Mixed-flag fleet 
and giant 
network
Manager/Crewing 29 vessels. 
Information on 
staffing not 
available
Information not 
available
Mixed-flag fleet
Owner/Manager. 200 vessels. 
Information on 
staffing not 
available
Old family 
company; 
started 1880
UK flagged
Manager 67 vessels; 400 sea Established in Mixed-flag fleet
staff 1919
N/A
N/A
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Company Code Business Function Size History Ships’ Flag
Company 14 Owner/Operator 7 ships. 
Information on 
staffing not 
available
Started in 2002 UK flagged
Company 15 Owner/Operator 9 vessels; 70 shore 
staff and 350 sea 
staff
Established in 
2000
Mixed-flag fleet
Company 16 Marine services 
company. 
Transformed from 
owning company
Provides services 
to a wide range of 
clients both public 
and private
Started in 1847. 
Old family 
company
Serves mixed- 
flag fleet
Company 17 Owner/Operator/
Manager
60 vessels. 
Information on 
staffing not 
available
Old family 
company
Mixed-flag fleet
Company 19 Owner/Operator 500 vessels; 
110,000
employees; in 130 
countries
Started in 1904 Mixed-flag fleet 
and giant 
network
Company 20 Manager 90vessels and more 
that 4000 sea staff 
worldwide
Established in 
1983
Mixed-flag fleet
Company 21 Training (Non­
profit)
One o f the largest 
in the U K .
Started in 1978 N/A
Company 22 Manager Over 900 ships; 
1,350 shore staff 
and 23,000 sea 
staff.
Established in 
1984
Mixed-flag fleet
Company 23 Owner/Manager 13 vessels. 
Information on 
staffing not 
available
Started in 1730; 
the oldest 
family British 
shipping 
company
Mixed-flag fleet
Company 24 Owner/Operator/Ma
nager
Wide range o f  
fleets. Operates in 
32 countries. 
Information on 
staffing not 
available
Established in 
1807
Mixed-flag fleet
Company 25 Owner/Operator 144 ships; operates 
in 100 countries; 
8000 staff
More than 150 
year old
Mixed-flag 
fleet; global 
network
Tonnage tax
N/A
available
Source: Author
The differences between the companies included in my sample mainly relate to the size 
of the company in terms the size of operated and/or owned fleet and staff size, the 
specialisation of the company, namely, whether it is a management, owner/operator or 
managing company, the age and historical background of the company and the 
registration of its fleet. All these differences, as explained earlier, might be expected to
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significantly influence management attitude and approach towards crewing and cadet 
training practices. In designing the sample I therefore tried as much as possible to 
include as many variations as possible in order to compare the different approaches and 
attitudes adopted by different companies towards officer recruitment and employment 
and their response to the tonnage tax MTO.
(ii) Training Institutions
As the parties directly involved in, and responsible for, the training of cadets, 
administrators and staff in cadet colleges were of central importance to the study. It was 
essential, for example, to discuss issues relating to the process of cadet training - both in 
college and at sea - and to examine the structure of the training programme and assess 
trends in cadet intake levels in order to evaluate the impact of the MTO on the 
recruitment and training of cadets.
There are four main cadet training institutions in the UK which are strategically spread 
around the country in order to tap into the seafaring potential and cater for the training 
needs of the entire country. In most cases these colleges have affiliations with nearby 
universities with which they share expertise and facilities. Some of these colleges have 
developed joint programmes leading to various graduate degrees in nautical sciences 
and maritime business management. Their primary task is, however, training officer 
cadets for the shipping industry. Generally, the course for an officer cadet takes three to 
four years after which the cadet obtains a third mate’s Officer of the Watch ( 0 0 W) 
ticket and becomes a qualified junior deck officer of engineer. There are three different 
entry points and training paths for the cadets depending on the individual’s entry 
qualifications, namely, Higher National Diploma (HND), Foundation Degree (FD) and 
Bachelor of Science (B.Sc.).
The training academic year begins in September and the programme is structured into 
periods of theory interspersed with periods of practical experience at sea (see appendix 
seven). This is designed to ensure that, by the end of the training, cadets are sufficiently 
equipped with both theoretical and practical knowledge and skills in shipping and 
seafaring and an initial experience of life at sea. My target data sources in the colleges 
comprised those people directly involved in the process of cadet admission and training. 
I specifically interviewed two cadet training officers and teaching staff in addition to
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several informal interviews in two colleges as I wanted to find out about the structure of 
cadet training in the UK, cadet training programmes and any problems in the training 
process in order to determine why it was difficult to increase the number of qualified 
junior officers.
I only interviewed staff in two colleges because of difficulty in gaining access to the 
institutions. The data collection process with the colleges included an exploration of the 
training schemes offered, the different paths followed by the cadets, the various entry 
points and the structure of the programme. It also involved collecting views on the 
MTO and its impact on cadet enrolment. An important area of exploration was also the 
recruitment, allocation and funding arrangements made between shipping companies, 
training agencies and the colleges. I also asked college staff about the issue of cadet 
‘wastage’ focussing on likely periods of ‘drop out’ and the possible reasons for cadets’ 
decisions to withdraw from training.
(iii) Cadets
In the course of the research it became clear that one reason for the failure of the MTO 
to increase the number of officers was cadet ‘wastage’. Many companies said that 
British people were not willing to work at sea, however it was also suggested that 
candidates may leave early because they discern that they have no future prospects. The 
reasons for cadet ‘wastage’ seemed important in arriving at an understanding of why the 
MTO was failing to deliver. I therefore decided to include some cadet interviews in the 
study although this was not in the original research design.
Subsequently the cadet data became of central importance to the study. It would help to 
explain the reasons why training levels and junior officer out-put levels had not 
increased despite the tonnage tax. The main area of exploration, in the cadet interviews, 
included the motivation of cadets to take-up training, their expectations at the beginning 
and their experiences of training. Because it was becoming clear, by this time, that the 
main problem hindering efforts to increase junior officers was high cadet dropout rates, 
I selected and interviewed only ex-cadets because it was essential to find out, through 
‘first-person’ accounts, what factors influenced cadets’ decisions to drop out of training 
prematurely.
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The identification and recruitment of cadets was highly challenging. This was due to the 
fact that, having withdrawn from the programme, they all went different ways and only 
a few remained within the shipping industry. However, I was fortunate in that I 
requested and received assistance from some of the college administrators who kindly 
agreed to identify some of their ex-cadets for me. The next hurdle was how to contact 
them. The colleges were not willing to give me a list with their contact details for fear of 
breaching data protection laws. The solution that I found was to draft the ‘access request 
letter’ which was then forwarded to the various ex-cadets by the college administrators. 
Luckily a number of them responded positively, either directly to me or through my 
college contacts.
Thirteen of the fifteen cadets I interviewed were aged between 16 and 20 years and had 
joined the cadet training programme soon after completing their GCSE or A-Levels. 
Eight of them came from families with a shipping and seafaring background and had 
therefore been influenced by parents, relatives or friends in their decision to join the 
profession. After dropping out of the programme, only two went into maritime related 
fields. Four of them had chosen to go to the university to develop a totally different 
career path; three had joined different commercial training programmes and the 
remaining six found jobs in different fields. The two who had chosen to stay within the 
industry had been assimilated into graduate trainee programmes by shore-side maritime 
related companies.
(iv) Others
Grouping the following data sources in the ‘others’ category should not, by any means 
be taken to mean that they were not as important as the rest. The reason is that this is a 
collection of ‘single-category’ bodies which could not fit in any of the categories 
described earlier and could not be discussed individually without resulting in the risk of 
disclosure of their specific identities. This category comprises government policy 
officials, seafarer union officials, and various persons from both government and 
industry training agencies and bodies. For ethical reasons I have to be vague in the way 
I describe some of these bodies hence the use of such descriptions as ‘various persons 
from both government and industry training agencies’. To say more would risk 
revealing their individual identities, to those who are well-informed about the sector.
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In the case of government officials, I contacted and interviewed policy officials in 
departments that are immediately related to shipping and have a connection to the 
tonnage tax. The aim was to find out how the government understood the decline in the 
industry and how it had gone about designing its response. I also wanted to find out 
what the government thought about the impact of the tonnage tax. In the case of union 
officials I targeted top officials o f UK based seafarer unions. The reason for 
interviewing union officials was to determine the unions’ role in the design of the 
tonnage tax, being one of the major maritime stake holders involved in the consultative 
process, to understand what they had done to make sure that the problem of declining 
seafaring skills in the UK was adequately addressed. Others were bodies, organisations 
and agencies directly concerned with the implementation of the tonnage tax, especially, 
the Minimum Training Obligation (MTO).
4.4 Data Analysis
My data analysis, as I have indicated earlier, was in two phases. I conducted a 
preliminary analysis of every interview soon after it had ended in which I consolidated 
my recollections of the session and reviewed the recordings of the interview. From this I 
was able to make comprehensive notes of my initial thoughts and I found that this 
helped me to improve and refine my approach to subsequent interviews. My fieldwork 
was therefore a process involving dynamic and continuous adjustment and refinement. 
During the data collection period and in spaces between interview appointments I made 
a point of going over the voice recordings of previous interviews so as to become as 
familiar with the data as possible. During these ‘listenings’ I kept revising, refining and 
expanding my thoughts on the various emerging themes. This meant that by the time I 
conducted the main and comprehensive analysis, I was very conversant with the data 
and some of the major themes that had emerged in the course of its collection.
Interview transcription started half-way through my data collection phase. Although I 
had the option of engaging the services of a professional transcription expert, which 
would have made the exercise faster and easier, I decided that it was best to transcribe 
my interviews myself in order to increase my interaction with the data prior to analysis. 
The transcription for each recording was reasonably comprehensive. However, it was 
time consuming and it took me an average of eight hours for every one hour of recorded 
interview.
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The method I employed for data analysis was categorisation and cross-thematic analysis 
as described by Strauss (1987) and Spradley (1979). It involved developing a coding 
process and an analysis of individual nodes (themes) followed by a rigorous cross 
thematic analysis. In the coding process I used NVivo which is a computer-based data 
analysis programme. Having designated the various thematic categories I dissected my 
interview transcripts into thematic paragraphs then dragged and dropped relevant 
paragraphs from all transcripts to each thematic category (code). After this I conducted 
a thorough cross-thematic examination and analysis in order to establish links and 
patterns of meaning (see Dey, 1993; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). I examined similarities, 
meaning, nuances, inconsistencies and variances (Coffey and Atkinson, 1996; Atkinson, 
and Coffey, 1997). For example I was able to analyse and compare what company 
managers said about their officer recruitment policies (code 1) and how they went about 
cadet recruitment (code 2) and training (code 3) in the UK in order to determine how the 
three related. This cross-thematic data analysis enabled me to engage with, and 
rigorously interrogate the data and begin to build theories and meaning around my 
various research questions. This also helped me to identify the paragraphs which I later 
used to illustrate my main findings.
The importance of using computer assisted qualitative data analysis software such as 
NVivo can not be overstated. It made the whole exercise of organising, coding, and 
categorising the data, into distinct themes, easy and quick. Some of the traditional 
methods for doing the same, for example, the ‘shoe-box’ approach, cutting and pasting 
and colour coding, would have taken me a long time. The other added advantage with 
using NVivo was that it combined all these other approaches such as ‘cut and paste’, 
‘shoe-box’ and ‘colour coding’ into an intricately integrated but quick and easy-to-use 
package. The cut, drag and drop facility made it easy to develop thematic categories and 
identify useful illustrative paragraphs.
Although I originally designated the period for the comprehensive analysis as October 
2006 and February 2007, the process continued through-out the write-up stage (March 
to October 2007) because there were constant and continuous follow-ups to update the 
data. At the same time, as the data chapters progressed, it was necessary to revisit earlier 
interpretations in line with new developments. My data analysis was therefore a 
continuing process spanning the entire period of the study.
- 8 9 -
4.5 Challenges, Limitations and Ethical Considerations
My study was relatively free from major problems and it progressed relatively smoothly. 
There were some challenges, however, which emerged during the process of negotiating 
access to the various participants. Out of 90 letters I sent out to companies, training 
institutions and government departments requesting appointments for interviews only 
15 actually replied but of these only seven were positive. Arranging interviews therefore 
required a lot of follow-up phone calls and e-mails. Most of those people who were 
approached in this way eventually gave me appointments and subsequently took part in 
the study. Some however declined to participate citing either company policy or busy 
schedules. From the initial batch of letters I sent I finally managed to get the 50 
participants who provided the core interview data for the study.
This meant two things. Firstly, negotiation of access took a lot more time than I had 
initially allocated and therefore put the project under immense pressure due to the 
limited nature of my funding. Secondly, the numbers of people who declined to 
participate meant that I did not interview as many participants as I would have wanted. 
Given that there are not very many shipping companies left in the UK, this presented a 
big problem. However, considering the amount of rich data that I was able to collect 
form the 50, the damage caused by the declined access was reasonably well mitigated.
One of the greatest challenges was my time limit for the completion and submission of 
the thesis which limited the scope and depth of the investigation. The study was 
conducted under the financial sponsorship of the Nippon Foundation which provided 
funding for three years which included two semesters studying for a diploma in research 
methods. This meant that time, which is often a problem for research students, was a 
particular limitation for me. With more time I could have reached more shipping 
companies and even extended the research to include some of the main shore-side firms 
affected by the shortage of maritime skills. I could also have included interviews with 
policy makers at the EU level in order to explore the EC policy on shipping skills and 
the possibility of an EU answer to the problem.
As the thesis unfolded it became apparent that an important unforeseen element of it 
was the need to explain the problem of high cadet wastage. In retrospect, and knowing 
this now, I would have liked to interview more ex-cadets and would also have liked to
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include, in my research design, a few interviews with cadets in training, especially in 
their final stages o f training so as to compare their experiences with those of ex-cadets. 
As it was I was happy to be able to include a small number of ex-cadet interviews in the 
study. These were particularly difficult to arrange because of the inadequate record 
keeping in colleges, especially, regarding cadet dropout. Colleges do not seem to pay 
much attention to the cadets who decide to quit. For example, neither the colleges nor 
the various training agencies and sponsoring companies conduct follow-up discharge 
procedures through which they monitor and determine the reasons for dropping out. 
Such data, perhaps in the form of completed discharge forms, would have been very 
useful and could have made my work much easier and made the data richer. Ultimately 
therefore I was pleased to achieve fifteen interviews with this difficult-to-reach group of 
people. I had sent out a total of 30 letters to ex-cadets through two colleges.
The fieldwork also involved a lot of time-consuming and costly travelling (and 
accommodation) because my participants were spread across different parts of the 
country. In some cases I found that it was impractical to reach the ‘base’ of an identified 
interviewee because of its remoteness, for example, when travelling on public transport 
and unreasonably high associated costs. In two such cases I resorted to telephone 
interviews. One important observation I made about using telephone, as opposed to 
face-to-face interviews, was that, although it is a useful tool for quick follow-ups, it is 
not very appropriate for ‘main’ interviews. Based on my experiment with this mode of 
interviewing, the telephone interview tends to remove the ‘person’ and the 
‘surrounding’ from the interview thus limiting the depth of ‘understanding’ for the 
interviewee. As an interviewee I found that I lost the benefit of essential non-verbal 
communication and the general information that maybe gained by observing the 
interviewee’s place of work. Furthermore, the ‘mechanical’ nature of this approach did 
not allow for a relaxed session since it imposed a certain sense of hurry. Consequently 
my telephone interviews lasted about 30 minutes each as opposed to an average one 
hour for the face-to-face interviews (see Frey and Sabine, 1995 for a detailed discussion 
on telephone interviews).
Other minor challenges include the few times when the participants declined to allow 
me to use a voice recorder and, although I was able to take down notes, I could not write 
fast enough while still concentrating on guiding and directing the interview session. In 
such cases the sessions were rather uncomfortable and a lot of valuable data was lost
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because my memory could not retain all of the discussion and I could not effectively 
take notes.
Although the research process was relatively straight forward I had to be constantly 
aware of the possible ethical implications of every step I took, right from the point of 
negotiating access to the write-up and reporting stage. For instance, I had to ensure that 
the purpose of the research was clearly and unambiguously spelt out to the interviewees 
before they made-up their minds to participate. I also clearly explained how the data 
would be used so that they made a properly informed decision on whether to participate. 
One important reason for observing ethical regulations in research is to protect the 
interviewees as well as to ensure the validity of the data collected (Dingwall, 1997; 
Payne and Payne, 2004). I therefore took pains to make sure that the participants were 
happy and comfortable with every step of the process. As I have said, however, this 
presented no big problem because most of my interviewees were highly educated and 
professionally experienced people. Furthermore, by the time we got to the actual 
interview session stage, we had gone through a lengthy process of correspondence 
involving e-mails, phone calls and (postal) letters which clarified the research to the 
participants.
Before every interview I informed the interviewees, verbally, about my intention to 
record the conversation and requested their permission to do so. If they declined, as it 
happened in a few cases, I did not go ahead with the recording. I also explained to them 
that they had the right to decline to answer any question they found uncomfortable or 
compromising, whether personally or professionally. In the few times when I had to 
conduct the interviews by telephone I made sure that I asked the interviewees if I could 
record the conversation. When they gave their consent, I informed them when I 
switched on the recorder and at the end I informed them when I switched it off.
A more complex challenge was with ensuring that my line of interviewing did not 
provoke bitter memories and sad emotions in the ex-cadets with whom I needed to 
explore their personal training experiences. In order to mitigate any such outcome I took 
a lot of care in the way I put the questions across and the way I reacted to and reinforced 
their responses. I also stressed the fact that they were free to decline to answer any 
question and may withdraw from the process at any point. Fortunately no such incidents 
occurred and the interviews were smooth and productive.
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A big ethical challenge for any researcher is how to conceal the identity of the 
interviewees at the write-up and reporting state. I have managed to overcome this hurdle 
by carefully ‘anonymising’ the identities of the participants, and the various 
organisations and institutions they represent, in all my chapters and conference papers 
and presentations. In order to eliminate any chance of identification I have constructed 
the anonymity in such a way that even the wider context does not, suggest the identities 
of either the organisation or the individual.
Considering all these issues, I approached every step of my research and write-up well 
aware of my duties and responsibilities towards the participants and sources, the 
research community, the data, and, my sponsors. I relied extensively on the guidelines 
of the British Sociological Association (BSA) Ethical Procedures (BSA, 2002) and 
also sought the approval and guidance of the Cardiff University School of Social 
Sciences (SOCSI) Ethics Committee to whom I submitted my research proposal 
including an outline of my methods and obtained approval before commencing the data 
collection (see Appendix four).
4.6 Summary: Methods and Questions
The research approach and methods outlined in this chapter were carefully and 
deliberately chosen to ensure that the data collected exhaustively answered the research 
questions posed. It is for this reason that the study employed a mixed method approach 
to data collection. The two main methods include interviews and policy document 
analysis.
By subjecting government policy documents to extensive document analysis rich data 
was extracted which helped to explain how the government viewed the problem of 
decline in officer numbers and the decline of UK fleet revealed the government’s 
commitment to recovering the fleet and the seafarer pool. Combined with interview data 
collected from government officials and seafarer union officials, this method produced 
data which I have used to effectively answer questions about the nature and form of 
government response to the decline. The documents provide an insight into government 
thinking and the understanding of the decline and explain the conception and 
development of the response. The data generated by this method is mainly used to 
inform the development of chapter five.
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This chapter specifically addresses the first research question about how the government 
has responded to the globalisation of shipping by discussing the shape of the 
government’s response strategy and the process leading to its design and adoption. It 
traces the development and adoption of the strategy and describes the government’s all- 
inclusive consultative approach which involved all the major industry stakeholders.
The interview approach, on the other hand, generated very important information about 
companies’ responses to the tonnage tax and the Minimum Training Obligation with 
reference to their officer recruitment and employment policies. The data collected by 
way of interviews is predominantly used to inform the development of chapters six and 
seven in which the questions about the performance of the strategy and the training 
atmosphere are addressed. Chapter six addresses research questions two and three, that 
is,
(ii) What shaped the government response? And
(iii) How effective has the government response been?
It examines the role o f shipping company recruitment policies in influencing the shape 
of state response strategies and their impact on cadet recruitment and training.
The interview approach was also the main instrument for collecting data from ex-cadets. 
Through interviews the cadets were able to give their personal accounts of the training 
process and their experiences of training at sea and in college. An analysis of these data, 
alongside the interview data from training administrators and managers provides further 
indication of why the minimum training obligation has not succeeded in increasing the 
number of junior officers in the UK. Interviews with government and union officials, as 
well as industry representatives, provided important indications of some of the main 
obstacles impeding effective state response and intervention to recover and restore the 
strength of the British seafaring pool. This data was especially valuable in answering 
the final research question, that is: How could the response have been more effective? 
This question is discussed in chapter seven which extensively examines companies’ 
attitude to cadet training and how cadets experience their training. By highlighting some 
of the shortcomings in the government strategy and examining the obstacles hindering 
effective state response the chapter tries to suggest how the response might have been 
made to work more effectively.
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Finally, the statistical secondary data analysis provided the figures to illustrate the 
trends in the shipping industry over the past three decades. These figures clearly show 
the extensive decline in the industry and also the trends after the introduction of the 
tonnage tax thus setting the context for in-depth analysis and discussion on the 
effectiveness of the strategy. The secondary data analysis approach therefore provides 
the essential statistical illustration which strengthens the arguments and discussions 
throughout the thesis.
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CHAPTER FIVE
State Strategies 
Introduction
The shipping industry has experienced accelerated globalisation over the past three 
decades leading to a greater diversification and concentration of shipping activities 
around the world. The consequence of such restructuring has been the decline of former 
maritime nations and the emergence of new centres of maritime business around the 
world. As explained in previous chapters, the patterns in the global distribution of ship 
registration have changed significantly with the growth of Open Registers leading to a 
situation whereby the industry, unlike the early decades of the 20th century, is no longer 
concentrated in, and dominated by, just a few European Traditional Maritime Nations. 
The current, highly globalised landscape of the shipping industry has developed 
alongside the wider globalising processes which have led to the removal of economic 
barriers to capital and finance movement around the world. In this sense, the shipping 
industry is a critical example of a globalised industry as argued by Sampson and Bloor 
(2007) because shipping enjoys a greater capacity for international mobility than any 
other industry by virtue of the fact that shipping capital assets are mobile. A good 
illustration of this is the ease with which ship-owners can choose and change the 
nationality of their ships without, for example, relocation costs.
One additional important feature that has developed in the industry as a direct 
consequence of globalisation, international mobility of shipping capital and the 
transborder operations of shipping companies, is the growth of an ‘open’ Global Labour 
Market (GLM) for seafarers, which gives employers unrestricted access to cheap labour 
drawn from the low-cost labour supply countries (Sampson, 2004; Kahveci and Nichols, 
2006). Whereas labour is, generally, more locally organised seafaring labour has, within 
the past three decades, been organised at a more global level than labour in any other 
industry because shipping companies, in search of cheaper crewing alternatives, have 
set up ‘satellite’ crew management companies which facilitate the operation of a 
globalised seafarers’ market (Wu, 2004).
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While such developments have beneficial effects for shipping companies, they have 
negatively affected some national shipping industries and domestic seafarer labour 
markets, especially, in the high-cost industrialised states. These states have experienced 
a drastic and steady decline in their national fleets and seafarer labour since mid-1970s 
which has led to diminished fleets and shrunken pools of qualified officers and depleted 
maritime skills bases. The decline in local seafaring labour happened, largely because, 
as ship-owners sought cheaper foreign labour, demand for national officers declined and 
ship-owners were no longer interested in recruiting and training cadets in their ‘home’ 
countries. The UK shipping industry is an excellent example of this demonstrating a 
huge decline, both in fleet and skills during the period since 1970s. The number of 
British seafarers employed on-board UK registered ships, according to Chamber of 
Shipping statistics, dropped from nearly 99,000 to 27,000 between 1970 and 1993. The 
number of officers declined from 45,600 to 12,080 within this period (see Obando- 
Rojas et al 1999).
The problem that faced British governments from the mid-1990s as a result of declining 
numbers of qualified British officers is complex. Apart from declining qualified sea 
staff, the UK was losing much of its general maritime skills base, that is, the people 
with the required skills to work in shore-side maritime related firms (Gardner and Pettit, 
1996; Pettit and Gardner, 1999; Gardner et al, 2004). The government was concerned 
that if the decline continued there would be a shortage of essential technical skills which 
would prompt many firms to consider shifting their operations to overseas locations 
where they could access the required skills at lower prices. The other major concern was 
about the decline in the number of qualified and available people with the skills and 
experience to operate UK vessels in times of war. The argument was that as an island 
nation the UK required a substantial pool of qualified officers for this purpose.
Traditionally skills for the shore-side maritime clusters always came from the sea. 
People were trained as seafarers; they worked at sea as officers for a number of years, 
gained experience and moved ashore thus transferring the essential technical skills to 
the wider maritime cluster. Also, in times of war, the government calls on national 
merchant vessels to boost the country’s naval capacity. The effective contribution of the 
merchant navy in such times depends on an abundant supply of qualified and 
experienced national officers. The capacity of the UK merchant navy to maintain such
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pool of staff and supply skills for the shore had diminished drastically with the 
depletion of the fleet.
Diminished training opportunities, coupled with massive lay-offs of British seafarers, in 
the 1970s and 1980s as employers sought cheaper labour elsewhere, not only 
undermined and destroyed the seafaring tradition in the UK (Obando-Rojas et al, 1999) 
but also, created the impression that seafaring was no longer a profession with good 
career prospects for British people. This led to the emergence and spread of the 
perception that seafaring had become a ‘third-world’ occupation in many circles of the 
industry. A government official explained:
Part of the government’s plan is to correct the notion that seafaring jobs are 
only suited or available for foreign seafarers. This is not true and if it is left 
to continue it will destroy Britain’s seafaring tradition [Government 
Interview]
In order to correct the situation an effective state strategy was needed to address both 
the demand and supply aspects of the problem. On the supply side there was a need to 
‘re-ignite’ the seafaring spirit of the British people and encourage more young people to 
train for the profession. State involvement in this aspect was necessary because there 
was a clear market failure in the development and replenishment of skills to the industry 
both ashore and afloat. It was then necessary to provide opportunities in the form of 
adequate funding and training facilities. Most importantly, the strategy needed to ensure 
a high rate of trainee retention; a problem which had greatly affected the profession in 
recent years (BIMCO/ISF, 2005). Moreover, employment opportunities had to be made 
available for qualifying junior officers so that they could work at sea and gain the 
required experience to replenish skills for the shore-side maritime industries.
In this chapter I will examine the tonnage tax, as the government’s main response and 
the identified problems. I will draw on material from a number of sources: Government 
policy documents which detail the process of designing and adopting the response. 
These documents include The European Commission paper, Towards a New Maritime 
Strategy, 1996, the March 1998 report of the Shipping Working Group (SWG), the 
government White Paper: The Future o f Transport, 1998, the Government White Paper: 
British Shipping - Charting a New Course, 1998, the Alexander Report, 1999, and the 
Finance Acts of 2000 and 2004 (See a more detailed list in chapter four). I will also rely 
on interview data from the various major stakeholders involved in the consultative
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design process including government officials, shipping industry managers and seafarer 
union officials. The chapter lays out a complex web of conflicting interests, including 
corporate capital interests and labour interests, and examines the government’s 
approach to the development of a common strategy for the recovery of British shipping.
This chapter is organised into seven broad sections. Section one briefly considers the 
erosive impact of globalisation on the national seafaring labour markets of TMNs so as 
to set the context for the analysis with reference to the UK. Section two examines the 
state’s motivation to intervene in the decline, especially, in a private sector industry in 
an era of free markets. Section three is an exploration of the government’s interpretation 
of the problem, and its causes, and a description of the process by which the response 
was designed and adopted. Section four examines how the government arrived at this 
strategy and describes the consultative process employed. Section five considers the 
complex web of conflicting interests involved in the process as a result of the 
involvement of parties with opposing interests, that is, the corporate shipping industry 
and the labour unions. Section six describes the various initiatives, including the 
tonnage tax, which comprise the government’s strategy and, finally section seven 
provides a brief assessment of the impact of the strategy.
5.1 Globalisation and the Decline in shipping Labour
Although the forces of economic globalisation have greatly diminished national 
economic barriers in the past four decades, labour is yet to enjoy the same global 
mobility that capital and finance enjoy. In the main, labour continues to be locally and 
nationally organised and the state still wields immense regulatory control through 
immigration restrictions across borders (Holton, 1998). Other obstacles like cultural, 
and language barriers, and variations in the education, training and qualification systems 
of different countries also restrict the international movement of labour (Lauder and 
Brown, 2006). However, in shipping, the growth of the Global Labour Market for 
seafarers has significantly increased the mobility of seafarers in the past few years (Wu, 
2004). Furthermore, the mobile nature of seafaring employment, combined with the 
international harmonisation of training and certification in the profession and the use of 
English as the accepted international language of seafaring, defines seafaring in 
distinctive ways.
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The relative freedom enjoyed by labour in the shipping industry must however be 
understood within a certain context. It is not to be equated to or compared with the kind 
of international mobility that shipping capital enjoys. Whereas increasing mobility for 
capital has brought increased global ‘political’ influence for shipping companies, the 
same has not been the case with seafaring labour. Yet, seafaring labour and the changes 
that have taken place in the seafarers’ labour market provide an unusual example of how 
globalisation could transform labour.
The relationship between state, global capital and labour, with regard to the shipping 
industry, differs in one important aspect from other industries. In shipping, the 
combination of mobile capital assets and a labour force that must, of necessity, be 
mobile has led to a situation whereby, without physically relocating overseas, shipping 
multinationals are able to draw cheaper labour from low-cost developing countries. This 
means that shipping companies are unusually placed to benefit from the best of both the 
industrialised, advanced countries and the less developed countries. They benefit from 
the advanced sophisticated financial and management facilities in the north as well as 
the low-cost flag-regimes and cheap labour in the south in maximising their profits. A 
British ship-owner, for example, manages ships from London and benefits from the 
advanced management and financial infrastructure offered by the City of London but 
can operate ships under a low-cost flag-regime and get labour cheaply from Asia or 
Eastern Europe. This is so because UK-based shipping companies are not obliged to 
employ seafarers from the UK, a fact that has, over the past three decades, negatively 
impacted upon the British pool of seafarers and led to a huge decline in this pool of 
employees (Brownrigg et al, 2001; Selkou and Roe, 2002; Gardner et al, 2004).
Although shipping labour has always been more mobile, relative to many other 
industries, this mobility has become more pronounced in the past few decades as a 
result of the increased mobility of shipping capital. Furthermore, most ship-owning 
countries have either abandoned or significantly relaxed their crew nationality 
requirements (Alderton et al, 2004) due to growing pressure from shipping companies 
seeking to employ cheaper foreign crews hence allowing ship-owners to source labour 
internationally. A few countries like China, India, Taiwan, Italy and Norway still 
require that either all or a certain proportion of the crew on-board their ships are their 
own nationals. However, when considering that more than 51% of the global fleet is 
registered with Open Registers (UNCTAD, 2006) and that most of the advanced nations
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have eliminated such requirements, there is little doubt that the majority of seafarers 
serve on-board foreign registered ships. This practice is growing as more and more 
seafarers join the emerging, and fast expanding, global labour market for seafarers 
(Alderton et al, 2004; Wu, 2004, 2005; Wu and Morris, 2006).
As a result, the number of seafarers from high-cost OECD countries has declined and, 
although OECD officers still play an important role in staffing the global fleet, most of 
them are nearing retirement. Their number is also much smaller as compared to the 
large number of junior and middle-rank officers from developing labour-supply 
countries (BIMCO/ISF, 2005). This declining trend is threatening the maritime skills 
level of many TMNs and by extension their entire maritime sectors. These sectors 
depend heavily on people with seafaring skills and experience for employment in shore- 
side maritime related firms providing essential services to the industry (Gardner et al, 
2004).
The UK government’s concern is that the pool of qualified British officers is not 
sufficient to sustain the growing need for essential technical skills in the shore-side 
maritime sector. At the same time there is concern that without increasing the supply of 
junior officers the existing pool will not be able to sustain the anticipated growth in the 
UK fleet following the recovery strategies that the government has adopted over the 
past decade. The government, therefore, considers the decline to have reached critically 
low levels and fears that, with time, the sector will face an acute skills shortage which 
might force many shore-side maritime operators, especially those within the core 
maritime cluster, to relocate to overseas destinations (DETR, 1998).
The Alexander Report, which, following the publishing of the government shipping 
policy document; Charting a New Course, investigated the possibility of introducing a 
tonnage tax as the main recovery strategy, clearly recognised the importance of 
seafaring and the dangers of falling numbers of British officers. It states that:
Our shipping industry and the skills of our seafarers have long been part of 
our success as a trading nation.... Without a revival, especially of the 
number of trained officers, there will soon be a shortfall well below the 
needs of the shipping and shore-based related maritime industries 
[Alexander Report, p.3].
For the purposes of this thesis, I focus attention on the decline in the numbers of officers 
rather than ratings. This is because the UK as a supplier of ratings has long ceased to be
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competitive because of the increasing dominance of low-wage labour supply counties in 
this market. The UK does not see any need to compete in the supply of ratings and is, 
instead, working on ways of promoting ratings, through further, accelerated training, to 
become officers (DETR, 1998).
The decline in officer numbers clearly presents a major concern for the government 
because of falling levels of maritime skills and the threat that with insufficient maritime 
skills, Britain would cease to be the world’s leading shipping centre. The shipping 
policy White Paper; Charting a New Course explains:
....present day seafaring skills still underpin Britain’s leadership in many 
international [shipping] businesses [Charting a new Course, p.l]
From the wording of the policy document, there seems to be clear recognition of the 
danger that the decline in the numbers of qualified officers and the lack of cadet training 
will eventually lead to the demise of British shipping and the entire maritime sector in 
the UK. Seemingly, the government also recognises the fact that the decline is driven by 
forces of an international rather than national nature, specifically, forces of economic 
globalisation and changing international demand and supply patterns. There is, therefore, 
a recognition that effective counter measures must be designed to take into 
consideration important developments in the shipping industry globally. The 
government document goes on to say:
The globalisation of the world economy has reinforced the inherent and
unique internationalism and fluidity of the shipping industry As a result,
the UK shipping industry has faced growing low-cost competition abroad - 
especially from fleets of the newly industrialised countries of the Far East 
and increasingly from ships crewed with both officers and ratings from
South East Asia and from the former Soviet bloc the decline in the UK
merchant navy has been steeper than in many others, and has accelerated
over the last couple of years  ship-owners have found it too expensive
to continue to operate with British seafarers Against a background of
increasing globalisation, key contributors to this situation are: the impact of 
unequal competition; labour and regulatory costs; and flag competition 
[Charting a New Course, p.l 1].
In the following section I briefly examine the motivation behind the UK government’s 
intervention in the decline in the number of national seafarers. There was of course
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always the ‘Ricardian’2 choice of concentrating in areas where the UK would have 
comparative advantage and let those countries better place to supply labour do so as 
suggested by Selkou and Roe (2002). However, state policy attempted to ensure an 
increased supply of British seafaring officers.
5.2 The Case for Government Policy
The state’s interest in the shipping industry was discussed, in chapter three, with the 
conclusion that states have great interest in the industry for both strategic and 
commercial reasons. States, especially the Traditional Maritime Nations, have had an 
interest in shipping for many centuries and have, at one time or other, registered and 
owned large and strong merchant navies, which have served their military and conquest 
purposes in times of war and trade, and their economic purposes in times of peace. It is 
with large and strong naval forces that political and economic empires have been built.
The prosperity of the global economy largely depends on efficient transport, especially 
shipping, since over 95% of world trade is transported by sea (see DETR, 1998). A 
large, efficient and strong merchant navy may facilitate success in international trade 
relations and secure a greater share of its benefits. Lord Alexander observes, concerning 
British shipping, that:
[The] shipping industry and the skills of our seafarers have been a crucial
part of our success as a trading nation But concern for a strong shipping
industry is not just rooted in nostalgia. For, with the growth of world trade, 
the shipping industry is continuing to expand globally. Not surprisingly, 
many countries prize a successful shipping industry and want to share in this 
growth [The Alexander Report, p.3].
At the same time, and perhaps more importantly, states, like the UK, benefit from the 
large number of shore-side maritime related businesses that shipping supports as well as 
the employment it creates. Although some of these countries still quote strategic and 
national security as reasons for their interest in shipping, nowadays the state’s interest is 
mainly driven by economic interests. Many Traditional Maritime Nations have, in the
2 This is based on the theory o f comparative advantage, developed by David Ricardo in the early 19th 
Century. It states that countries should concentrate in producing and exporting goods in areas where they 
enjoy the highest comparative advantage.
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past few decades, gone out of their way to protect national shipping industries with 
various tax policies.
As far as national economies are concerned, shipping is therefore a commercial catalyst, 
not just in the growth of maritime activities, but also to the entire economy of a nation. 
It is also a big revenue source for governments. In the UK, for example, the shipping 
industry is ranked as the fourth largest service-sector exporter, greater than 
telecommunications, film and television, and computer services and 95% of UK trade is 
carried by sea (DETR, 1998). It is for this reason that Charting a New Course, the UK’s 
shipping policy paper states that:
The Government attaches great importance to the UK shipping industry.......
[and] does not accept that the long decline in the British merchant navy 
should simply be allowed to continue. It seems inconceivable [to me] that, 
as an island nation, we could contemplate abandoning our historic 
involvement with the sea [Charting a New Course, p.3]
The policy paper continues to underscore the importance of shipping to the UK’s 
economy, which it considers both unique and greater in comparison to many other 
industries. It summarises what the government considers to be the industry’s main areas 
of importance as follows:
Shipping has an importance for the UK which differentiates it from other
industries Efficient shipping is vital to our economic well-being: 95% of
our external trade by weight (77% by value) and 7% of domestic freight 
tonnage (but around 25% in terms of tonne kilometres), moves by water.
The competitiveness of our exporters and importers requires that 
international shipping markets are open and not unnecessarily expensive. 
[Charting a New Course, p.4].
For similar reasons, the different Traditional Maritime Nations have responded in 
various ways to the decline of their shipping industries. The UK’s strategy and the 
motivations behind it are well documented in the policy paper and, seemingly, the 
government admits that the huge decline in the industry is partly because it had been 
neglected for a long time by successive governments. It seems that, in the 1990s, the 
government came to a realisation that the country stood to lose the benefits of an 
industry which previous governments had taken for granted. One government policy 
official explained in an interview:
It is unimaginable that we had let the industry decline so much but great 
achievements have been made in the past five years  Previous
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governments have neglected the industry and left ship-owners to face unfair 
international competition leading to the decline we are facing.... This 
government has however done a lot for shipping [Government Interview]
By the mid 1990s Britain had lost a large proportion of its registered trading fleet. It had 
lost a large proportion of seafaring employment leading to an erosion of the local 
seafaring skills base and was facing the threat of losing its core shore-side maritime 
related industries. All these areas needed to be addressed and corrected if the industry 
was to be retained. The government, as evident from the policy document, decided that 
direct economic intervention, mainly in the form of reduced corporation tax, was the 
best way forward.
Whereas it seems clear why the government wanted to intervene and try to rebuild the 
UK fleet, there are many people, in the industry, who have questioned the need to spend 
a lot of effort and resources on rebuilding the pool of seafaring skills when the same can 
be acquired easily and cheaply from abroad. Selkou and Roe (2002), for example, argue 
that the UK has long lost its comparative advantage in the supply of seafaring skills and 
feel that the government’s efforts are driven by nothing other than nostalgia. The 
government, however, maintains that being an island nation and highly dependent on 
international trade for survival, the UK must maintain a strong pool of seafaring skills 
(see DETR, 1998). A government official explained:
We are an island nation and our trade with other nations largely relies on the 
strength of our shipping. Without a strong merchant navy force the strength 
of our shipping is gone [Government Interview]
Over 75% of industry managers interviewed supported the view that there is no use 
trying to hold on to a pool of seafarers because, as one explained, “UK trade does not 
necessarily depend on British staffed ships” [Shipping Company, Interview 1]. In the 
words of another manager:
With or without British officers, ships will still sail and cargo will still 
move” [Shipping Company, Interview 13]
Just like Selkou and Roe (2002), they also think that developing countries are better 
placed to supply shipping labour while developed ones concentrate on the technology, 
finance and management. The government, however, describes this position as short 
sightedness. In response to these views a government official said:
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It is only those companies with a short-sighted approach to business who 
promote such views. Many serious companies are working with us because 
they recognise and support our view that a strong domestic shipping 
industry is important to the British economy [Government Interview]
The government insists that it is essential to recover the UK seafaring labour pool 
because as the fleet grows UK based operators will need UK national officers. Most 
importantly, they say, a strong pool of qualified seafarers will maintain a steady supply 
of essential technical skills to the shore-side cluster of firms which are essential for the 
sector and the economy. The official went ahead to say that:
It is not only the deep sea businesses that stand to suffer from such short­
sightedness. It is already emerging that the decline in qualified officers is 
affecting shore-side maritime firms because they are experiencing a 
shortage of people with the essential technical skills [Government Interview]
The approach taken by the government for boosting skills and thus retaining the shore- 
side maritime cluster of firms is to increase the supply of qualified and experienced 
British officers. This argument is based on studies conducted by Cardiff University 
(Gardner and Pettit, 1996), the London Guildhall University (McConville, 1997) and a 
follow-up study by Cardiff University in (Pettit et al 2005) which clearly highlight the 
problems of diminishing numbers of British seafarers, including the advanced age 
profile of officers and the increasing demand for people with seafaring skills and 
experience to work ashore.
The Shipping Working Group set up in 1997, by the Deputy Prime Minister (Mr. John 
Prescott), to look into ways of reviving the industry emphasised the urgent need to halt 
the erosion of seafaring skills and boost the general maritime skills base (DETR, 1998). 
The British shipping policy document which drew upon the SWG report, also further 
emphasised the need for appropriate strategies to achieve this revival. It explains:
The following measures, which draw on the proposals made by the Shipping 
Working Group, are designed to increase the UK skills base, both by 
increasing seafarer training through meeting the challenges of perception, 
training promotion, funding and access to training berths; and by optimising
available and potential skills We need to assure ourselves of a continued
supply of people with seafaring skills and experience not merely to man our 
ships but to fill a wide range of jobs in the shore-based maritime-related 
sectors of the economy [Charting a New Course, p.22]
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The Alexander Report of 1999, which was the result of an independent enquiry into a 
UK tonnage tax, as the main recovery strategy for the industry, also highlighted the 
importance of a strong pool of UK national seafarers and stressed the urgent need to act. 
It pointed out that:
The stock of skilled seafarers is dwindling and their average age is 
increasing. Without a revival, especially of the number of trained officers, 
there will soon be a shortfall well below the needs of the shipping and 
shore-based related maritime industries [Alexander Report, p.3].
The point of emphasis seems to be that the wider maritime industry depends on the 
shipping industry to recruit and train seafarers who would eventually come ashore to 
sustain its operations, especially in the technical management areas. The policy 
document continues to explain:
....the training has to be carried out by shipping companies, whereas the 
ultimate end-user of seafaring skills is the shore-based maritime-related 
sector [Charting a New Course, p.22]
So, the long decline in numbers and the ageing profile of the pool of qualified and 
experienced officers means that the general maritime skills base is untenable. It also 
seems clear from the wording of these documents that the government’s main concern 
has been with the decline in the maritime skills base rather than the number of ‘active’ 
seafarers. The option for many shore-based maritime related companies, in the face of 
declining technical skills, has been to look to overseas supply. Some have even 
considered relocating operations in search of the skills. The Alexander report clearly 
recognised this as a threat and stressed the need to retain the UK shore side maritime 
industries by ensuring a sufficient supply of skills. It says:
I am obviously very aware of the importance and quality of these shore- 
based City and law-based industries. Their value is well summarized by the 
Baltic Exchange. London is the world's largest provider of maritime services
with a value assessed by British Invisibles of some £1.5-2 billion a year.....
[shore-side] agencies here are sustaining over 4,500 jobs, contributing £100 
million in tax revenue, and bringing work to City firms which specialize in
services related to shipping Without a national shipping industry and
the associated skills base, London's position as the world's biggest maritime 
centre would be vulnerable [Alexander Report, p. 17].
According to government policy officials taking part in the study, the problem of 
shrinking and ageing pool of officers has become obvious. In the past decade, there has 
been increased demand for people with seafaring skills and experience to work in
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technical management positions in shore side maritime related firms. The number 
and/or size of these firms has seemingly increased in the past few years as a result of the 
condition built into the tonnage tax which requires all shipping companies wishing to 
benefit from the tax to set-up strategic and commercial management bases in the UK. 
One of the officials explained:
We have seen an increase in demand for people with sea going experience 
to fill positions in the maritime related industries ashore, especially in the 
past few years with the increase in the number of companies joining the 
tonnage tax and moving their operations to our shores. If we do not find a 
quick solution to this problem we risk losing the entire maritime sector. This 
is beyond contemplation considering the importance of shipping to the UK 
[Government Interview]
In an interview with one shipping company personnel manager he too suggested that the 
industry could easily face a crisis soon by pointing out that his company was already 
importing skills from overseas:
If you look out there you will see a very large number of foreigners.... We 
have been forced to import all these people because it is becoming very hard 
to get qualified British people to work in positions like technical marine
management and others and it will certainly get worse [Shipping
Company, Interview 5]
However, although a few companies seemed concerned about a possible maritime skills 
crisis, over 70% of my company interviewees did not seem very bothered. Many argued 
that there will always be skills available even if not from the UK. A government source 
however dismissed such views as “the discouraging short-termisim of the industry 
which makes everything ever so complicated” [Government Interview].
The strength of the government’s argument for a stronger pool of qualified British 
officers, therefore, seems to lie in the need to maintain a steady supply of shore-side 
maritime skills. This problem was clearly highlighted in the Alexander Report. It 
emphasised the need to boost the maritime skills base and stressed the central and 
critical role that the shipping industry plays in the development and sustenance of such 
skills:
The need for more officers is highlighted by the strength and requirements 
of our shore-based infrastructure.... Most of these jobs were [always] filled 
by the most fully trained officers with Class 1 certificates.... Practical 
seafaring experience generally remains the key element in the mix of
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competences which is sought by shore-based sectors in appointing seafarers 
[Alexander Report, p. 17].
The focus for the state to intervene therefore seems clear; the shipping industry is 
considered crucial to the economy and can not be left to disappear. Without restoring 
the pool of national officers the country risks losing that very important shore-side 
maritime cluster which, not only provides employment to millions of British people, but 
also earns the country a lot of revenue and ensures the continued prosperity of UK’s 
international trade. The objectives of the intervention strategies adopted were equally 
well spelt out in the form of terms of reference for the Shipping Working Group:
• To enable the maximum economic and environmental benefit to be obtained 
from shipping;
• To reverse the decline in the UK merchant fleet;
• To increase the employment and training of British seafarers; and
• To encourage ship-owners and the wider maritime industry to commit more 
resources to seafarer training (DETR, 1998).
One essential point to explore, in the process of trying to understand the state’s response, 
is the specific interpretation that the government gave to the problems of decline. 
Because effective solutions often follow accurate interpretations of the causes of the 
problem, it is important to try and examine the state’s diagnosis of the causes of this 
particular problem. This is the main subject of the next section.
5.3 The Problem
Clearly, the state recognised the need to intervene and stop the decline in both tonnage 
and seafaring labour. The state has maintained the argument that the decline poses a 
threat to the future of British shipping, the survival and prosperity of the UK’s shore- 
side maritime sector and the wellbeing of the general economy (DETR, 1998). The 
effectiveness of any intervention strategy adopted by the government would, however, 
be determined by the specific diagnosis of the problem. The government seems to have 
adopted a simple narrative to explain the decline. This narrative describes a situation 
where in the 1970s and 1980s, increasing operating costs and growing competition
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pushed many British ship-owners to seek cheaper sources of labour overseas. In 
addition to the decline in the UK fleet this led to a situation of diminished cadet training 
capacity because shipping companies were no longer training British cadets. A 
government official explained:
Companies in the 70s and 80s stopped training cadets in the UK because 
they wanted to employ cheaper foreign labour so as to reduce costs. 
Training completely stopped and previous governments did little to 
encourage it. This is what the current government is trying to do: encourage 
companies to recruit and train more UK cadets [Government Interview]
According to government policy officials participating in this study, the neglect of the 
decline for a long time diminished the British seafaring tradition (see also Obando- 
Rojas et al, 1999). The consequence was that many young people today know little 
about seagoing careers and feel less inclined to go to sea in the face of many more 
shore-based career alternatives. One policy official observed in an interview:
The decline in officer numbers is due to a combination of factors but most
importantly it has a long history behind it the huge decline in UK fleets
obviously meant that training opportunities also declined [Government 
Interview]
Most important here is the fact that, the state understands the decline in seafaring skills 
to have been strongly linked to, and preceded by, the decline in tonnage. That declining 
UK tonnage led to a fall in employment for UK seafarers and diminished demand for 
UK officers. Furthermore, it reduced the cadet training capacity as the following quote 
suggests:
Because ship-owners were going after cheaper crews they stopped 
employing British officers and naturally they stopped training UK cadets,
[and] that is where the problem started from [Government Interview]
The government also understands that the prolonged lack of employment for British 
officers and lack of cadet recruitment and training negatively impacted upon the 
society’s perception of the career which might have led to a decline in the enthusiasm of 
British people towards the seafaring occupation. According to a government source:
During these years of decline the momentum of our seafaring tradition was 
interrupted such that now we have to try and re-cultivate awareness and 
interest among British youth [Government Interview].
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According to these government officials the worst effect of the prolonged period of 
decline in the fleet, employment and officer numbers has been a growing distance 
between shipping and seafaring activities and people’s lives. One explained:
Now many people no longer have contact with shipping and the new 
generation knows very little about seafaring careers [Government Interview].
The government’s view on the impact of this decline in seafaring skills is well 
documented in the main shipping policy documents like Charting a New Course and 
came out clearly in my interviews with the policy officials. Evidence from these 
documents show that the government’s position was that this decline not only affected 
deep-sea shipping skills but, and perhaps more importantly, shore-side maritime skills. 
Primarily concerned with the effects of a skills shortage to such an important sector, the 
government saw boosting cadet recruitment and training as the best way to increase the 
supply of qualified junior officers. These officers would, after some years of sea 
experience, transfer essential skills to the shore-side maritime sector. One government 
policy source explained:
It is important that we increase training activities; it is the only way we can 
ensure a steady and reliable replenishment of such important skills 
[Government Interview]
Another official added:
If we do not have a steady supply of maritime skills coming through from 
the sea, you can imagine what could happen to London as a centre for 
international shipping... It is very important that the pool of qualified 
officers is maintained.... The government, as you know, is doing everything 
possible to make sure of this [Government Interview]
The government’s emphasis on ‘shore-side maritime skills’, as opposed to ‘seafaring 
skills’, in both the documents and interviews is significant and, perhaps, reveals its 
central interpretation of the skills problem. From the wording of the various policy 
documents and the interviews it seems that the government’s main interest in the British 
pool of officers is only as a means of producing and transferring seafaring skills to the 
shore. This might lead to one important but disturbing question: Is it possible, therefore, 
that the government had long given up on the local pool of seafaring skills and was, 
instead, only concerned with shore-side maritime skills? A government source had the 
following to say:
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We will be lying to ourselves to expect that the UK can ever play a major 
role in staffing the international fleet. That market is gone. However, we 
cannot give up on the shore-side skills base; that is important else there will 
be no Maritime London [Government Interview].
Should it be the case that the government’s main concern was not with seafaring skills, 
but rather, shore-side maritime skills, then it might explain the lack of force behind the 
strategy. However, there would still be one puzzle: if the government was not keen on 
rebuilding the pool of seafarers for its own sake, why did they not find more effective, 
shore-based, solutions instead of the more complicated route via seafaring, which the 
companies seemed to oppose?
A possible answer to this puzzle is that the government was always aware that 
rebuilding a huge pool of sea-going staff would be difficult because of the competition 
from low-cost labour supply countries, although there was urgent need to increase the 
supply of shore-side skills. Unfortunately developing shore-based training solutions 
would be hard and could take a long time because it would involve a complete change 
in the current system of producing skills for the industry. The only option was therefore 
to convince shipping companies that training officers in order to replenish and sustain 
shore-side maritime skills was ultimately to their own advantage because, although they 
could get seafaring crews from low-wage countries, they could not rely on the same for 
their operations ashore. This also comes out in one government interview where the 
official remarked that “after all, it is these same companies who require the skills in 
their shore-side management activities” [Government Interview].
While analysing the government’s interpretation of the problem and considering its 
impact on the form of the response adopted, it is important to consider the fact that the 
government was working with other stakeholders whose interpretations inevitably 
impacted to some extent upon its perception. There was pressure from unions and from 
corporate industry to ensure that the government’s strategy effectively represented their 
different interests. In the next section I will examine the consultative process 
underpinning the development of the strategy and consider the influence of the industry 
and the unions on the outcome.
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5.4 Designing an Approach
In the process leading to the development of a comprehensive shipping policy which 
would set out the government strategy for the recovery of the industry, the government 
did not work in isolation. It engaged in a consultative process involving all the major 
stake-holders including seafarers’ unions, and the corporate industry. In 1997 the 
government formed the Shipping Working Group (SWG) consisting of representatives 
from key stake-holders in the industry including trade unions, Maritime London3, the 
Chamber of Shipping, Ports and Harbours and various relevant government departments 
(DETR, 1998). This group was charged with the responsibility of examining the 
problems facing the industry. It came up with recommendations upon which the White 
Paper, British Shipping: Charting a New Course is based. The main objectives detailed 
in the policy were therefore drawn from the recommendations of the SWG report. These 
are summed up as:
...to develop the UK's maritime skills, secure British seafaring employment, 
enhance the UK's attractiveness to shipping enterprises, and gain safety and 
environmental benefits [Charting a New Course, p.l].
This consultative approach was necessary, according to the government, because the 
decline in the industry touched on, and affected, all parties related to maritime business 
(DETR, 1998). It was also a problem that had been left to grow so big that only a 
combined effort of all interest groups could resolve it. The shipping policy document, 
Charting a New Course, clearly emphasised the need for all stake-holders to continue 
working together to stop the decline and reverse the trend in order to make the British 
maritime sector strong again:
More than an action plan is required [to reverse the decline]. [The objectives 
of Charting a New Course] will be attained - and the maritime economic 
future of the nation secured - only over time and through a committed and 
sustained partnership between the Government, the maritime trades unions, 
the UK shipping industry, 'Maritime London', the ports and the other 
maritime-related sectors [Charting a New Course, p.l].
3 Maritime London is the term used to refer to a collection o f  shore-side firms offering maritime services 
in the city o f London. These include Finance, Insurance, Legal, Brokers and Agency, Survey, ship 
management and consultancy, firms.
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It further described and stressed the need for ‘partnership and synergy’ as the only way 
to achieve positive and lasting solutions to the decline:
The piecemeal measures taken to date have not succeeded in reversing the 
present vicious circle of decline because they have not addressed the
complexity of the situation It is evident therefore, that success in creating
a Virtuous circle' of growth rests greatly on the synergy generated by the 
integrated policy proposals. This can be achieved only by a committed 
partnership between all the various interests - the ship-owners, the maritime- 
related industries, the maritime unions and government - to ensure full 
implementation of the 'package' [Charting a New Course, p.21].
The government also maintained that in order to effectively address problems in such a 
complex industry all interested parties needed to work together because “individual 
interest-group strategies would only promote specific interests and would be ineffective 
in the long term” [Government Interview]. It recognised that all maritime interests were 
conjoined and had to be addressed as one. For example, the government identified the 
fact that the burden of developing and maintaining a steady supply of maritime skills 
rested with ship-owners and pointed out that it was a burden which these companies 
would not want to continue to carry unless it was made worth their while (DETR, 1998). 
For this reason all parties affected by the decline in skills needed to coordinate the 
process of recovery:
 maintenance of the UK maritime skills base required by the shore-
based sector of the economy depends on increasing the recruitment and 
training of British seafarers - a burden which will continue to fall, in the 
main, on UK shipping companies. Even with the aid of government grants, 
these companies will have little incentive to make this investment unless 
they consider it viable to employ such seafarers [Charting a New Course,
P-21].
Following the adoption of the policy the government constituted an independent 
commission of enquiry into a UK Tonnage Tax which was chaired by Lord Alexander 
of Weedon. This commission investigated and reported on the viability of a tonnage tax 
as a possible strategy for the recovery of British shipping. In the same spirit of 
‘partnership and synergy’ the commission was also made up of representatives from all 
the major stake-holders in the industry. When it reported {Alexander Report 1999) the 
commission recommended the adoption of a UK tonnage tax as the main strategy for 
the recovery of shipping. The aim was to make the UK a more friendly investment and
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business environment for ship-owners and operators in order to encourage growth in the 
industry, both afloat and ashore. The report explains:
It is accepted by all those I have consulted, including Government 
departments, the industry and trades unions that without a user-friendly and 
virtually tax-exempt environment there is no real prospect of achieving the 
aim of Government policy to revive the industry. A tonnage-based form of 
corporation tax is the means proposed to achieve this fiscal environment. 
Evaluation of it was at the core of my terms of reference [Alexander Report, 
p.3]
After all the consultations and deliberations the UK tonnage tax was agreed upon as the 
main government strategy to spearhead the recovery of the UK’s shipping industry. 
Because of the diversity of perspective and interests comprising the consultative process 
described above, that is, the union perspective, the corporate perspective and that of the 
government, one would reasonably expect a conflict of interest since each group would 
be pursuing its own agenda. In the following section I examine and discuss this ‘clash’ 
and explain how it might have influenced the process and the final result. It is essential 
to examine how the government handled the diverse agenda that must have been 
presented by the different parties. This might help shed some light on the puzzle as to 
why the strategies are inconsistent with the state’s diagnosis of the problem.
5.5 Conflicting Interests
I have already indicated that the government had to work through a complex of 
conflicting stakeholder interests in the process of arriving at a comprehensive response 
strategy. The three most important stake-holders, in this case, were the corporate 
shipping industry, represented by the Chamber of Shipping and the seafarers and 
shipping professionals unions, represented by (NUMAST) - the National Union of 
Maritime Aviation and Shipping Transport (now called Nautilus-UK), the National 
Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers (RMT) and the Transport and General 
Workers Union (T&G) and the Government.
The unions pushed for the training, employment and general welfare of British seafarers 
and their recommendations to the SWG included encouraging all UK-based ship­
owners and operators to train British cadets and make training berths available on all 
suitable vessels. With regard to employment, the unions’ recommendations centred on
- 115 -
the need to ensure, through state legislation, that more seafaring jobs were created and 
protected on-board all British flagged ships (DETR, 1998).
The corporate industry, on the other hand, proposed that the government help reduce 
their cost burden with regard to training and employing British seafarers (DETR, 1998). 
Their argument was that British officers were much more expensive than those from 
low-cost developing countries. Hence, if the government subsidized the cost-difference, 
they would be willing to employ more British officers. In addition, they called for 
National Insurance contribution alleviation and the expansion of the Crew Relief Cost 
Scheme4 for those companies which met the minimum training commitment as ways of 
encouraging operators to employ British junior officers (See DETR, 1998).
Seemingly, the companies’ main interest was to push for an improved business 
environment for their operations because, according to one industry manager, “there is 
sufficient supply of seafarers and we do not really rely on the British source” [Shipping 
Company, Interview 10]. Their major concern was that the cost of operating ships under 
the UK register was too great, such that UK ship-owners and operators were finding it 
difficult to compete with their counterparts from low-cost flags. They recommended the 
introduction of a more favourable tax arrangement for resident companies and 
enhancement to the rate of depreciation allowance to make capital investment more 
profitable (DETR, 1998).
While there certainly was common ground in the need to see UK shipping come out of 
the decline and grow, the two main stake-holders were pushing two separate and 
conflicting positions. The unions’ called for more involvement by the industry, both at 
sea and ashore, in funding more cadet training. The same goes for their call for the 
provision of employment opportunities for British seafarers on UK-flagged ships. These 
proposals went against the cost-cutting agenda of the corporate industry.
4 The Crew Relief Costs Scheme provides assistance in meeting the cost of flying British crew to and from distant 
ports. The scheme aims to encourage ship owners and managers to employ seafarers resident in the British Isles. 
Section 76 o f the Merchant Shipping Act 1995 allows financial assistance to companies for travel costs for crew 
members who are U.K. resident. The government contributes £1.4m to this scheme annually.
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It was, therefore, largely a ‘battle’ of interests between shipping capital and shipping 
labour in which the main difficulty for the state was in arriving at strategy that would 
effectively serve both sets of interests. The dilemma was how to convince ship-owners 
to train more British cadets and employ more British junior officers when it was clearly 
not in their short-term commercial interest to do so. By looking at the design of the 
tonnage tax it seems as if the government’s fear of ‘tonnage flight’ meant that corporate 
interests prevailed. This is because the tonnage tax delivers more ‘tangible’ benefit to 
ship-owners than to seafarers. It gives ship-owners enormous tax reductions but requires 
no UK officer employment commitment on their part. The Minimum Training 
Obligation contained in the Tonnage Tax only requires ship-owners to recruit cadets 
and contribute 50% of the total expenses of their training but, as the unions argue, “if 
the companies do not want to employ the junior officers they undertake to train, the 
training obligation is meaningless in the long-run” [Union Interview].
What this implies is that, whereas the government finally had a clear strategy in place 
for increasing UK tonnage (offering tax reductions to ship-owners and improving the 
general business environment), they did not have any for seafaring skills. The most 
persuasive explanation for this is that the government was most strongly influenced by a 
fear of ‘capital flight’ and this caused it to abandon any efforts to make a stronger case 
for seafarer employment. Like the government, the unions were also influenced by the 
same fear and did not push convincingly for their case fearing that companies would 
decide to flag out as a result of pressure to employ British junior officers, resulting in a 
further loss of employment for British officers. The impact of this upon unions would 
be a further decline in terms of membership and, ultimately bargaining capacity. The 
data therefore seem to strongly suggest that the design and adoption of the 
government’s response was heavily influenced by a fear of capital flight such that the 
overall response favoured shipping capital interests more than the interests of seafaring 
labour.
5.6 The Strategy
The tonnage tax was introduced into UK law by the Finance Act of 2000 (HMSO, 
2000). It is mainly a tax incentive via which the government sought to reduce shipping 
companies’ tax burden by offering a friendlier and predictable tax system based on the 
total tonnage operated rather than the total profits of a company. A training element was
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included to commit the companies to train UK cadets in order to increase the supply of 
British junior officers (Lord Alexander, 1999; Selkou and Roe, 2002).
Prior to this, however, and with regard to the need to increase the number of officers, 
the government, following the proposals of the Shipping Working Group on how to 
increase funding for cadet training, put in place a scheme called SMarT -  Support for 
Maritime Training. The aim was to channel government funding for the recruitment and 
training of cadets in the UK. This scheme was introduced in April of 1998. The main 
objective was to increase the number of officer trainees, which had dwindled over 
previous years to a mere trickle, through increased financial support for cadet training 
from the government.
The SMarT scheme is divided into four categories:
(1) SMarT 1 funds trainees following a programme of training leading to a 
Maritime and Coast Guard Agency (MCA) first certificate of competency as a 
deck, engineering or dual officer;
(2) SMarT 2 funds junior officers following a programme of shore-based 
training leading to a second certificate of competency as a deck, engineering or 
dual officer;
(3) SMarT 3 funds ratings following programmes of shore-based training to 
develop their skills and;
(4) SMarT 4 funds officers already holding certificates of competency following 
shore-based training to update their skills in order to meet the new requirements 
of the revised Standardisation o f Training, Certification and Watchkeeping 
(STCW) 95.
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This fourth category was necessary because following the revision of the STCW 785 in 
1995 there was a requirement to upgrade seafarers’ training to the standards and 
requirements of the new STCW 95. The objective of this new version was to provide a 
standard for training officers worldwide so as to ensure a uniform quality of officers due 
to the growing diversity of nationalities joining the global seafaring labour market. All 
those officers who were working at sea before 1st August 1998 and had not completed 
the requirements for the STCW 78 certificate would be required to take the new STCW 
95 certificate after extra training.
A fifth category was added to the scheme recently (in 2004) which targets new entrants 
and other supernumerary ratings following apprenticeship and other courses of more 
than fifty-two weeks in length. This scheme is a long term government funding 
commitment. It will increase the industry financial support from £6.4 million in 1999 to 
£23.4 million in 2007 (Lord Alexander, 1999:18).
Although this scheme was introduced much earlier than the main policy strategy -  
tonnage tax -  it has come to play an important role as a supporting mechanism. It is 
now the main vehicle for channelling the government’s part of the cadet training 
funding under a joint training commitment established as part of the tonnage tax 
whereby shipping companies pay half of the total cost of training cadets while the 
government pays the other half. The primary objective of the scheme is to enable as 
many young British people as possible to train as officers by providing funding. The full 
course costs around £40,000 per cadet for a three to four year programme. Providing the 
funding in this way therefore ensures that all those school leavers who would like to 
train as officers are not denied the chance and so that the government maximises the 
opportunity to get as many young people to enter the programme as possible by 
eliminating financial obstacles.
5 The International Convention on Standards o f Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers 
(STCW) is an International Maritime Organization (IMO) which sets minimum qualification standards 
for masters, officers and watch personnel on seagoing merchant ships. The Convention was the first to 
establish basic requirements on training, certification and watchkeeping for seafarers on an international 
level. Previously the standards were established by individual governments, usually without reference to 
practices in other countries. It was adopted in 1978, entered into force in 1984 and was significantly 
amended in 1995.
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With regard to boosting growth in the pool of British seafarers an important training 
element was included in the tonnage tax. This training element takes the form of a 
requirement that all participating companies recruit and train one UK cadet per every 
fifteen officer slots entered in the ships ‘manning’ certificate:
The formal training offer made by the industry as a precondition of 
eligibility to the tonnage tax is a "minimum training obligation", "to recruit 
each year one UK officer trainee for every 15 existing officer posts, 
regardless of whether the existing post was currently filled by a UK officer 
or one from another country." After three years this would mean in broad 
terms that there would be one officer cadet under training for every five 
officer posts [Alexander Report, p. 17].
A third and more recent initiative which, like the SMarT scheme, is complementary to 
the tonnage tax is ‘Sea Vision. ’ It is a coordinated national campaign led by the British 
Chamber of Shipping to raise awareness of the sea and the maritime sector. Its two main 
objectives are to raise awareness and increase understanding of the sea and the wider 
maritime sector, and to attract young people to participate in maritime activities and 
careers. The government works in partnership with the Chamber of Shipping, the 
Merchant Navy Training Board (MNTB) and other maritime bodies and institutions to 
organise promotional events and activities in schools and youth centres around the 
country. The ultimate aim is to correct the negative social perception of the profession 
and rejuvenate the shipping and seafaring tradition of the British people in order to 
create and maintain a viable source of British officers to sustain the maritime skills base:
Sea-vision UK campaign is driven by industry, from the chamber of 
shipping as you already know. Funded by industry to a large part and it is 
all about raising awareness, along side, the merchant navy training board 
also do a lot work to promote and encourage awareness of careers at sea, its 
a big job [Government Interview].
A fourth and closely related initiative in which the state has played a greater role is the 
development of a new foundation degree. This is also a supporting initiative intended to 
promote and enhance the image of the seafaring career. In order to encourage more 
young British people of higher academic quality to join seafaring the government is 
experimenting with this new training path for cadets with an elevated academic status 
which allows those who are interested in degree qualifications to achieve them in 
seafaring.
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All these different initiatives make up the government’s comprehensive recovery 
strategy but, as I said earlier, the main element is the establishment of the Tonnage Tax 
and the Minimum Training Obligation contained within it. In this thesis I therefore refer 
to them as ‘the tonnage tax package of initiatives’.
5.7 Assessment
As already discussed in chapter three, the objectives of the government’s strategy for 
shipping were threefold: first, to boost growth in the UK fleet by creating a friendly and 
attractive business atmosphere for ship-owners; second, to increase the supply of 
seafaring skills through increased cadet recruitment and training; finally, to boost 
growth in the shore-side maritime cluster of industries so as to maintain the strength and 
influence of the city of London as the international centre for maritime business. One 
important characteristic of this strategy is that it is almost entirely supply oriented in the 
sense that it is designed to address supply rather than demand issues.
There is too much emphasis on state-prescribed supply initiatives which do not take 
demand into serious consideration. This is an important characteristic because it is 
inconsistent with the government’s diagnosis of the actual problem which highlighted 
predominantly demand related issues. Furthermore, a recent review of skills in the UK 
shows that an effective approach to skills development is one which is demand-led 
rather than supply oriented (Leitch Review of Skills, 2006). Data from World Fleet 
Statistics, presented in the chart below, indicate that UK registered tonnage has 
increased significantly since the introduction of the tonnage tax in 2000. From 
5,531,986 GT in 2000, the total tonnage of the UK fleet grew to 12,149,988 GT in 2006 
which represents a big improvement within five years.
Fig. 13: UK Registered Tonnage 2000 -  2006
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Although there has been some improvement on the side of cadet training, the increase is 
not great. Government statistics indicate a rise in the number of cadets joining training 
between 1999 and 2006. There has been a 30% growth in cadet intake. Though this 
growth is significant, measured against the target set of 1200 cadets a year, it is not 
enough to sustain the UK’s seafaring skills needs because the decline in the skills base 
was very great.
Cadet in-take and training declined drastically in the period between mid 1970s and late 
1980s. From an annual intake of 2,315 in 1975 it fell to 1,274 in 1980 and down to 162 
in 1987. From then it recovered slightly to between 400 and 500 in 1999 (House of 
Commons, 1993; Employment Link, 2004). Since the tonnage tax was introduced, with 
its training commitment, there has been a significant improvement on these figures to 
around 630 in 2006. The number of cadets actually in training in each year, which 
would suggest the annual output levels for junior officers, has, however, not improved 
much. From 981 cadets in 2000 the number has only slightly increased to 1090 in 2006. 
Figure 14 shows the cadet intake and training trend since the tonnage tax (see figure 
below).
Fig. 14: Cadet Intake and Training Levels 1999 - 2006
Cadet Intake and Training Levels 1999 - 2006
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This small improvement in levels of cadet output, despite the significant increase in 
intake levels, raises questions about the success of the strategy. The officers’ union, 
Nautilus UK says that:
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Sadly, since Charting a New Course was published in December 1998 there 
has been growing evidence that the measures put in place to develop the 
industry’s workforce have been inadequate [Employment Link, 2004, p.l]
According to the 1996 study, it was determined that the UK needed a yearly cadet in­
take of 1200 in order to maintain the minimum maritime skills base (Gardner and Pettit, 
1996). With the introduction of the tonnage tax it was hoped that this target would be 
met within the first five years but unfortunately this has not happened although it is 
important to acknowledge that there has been a 30% increase in cadet intake levels 
between 1999 and 2006. The main problem seems to be that this increase has not 
translated into an increase in the number of qualified junior officers graduating from the 
training programme. Consequently the total number of qualified British officers has not 
changed significantly since 2000 and, evidence from the industry shows that the little 
increase is being quickly absorbed into a market that is already experiencing a shortage.
Fig. 15: Total Number of UK Officers 2000 - 2006
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The overall assessment is that whereas the strategy has succeeded in the objective of 
attracting ship-owners and increasing UK registered tonnage, it has failed to increase 
the number of junior officers. The surprising outcome of this analysis is, however, that 
the Minimum Training Obligation and all the associated initiatives have led to a 
significant increase in annual cadet intake levels. The important question therefore is: 
why has this increase not translated into an increase in the annual output of qualified 
junior officers? The answer lies with corporate officer recruitment and employment 
policies and practices, the subject of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER SIX
The Company Approach 
Introduction
Chapter five described the complex context of conflicting stakeholder interests from 
which the government had to work out a common response strategy for the declining 
UK shipping industry. However, the assessment at the end of the chapter concluded that 
the strategy adopted has not been successful in relation its objective of increasing the 
number of British junior officers. To begin to explore why this is the case, I consider the 
position of the companies in this process. After all, the critical partner in the process of 
developing and adopting the tonnage tax package of measures is the shipping 
companies. They were targeted as the main beneficiaries of the tax package as well as 
the implementers of a largely supply based approach.
The tonnage tax is primarily a form of corporation tax, specially designed for shipping 
companies, whereby their income is taxed on the basis of the total tonnage of their 
registered fleet rather than their total annual profits. Via this tax regime and its 
associated “Minimum Training Obligation”, the UK government has sought to boost 
growth in the national fleet and encourage the training of British officers. They have, in 
addition, introduced extra indirect measures to support seafarers’ employment but, as 
we have seen previously, nothing has been done to directly address the problem of lack 
of employment opportunities for UK seafarers on UK ships.
The tonnage tax package of initiatives has so far failed to effectively tackle the crisis in 
shipping labour in the UK despite the increase in company involvement in cadet 
recruitment and training. The main question here is why this has been the case? In this 
chapter I will analyse the interview data collected on shipping companies’ post-tonnage- 
tax recruitment and employment strategies, for merchant navy officers, in order to 
consider why the government strategy has not been as successful as initially expected.
The overall objective of the government in introducing the tonnage tax was to 
encourage growth in the UK registered fleet and the shore-side cluster of maritime 
related industries. Additionally the government sought to stimulate the recruitment and
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training of British cadets. What the tonnage tax did not do was specifically address the 
employment of qualified British junior officers. A number of important questions are 
addressed in this chapter: How have company recruitment policies and practices been 
affected by the tonnage tax? What drives and determines the direction of company 
recruitment policies? And, in what ways have these policies rendered the tonnage tax 
strategy ineffective with respect to skills development.
The chapter is organised into four sections. Section one introduces a possible 
explanation for the failure of the tonnage tax by examining the prevailing attitude of 
UK-based shipping companies towards its design and focus. Section two presents a 
discussion of the recruitment policies and strategies of UK based companies and their 
determining factors. Section three is a discussion of the impact of these company 
policies on the performance of the tonnage tax and will examine how companies have 
approached and executed their training obligation by analysing company managers’ 
accounts of their commitment to cadet recruitment and training. Finally, section four 
concludes the chapter with an overall assessment of the implications of company 
recruitment and employment policies on training levels in the UK and examines the 
reasons why companies use arguments about quality and reliability to justify and 
legitimise the arguments about cost.
6.1 The Industry View of the Tonnage Tax
As already stated, the tonnage tax was designed to achieve three main objectives: (1) To 
revive the diminished UK registered fleet; (2) to expand the cluster of maritime related 
firms and industries and; (3) to increase the number of qualified British junior officers 
and boost the maritime skills base. Chapter three established that whereas much has 
been accomplished, through the strategy, with regard to the first two objectives, the last 
objective, that is, increasing the number of qualified British officers has proved difficult 
to achieve. According to the Department of Transport (DfT) data a significant number 
of ship-owners have brought their vessels into the tonnage tax regime, many of which 
have since been transferred to the UK register. This is reflected in the increase in UK 
registered tonnage from 5.5 to 12 million GT between 2000 and 2006 (Lloyd’s Register 
-  Fairplay: World Fleet Statistics, 2006).
In a highly globalised industry such as shipping where the possibility of capital flight is 
probably greater than anywhere else, and labour, though locally based, is organised and
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accessed globally, the influence of companies on related state economic strategies is 
likely to be significant. The success or otherwise of a strategy like the tonnage tax 
Minimum Training Obligation, which aims to develop and sustain an individual, 
national labour segment, therefore, largely depends on the attitude and response of the 
companies based within the state.
According to shipping company managers the tonnage tax has several shortcomings. 
Their concern is mostly with the cost of operations and the general business atmosphere 
in the country. Many presented the view that the government could have done, and 
should do, more for the industry in order to encourage more capital investment. For 
example, they argue that the government could “re-introduce 100 percent depreciation 
allowance for ships and take measures to bring back ship-building” [Shipping Company, 
Interview 11]. Many, however, agreed that the tax savings offered by the tonnage tax 
arrangement were substantial, which explains why many of them have opted to bring 
their ships and a substantial amount of their ship management operations (back) to the 
UK. A government official explained that “many owners [were] already seeing the 
benefits of the tonnage tax and bringing their ships into the UK register” [Government 
Interview]. According to the official, “the UK fleet [has] responded with good growth in 
the past few years”.
The issue of increasing training and employment for British junior officers is however 
more complicated and industry managers had different things to say about it. The 
strategy is clearly not working in this area and there seems to be divided opinion as to 
whether the tonnage tax is adequate and well balanced enough to achieve all its intended 
objectives. Although many of the managers did not seem bothered about this particular 
issue, there were a few who supported the view that the number of officers in the UK 
should be encouraged and aided to grow but they argued that the government had not 
done enough in this direction and suggested that, from the way the strategy was 
designed, it seemed that increasing the pool of seafarers was not top of the 
government’s list of priorities. Some argued that the strategy was primarily aimed at 
fleet recovery and encouraging capital investment in the industry with cadet training and 
employment being just a secondary objective. One such manager said:
...if  you look at the tonnage tax critically you will realise that it was never 
really meant to focus on cadet training and employment from the start, it 
was only hoped that it would result in some increased training. The tonnage
- 1 2 6  -
tax was always a financial instrument to encourage ship-owners to operate 
their vessels under the UK regime [Shipping Company, Interview 17]
Their interpretation of the strategy was that, it was influenced by the fear of tonnage 
flight, whereby national governments are in constant fear of introducing measures 
which might upset ship-owners and drive them out of the UK register. Confirmation for 
the view that tonnage flight was a major factor shaping the strategy was given by union 
and government officials. One union official, for example, observed that “the 
government is just scared that the owners will up and go if forced to employ more 
British junior officers” [Union Interview]. A push for employment is one of the things 
that might cause capital to move elsewhere (See Sorensen, 2004; Fourcade-Gourinchas 
and Babb, 2002; Hall, 2003). In an interview With one of the government policy 
officials he explained that “the government is aware of the dangers of pushing 
companies too hard” but added that “this does not mean that we are doing nothing, we 
are in negotiations with companies to make sure that a lasting solution is found” 
[Government Interview].
The greatest criticism o f the government strategy, especially from those industry 
managers who support efforts to increase the pool of officers, is that it contains no 
effective blueprint for recovering the pool of seafarers. In response to a question on this 
a government official said:
When [the tonnage tax] was being developed all parties hoped that the 
training commitment in itself would lead to employment. All parties 
believed that once people had trained seafarers they would employ them and 
that this would then automatically lead to an increase in the numbers of 
junior officers and more enthusiasm [Government Interview].
What this suggests is that there was no clear strategy for increasing employment for 
British junior officers since it was only “hoped” that employment would 
“automatically” follow. There is wide consensus though that the government, through 
the tonnage tax, addressed only the supply side of an equation which could not be 
effectively solved without tackling the demand side. Even the employers (the ship­
owners and operators) acknowledge the fact that without boosting employment 
opportunities for British junior officers, the seafaring career will continue to be 
perceived as a career without prospects for the British. This would mean that attracting 
and retaining many young people of suitable quality and disposition would be difficult. 
One training manager observed that:
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The problem with the tonnage tax is that none of its financial incentives 
really translate into any benefit for the seafarer. There is little 
encouragement directly to the seafarer and, to make it worse, it does not 
really focus on creating jobs for the cadets that go through the system. It has 
done little to address the problem of diminishing job opportunities since it 
does not compel the owners to employ so the owners train British cadets but 
they are not willing to give them jobs because they are too expensive, 
[Shipping Company, Interview 3].
It seems, therefore, that it was not enough for the government to just ‘hope’ that 
employment would follow. According to many people in the industry, including, some 
company managers, training managers and union officials, it was clear from the 
beginning that creating employment was key to achieving the overall objective hence 
the government should have pushed strongly for employment as a key component in the 
strategy.
So, seemingly, many industry managers agree on the necessity of subsidising 
employment opportunities by the state as a way of stimulating growth in the British 
pool of qualified junior officers. Many of them however maintain that the circumstances 
which led employers to seek low-wage foreign labour have not changed. They insist 
that the cost of operating ships is still very high and that British junior officers are still 
much more expensive as compared to their counterparts from Eastern Europe, Asia and 
elsewhere in the developing world. Furthermore, the British source, in the opinion of 
many employers, is not reliable as most officers tend to retire early from sea service. 
Many therefore argued that, whereas they can not agree to any formal employment 
commitment, as proposed by the unions (see Employment Link, 2004), appropriate 
government incentives, especially those that could mitigate cost, might encourage 
British ship-owners to employ more British junior officers. One such manager 
explained:
Unless the government is willing to subsidise shipping companies I don’t 
think any of us are willing to commit to employing any more British junior 
officers than we necessarily can. It is becoming even more expensive to 
employ the British as cost increases and you. are not going to convince a 
ship-owner, keen on surviving cut-throat competition to employ a British 
junior officer when he can get good Polish officers at a much less price 
[Shipping Company, Interview 17].
With regard to the tonnage tax as an incentive for registering and operating ships from 
the UK, most of the companies seem satisfied and, as stated earlier, many of them have
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brought their vessels into the tonnage tax regime and even transferred them to the UK 
register. One manager observed:
The tax benefits are substantial, compared to the normal corporation tax, 
this is a great relief from the heavy cost burden that has crippled British 
owners in the past many years [Shipping Company, Interview 12]
Even the cost of training cadets does not seem to bother the companies greatly though 
some think that the state should consider subsidising the total cadet training cost as is 
the case in other EU countries like the Netherlands. One HR Manager explained that the 
amount they have to spend on the training scheme is reasonable though more state 
subsidy would be even better:
The 50/50 training cost-sharing arrangement is reasonable. It certainly 
makes it easier for companies but maybe the government should be thinking 
in terms of 100% training subsidy like in the case of the Netherlands in 
order to encourage even more training activity [Shipping Company, 
Interview 12].
So, the tax reduction is ‘substantial’ and the training cost arrangement is ‘reasonable’ 
but, the data clearly suggest that the overall arrangement does not necessarily encourage 
companies to consider employing more British junior officers. Very few of the 
companies interviewed actually train with the view of employing. This suggests that 
many companies view the training obligation simply as a condition to be met in order to 
participate and partake in the benefits of the tonnage tax regime. With relation to the 
intention to employ cadets, one Operations Manager explained:
We don’t guarantee employment to any of our cadets simply because we 
can’t. We tell them we will do our best to get them employment...We 
cannot guarantee jobs at the beginning of a three year training programme 
because you never know what happens three years down the line maybe 
circumstances may change, fleet decline or even expansion [Shipping 
Company, Interview 4]
A Human Resource Manager of another company explained:
We train alright but that does not mean very much... I don’t want you to get 
me wrong, I have nothing against training British officers but who is going 
to employ them? If we train then we should employ but we can’t... it is just 
too expensive... I don’t want to give young people false hopes... It is a sad 
situation, I agree, but that is the way of open markets... we must live with it 
[Shipping Company, Interview 13]
- 129 -
Many of these company managers stated that, even in better circumstances, they were 
unwilling to employ British junior officers because of the availability of cheaper yet 
equally suitable alternatives overseas:
There is very little reason for many companies to revert back to employing 
British officers. The fact is that officers from these other countries are much 
cheaper but equally well qualified. So the government would have to dig 
deeper for a way to convince us that we need them [Shipping Company, 
Interview 11].
The company managers participating in this study clearly indicated that it did not really 
bother them whether or not the decline in the pool of qualified British officers continued. 
What mattered to most of them was the cost of operating ships and, as long as they were 
able to get enough officers at the right price, they were happy to continue employing 
foreigners, as the following quote for a company manager suggests:
... it does not matter who operates the ships as long as ships are running 
efficiently and cost effectively. Does it bother me that the pool of British 
officers has diminished? I’d say, it makes no difference [Shipping Company, 
Interview 17].
This discussion clearly reveals the prevailing company attitude towards the tonnage tax 
and the Minimum Training Obligation. This attitude certainly influences the shape of 
the companies’ officer recruitment and employment policies. In the next section I will 
examine factors which drive their recruitment policies.
6.2 Understanding Company Recruitment Strategies
One of the most important determinants of the success, or otherwise, of state strategy in 
relation to employment and the recovery of local labour markets is industry 
employment policies. This is especially so in shipping where employers have a wide 
range of sources of labour available to them from around the world at varying prices. It 
is in turn influenced by the corporate profit motive which forms the main driving force 
in company operations. In order to maximise profit, companies look for ways to 
minimise their operating costs. As has been pointed out in earlier chapters of this thesis, 
ship crewing costs are substantial but, more importantly, of all the major cost items 
involved in the operation of ships, labour is arguably the most variable in a context 
where many other costs are not under the control of operators. Ship-owners have, 
therefore, over the years, designed crewing policies which enable them to increase their 
competitive advantage in terms of cost effectiveness. These policies direct their
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recruitment strategies and have, over the years, resulted in increasing the prevalence of 
seafarers from low-wage developing countries.
The international wage structure for seafarers is highly complex and a wide range of 
nationalities participate in the seafarers’ global labour market. All these nationalities 
come from countries with different standards and varying cost of living which impact 
upon wage expectations and produce considerable variation in wage scales across the 
globe. Certain countries, like the UK, apply national minimum wage limits to seafarers 
but these are generally restricted to those working on-board ships in domestic trades and, 
therefore, leave the wages of the majority of seafarers serving aboard international 
vessels to be fixed freely by ship-owners and operators. Consequently, operators, 
especially those of FoC ships, have a wide discretion on wage scales, in spite of efforts 
by the International Transport Workers Federation (ITF) to establish minimum rates of 
pay for FoC crews. Consequently, it is common practice for seafarers of a different 
nationality to be found working on the same ship, performing the same duties as the rest, 
but receiving a different pay rate.
According to my company interviewees, the challenges for ship-owners in recent years 
go beyond cost. Apparently increasing global competition for the provision of shipping 
services coupled with growing consumer and societal awareness has forced some ship­
owners and operators to re-examine their strategies and redesign their employment 
policies (Sampson, 2004; Bloor et al, 2006). In doing so, they have attempted to arrive 
at a balance between remaining cost competitive and satisfying consumer and societal 
demands for a clean, safe, and environmentally friendly shipping service. As a 
consequence, company recruitment and employment strategies, worldwide, have 
become more complex, taking not only cost but also ‘quality’ into account when 
sourcing labour. In the following subsections I will examine and discuss some of the 
major factors which influence the officer employment policies of UK-based shipping 
companies.
6.2.1 Cost
From the accounts of many of the industry managers interviewed for the study, it seems 
that increasing competition and rising ship operation costs in the 1970s and 1980s 
forced ship-owners to find cheaper means of operating their vessels in order to remain 
competitive and profitable. Chapter two and three explored the developments in the
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industry, during this period, which led to the rapid growth of Open Registers and their 
extensive transformative impact on world shipping. More than anything else, it is this 
development that offered an ‘escape route’ from ‘crippling’ costs for many ship-owners 
and operators. By ‘flagging out’ vessels to less stringent and low-cost flag-regimes, 
ship-owners were able to benefit from, not only lower corporation tax rates but also, a 
reduction in crewing costs and generally lower overhead costs (Metaxas, 1985; OECD, 
1996; Marlow et al, 1997; Marlow, 2002). Some of the major ship operation cost items 
for shipping firms include stores, repairs and maintenance, insurance, administration 
and crewing, as shown in Figure 16 below which tabulates the operating cost of three 
different ship types. It shows that crewing costs make up the largest percentage of the 
total operating costs for all the ship-types shown, that is, 52%, 63.1% and 50.3% for the 
container ship, the bulk carrier and the multipurpose vessel respectively.
Fig. 16: Annual Operating Cost Figures for three Different Ship-types
Vessel Name Container Ship Bulk Carrier Multi Carrier
Light Weight Tonnage 5,600 11,483 13,700
Year Ended 31-12-06 31-12-06 31-12-06
Currency USD USD USD
Operating days in 2006 365 365 365
Crew Wages 601,009 1,272,805 971,382
Stores 184,996 150,593 270,660
Repairs and Maintenance 217,952 355,145 476,436
Insurance 167,147 249,647 336,843
Administration 175,903 219,876 191,627
Total 1,347,007 2,248,066 2,246,948
Note: Container ships are cellular vessels which are built to carry only containers. Bulk carriers are built with large 
holds for the carriage of large quantities o f dry homogeneous cargoes like grain and coal. Multipurpose vessels are 
those which carry all types o f cargoes in small packages. These are labour intensive and have been largely replaced by 
purpose-built vessels like container ships. Container ships and bulk carriers do not normally require large crews. A 
container ship of the size given here will carry a crew of around 16 while the bulk carrier will have around 22 and the 
multipurpose one will have 30.
Source: One UK-based shipping company participating in the study.
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Most of the cost items shown in the table are generally considered ‘more fixed’ or costs 
which operators have little control over. For example a ship must incur most of the 
administration expenses shown in the table as well as repairs and maintenance whether 
or not it is active or laid-up. The ship’s hull must also be insured at all times and the 
stores expenses are largely fixed. Crewing costs are, however, variable. It is important 
to note, however, that although some of these cost items are considered fixed, ship­
owners can still find ways of manipulating them by, for example, varying sources of 
various commodities and services. Room for manoeuvre in the ‘more fixed’ cost items 
is however not as big as in crewing whereby by changing the nationality of the crews a 
ship owner can significantly vary most of the crewing costs, both wage and non-wage. 
One of the reasons for the lower wages bill for ‘container ship B’, for example, is the 
nationality composition of the officer crew. The other ship-types have a percentage of 
officers from high-wage countries like the UK, Canada and Ireland which increases the 
overall wage bill. Other factors to consider in determining the level of the wage bill 
include the size of the ship and the type of ship.
A ship owner may also significantly reduce the amount of corporation tax and 
registration fees by shifting vessels to a low-cost Open Register thus cutting down on 
administration expenses. At the same time the owner will avoid the costly adherence to 
international conventions on safety and environment protection which many of these 
flags do not strictly enforce. Under stricter flags there is far less room for such 
manipulation and operating costs are, therefore, much higher. Since crew wages 
comprise a significant part of the total cost of ship operation, as the table clearly shows, 
the chance to recruit cheaper crews is always attractive to operators. It is for this reason 
that, over the years ship-owners have increasingly flagged out of strict flag regimes and 
successfully taken advantage of labour from low-wage labour supply countries 
especially in Asia and Eastern Europe. With the end of the cold-war and the collapse of 
the Soviet Union since the late 1980s, Eastern Europe has become a major source of 
seafarers due to the long shipping and seafaring tradition that existed in some of the ex- 
Soviet countries (Wu and Veiga, 2004). Furthermore, the collapse of the Russian 
shipping industry, and that of other former soviet countries, left behind a large 
unemployed but well qualified and experienced pool of seafarers in the region which 
subsequently became available to Western European ship-owners at very low prices.
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The most popular sources of officers for the companies I interviewed were India, 
Philippines, Poland, Croatia, Ukraine and Russia, and the main determining factor in 
sourcing seafarers from these countries was given as cost, as the following extract from 
an interview with the manager of one company shows:
All companies are struggling to survive crippling costs and competition and 
will take the slightest opportunity to break even. Labour is one of the 
biggest operating costs facing shipping companies but it is also the most 
variable, hence the opportunity to employ cheap crews.... is always 
welcome [Shipping Company, Interview 15].
Many operators, therefore, capitalise on the variability of the crewing cost item to 
reduce their overall ship operation costs. The following interview extract illustrates the 
point about varying the prices of seafarers by changing sources:
... .the cost of other nationalities is much cheaper so the owners are looking 
at the cost of putting people on board their ships and if we find a nationality 
that we are quite happy with like Croatian or Polish then we go for
them we are turning more and more to Eastern Europe and Asia for
officers in recent years [Shipping Company, Interview 6].
British officers are generally considered to be relatively expensive to employ by all 
shipping companies, including those that do employ them. Many company managers 
suggested that they could not afford to employ them and even those who could 
explained that they had little compelling reason to continue doing so because they were 
able to source crews much more cheaply from elsewhere. Many companies are therefore 
not so much unable as unwilling to employ British officers because the ultimate 
objective is to maximise their profits by taking every chance to reduce operating costs, 
as the following extract demonstrates:
British officers are too costly and companies are not willing to take them on 
considering that there are cheaper sources out there of people who can do 
the job as well and are properly qualified. As I have indicated, shipping is a 
very competitive industry and in order to remain profitable we are having to 
be very careful with cost and that means reducing cost without affecting 
quality and compromising safety. So we are going for foreign seafarers but 
are being careful to get the best and as long as they are available there is no 
reason why we would want to continue using the British officers who are 
way too expensive [Shipping Company, Interview 15].
There is emphasis here on the centrality of the cost element as a driving force in 
company recruitment policies. With time, seemingly cheaper foreign officers could be 
expected to replace all British officers on ships operated by UK domiciled companies
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unless the government finds a way of ensuring their continued survival. This 
replacement is likely to include the senior positions of master and chief engineer which 
have, hitherto, been more or less reserved for British nationals on many UK registered 
vessels. One company manager explained:
... .they [the British] are over twice the cost of a Russian or a Ukrainian or a 
Filipino and we are talking ITF wage rates so there is no undercutting. We 
did have, up to two years ago, a number of British masters and chief 
engineers but time has got hard in the multi-purpose sector. ...we had to 
replace them [Shipping Company, Interview 13].
A further disadvantage for the British junior officers is that, whereas many employers 
consider them of good quality and would readily employ them if they were less costly, 
the quality of the cheaper alternatives from developing countries has improved over the 
years. It is now the case that many companies, such as the one represented by the quote 
below, see no particular advantages in employing British junior officers over other 
nationalities and therefore no reason to incur that extra expense. This could explain the 
reports that the majority of officers below the rank of master and chief engineer are 
currently from developing countries (BIMCO/ISF, 2005), and it certainly reinforces the 
view that foreign officers are replacing those from industrialised countries. The 
following quote from yet another industry Human Resource Manager reinforces this 
widely held industry view:
Why will an employer go for a British officer, pay him an x amount of 
dollars when you can go to the Philippines, get a perfectly good, well 
qualified, officer for half the price, it does not make economic sense 
[Shipping Company, Interview 22]
A further problem in employing UK officers was identified by many managers as one of 
supply and sustainable ‘manpower’ reserves. The quote below is illustrative of this 
concern:
The British source of officers is not reliable. Most of our guys no longer 
want to stay at sea for long and we want to avoid juggling personnel too 
much; not good for business and it is costly as well. The Polish officers that 
we acquired with the vessels have been with us till now but since then we 
have lost many British officers who are too eager to leave for shore-side 
positions. So we look at this as well [Shipping Company, Interview 13].
The perception of UK seafarer employers therefore seems to be that the British pool of 
officers is both expensive and unreliable and no longer any better qualified than officers
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available elsewhere at lower rates. This perception might be one of the factors making it 
difficult to achieve the objectives of the tonnage tax with relation to increasing the 
supply of qualified British junior officers.
The main argument behind the tonnage tax is that as more ship-owners subscribe to it, 
they will train more British cadets under the Minimum Training Obligation. This will 
lead to an increase in the supply of qualified junior officers. However this primary 
argument leaves out the question of employment for these cadets such that, whereas the 
companies are forced to train as a requirement, they are under no obligation to employ. 
According to government interview data, the issue of employment was never dwelt 
upon much during the design of the tonnage tax. As already explained, the government 
officials taking part in the study explained that it was only assumed that increased 
tonnage, plus increased training, would automatically lead to increased employment for 
British junior officers. The employers are however, evidently, not willing to employ UK 
junior officers. Furthermore, it is heading to a situation where even senior British 
officers are no longer necessarily a favourite of UK ship-owners as the quote below 
demonstrates:
We used to reserve the top four posts for British officers but times have 
changed, other nationalities have come up the ranks and proved their worth, 
not forgetting that they are much cheaper. It goes back to the question of 
cost. Now we don’t employ any British at all [Shipping Company, Interview 
13]
One major consequence of this situation is that, because cadets are being trained but not 
getting job opportunities to propel them up the ladder of experience, the strategy is not 
effectively addressing the problem of declining numbers of qualified and experienced 
British officers. Instead, the senior ranks are now being filled with foreign officers. 
Consequently the negative perception about seafaring that originated with the loss of 
employment for British officers in the 1970s and 1980s is perpetuated.
Although cost is by far the greatest influence upon company recruitment policies, the 
weighting it is given seems to vary from company to company. For some companies it 
is the single most important factor while for others it is one amongst the top factors. 
This variation seems to be influenced mainly by the size and specialisation of the 
company such that for many of the smaller companies cost is certainly the single most 
significant factor. They justify this with the argument that it is becoming increasingly
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hard for them to compete with many of the larger and wealthier companies serving the 
same trades. For this reason, every opportunity to reduce ship operation costs is 
valuable and low-cost overseas labour presents this opportunity. The view in the 
following extract from an interview with one company HR Manager sums up what 
many small operators explained:
We are a small company and therefore the primary challenge is always 
finding cost effective crews; cost competitiveness. There is always pressure 
on the market place to find the crews as cheaply as possible and this is more 
so for small rather than big companies who have the resources. The 
additional pressure is finding people with certain qualifications and 
experience at an affordable cost [Shipping Company, Interview 15].
The larger, wealthier operators, like the oil majors and global container giants thought 
differently. For them, there are other factors like environmental safety, the standard of 
service they provide and, prestige, all of which sometimes force them to recruit labour 
that is not necessarily as cost effective as they would like it to be. A series of tanker 
accidents since the Torrey Canyon accident in 1967 have put the spotlight on oil, gas 
and chemical transporters. To avoid this negative scrutiny, which might be damaging to 
business, many of these major operators seek to provide the highest quality of service 
(Sampson, 2004) and adhere to all international conventions like Safety of Lives at Sea 
(SOLAS) and Marine Pollution (MARPOL). Furthermore, they want to avoid any 
possible disruption of operations by ITF action and Port State Control (PSC) inspections 
which could be costly. For these reasons they often take proactive measures to ensure 
that their operations are up to the expectation of international and local regulations, 
consumers’ expectations, insurers and environmentalists. The manager of one such 
company explained:
Cost is always a factor...but our main drive is quality of operations. 
Significant risk is involved in transporting oil or gas round the world and we 
have invested a lot of money in building sophisticated ships. We cannot then 
risk everything that we have built by putting cost first when considering
crews to man these ships so cost is important but not to the extent that
you will accept poor quality. If we have equal quality then we look at cost 
[Shipping Company, Interview 5].
The manager of another company said:
Cost is obviously an important part of the equation but in the services we 
are operating in it isn’t the ‘be all and end all’ of ship operation [Shipping 
Company, Interview 15].
- 137 -
The picture is not, however, as straightforward as it might appear from such a 
straightforward account. It is not a simple large/small; wealthier/poorer company 
dichotomy. In an industry where smaller does not necessarily mean less wealthy a lot 
depends on the type of trade pursued by the company. The bigger companies like oil 
majors and container giants have the capacity to weather cost storms much more easily 
than their counterparts in the general tramp6 trade but there are also much smaller 
operators in highly specialised, up-market, trades who control huge capital assets. Such 
companies will mostly employ local officers, not because they do not mind the cost but, 
because their operations are confined within a particular country or region. For these 
companies it would be more expensive to employ foreign seafarers since they have to 
incur the extra cost of transporting them to the ships and repatriation at the end of 
contracts. When they operate within a certain confined region, for example Europe, it is 
much more convenient and less costly to employ from the local market. This, however, 
does not mean that the British have an advantage here because, with the expansion of 
EU membership, cheaper officers are now available from low-wage member-countries 
in Eastern Europe like Poland, Croatia and Romania.
The major players, with significant influence on the global seafaring labour landscape 
are the oil majors which diversify their operations into different specialist trades like 
LNG and LPG and chemicals, and the global container giants. However it is not just the 
trade or the type of ships they operate which makes them influential in the organisation 
of the seafaring labour market; it is also because, by sheer size and the global spread of 
their operations, they tend to retain large pools of highly trained and qualified labour 
unlike tramp operators where seafarer turn-over is higher.
It also seems as if, by the fact that these larger companies have branches and 
subsidiaries all round the world, they have a higher capacity to invest in diverse local 
labour markets hence, influence patterns in the global demand and supply of seafaring 
labour. The Operations Manager of one such company explained:
Because we operate in and maintain large officers in many parts of the
world, you will find that we train cadets and maintain large numbers of
6 Tramp is the term used to refer to ships operating on the spot charter market. Because their trade is 
erratic, they operate on the lower market side and most ‘rust-buckets’ are found here. They are more open 
to market forces and hence thrive on manipulating costs and the freight market.
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officers from the various countries. We have a very elaborate training 
scheme, both for our shore-side managers and cadets, which involves 
recruiting bright young people as management trainees as well as cadets
from all over the world Much as we benefit from low cost labour from
around the world we also train a lot both in developing countries as well as 
developed [Shipping Company, Interview 19].
The study however shows that this is the exception rather than the rule. Many 
companies seem contented with recruiting foreign junior officers with little training 
input.
From this brief analysis it seems that all companies irrespective of size or trade consider 
cost to be one of the most important factors in deciding where to recruit crews. This 
makes cost the most influential factor in determining the recruitment and employment 
policies for officers within the industry.
6.2.2 Quality, Safety and Environmental Considerations
As I have indicated, many of the ship-owners and operators I interviewed explained that 
with growing international environmental concerns and tightening international 
regulation, companies are increasingly forced to be more careful about how they operate 
their vessels. This includes careful consideration of crewing issues, strict adherence to 
staffing regulations and, making efforts to ensure that the crews working on board ships 
are well trained and properly qualified. One manager explained this as follows:
Safety of the vessel is ultimate the ability of the crew to operate the
vessel effectively, professionally and safely , so we take a lot of trouble
in ensuring that the ships are manned by competent people [Shipping 
Company, Interview 25].
This, however, does not apply to all operators; company practices vary greatly and there 
are indeed many who still operate ‘rust buckets’ because they want to minimise costs 
and maximise profits. Indeed, although many of the ‘traditional’ Open Registers have 
ratified and do enforce most of the IMO conventions on safety and environment, many 
of the ‘new’ ones accommodate most of the worst ships in the world fleet, those which 
still merit the ‘rust bucket’ description.
According to many managers, the policies of many shipping companies relating to 
crewing have evolved and changed over the years. Whereas previously ship-owners and 
operators sought cheap labour and cared less for quality, they are now forced by 
circumstances to pay more attention to the quality of their crews in terms of standards of
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national education systems in source countries, the quality of cadet training and, the 
system of certification. Although the cost element still remains the most significant item 
on their policy agenda, it is now joined by the need to offer a safe and efficient service. 
The manager of yet another company said that in his company “....policy on officer 
recruitment is now driven by two elements; cost and quality” [Shipping Company, 
Interview 10].
Another manager explained that, whereas in the past some companies got by with 
aiming to provide the cheapest service, this strategy can no longer work because the 
industry is becoming more regulated and the customers (shippers) expect not only 
affordable but also high quality services. Another manager explained that apart from 
individual state regulations and international conventions, market circumstances, and 
the sensitive nature of shipping, are forcing operators towards self-regulation. This 
coupled with increasing pressure from environmental concerns, means that many ship­
owners and operators now increasingly compete on the basis of who can provide the 
best quality, safest but also affordable shipping services to customers. One company 
manager said:
In the 60s, 70s and 80s you got away with providing a shoddy service as 
long as it was cheap. Ship-owners went for the cheapest of everything, 
including rusty ships. Nobody bothered to scrutinise the qualifications of 
crews....hence the term rust buckets. Now you present one of those and 
nobody will touch it. It is not because of the law, or the IMO conventions, 
the customers simply won’t touch it. The environmentalists will be after you 
and the ITF will be your worst nightmare... you will definitely go under... 
[Shipping Company, Interview 22]
This quote represents a view that was shared by the large majority of the companies I 
visited and it demonstrates what might be an increasing tendency towards self 
regulation and what has been referred to as “market-in-virtue” (Bloor et al 2006) and 
‘virtuous’ competition (Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000). The notion of ‘virtuous’ 
competition or ‘markets-in-virtue’ has evolved from studies, in recent years, into the 
concept of ‘smart’ regulation or what Bloor et al (2006:538) have described as “a multi­
faceted and flexible system of governance that seeks through incentives to promote 
proactive compliance by regulatees” (See also Dorf and Sabel, 1998; Gunningham et al, 
1998; Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000; Sabel and Simon, 2004; Sampson, 2004).
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As indicated by Bloor et al (2006), the highly international nature of shipping makes it 
an appropriate ground for the growth of this kind of regulation and, indeed, by looking 
at recent developments in the shipping industry, elements of ‘smart’ regulation, 
identified by the various authors above, are evident. To begin with, from the 1940s to 
the 1980s, as discussed in chapter three, the industry went through a systematic process 
of de-regulation; national states, faced with the growing influence of Open Registers 
and the threat of tonnage flight, eliminated regulations on ship registration, crewing and 
almost all other aspects of ship operation. It is this de-regulation that catapulted the 
industry from a tightly regulated and nationally controlled one in the 19th century to the 
most globalised and deregulated one by the turn of the 20th century (Sampson, 2004).
Shipping companies are effectively ‘stateless’ or, more accurately, the nationality of 
ships and their owning/operating companies is often fictitious as observed by Kahveci 
and Nichols (2006). They can register their vessels wherever and staff them with 
whatever nationality of seafarers without state restriction. The result of such 
developments, in the decades following World War Two, until about the 1980s, was 
increasing deterioration of ship quality and shipping standards, the growth in numbers 
of untrained or poorly trained seafarers on board ships and, consequently deteriorating 
services and safety. All this happened because the situation permitted operators to go 
for the cheapest possible option in all aspects of ship operation including ship 
maintenance and staffing, hence the term ‘rust bucket’ came to be used to describe the 
type of ships that dominated international waters and characterised FoC standards.
Since the early 1990s, however, the industry is seeing a slow but steady elaboration of 
what can be termed as ‘enforced self-regulation’ in the industry (Bloor et al, 2006). This 
form of regulation is not the direct act of governments but rather a mixture of market 
pressure and the ‘promise’ of better commercial results pushing ship-owners and 
operators towards self-regulation. Another emerging form of regulation is ‘smart 
regulation’ whereby companies are forced to improve the standard of their ships in 
order to avoid costly action by, for example, Port State Control. There is no doubt that 
IMO conventions like MARPOL and SOLAS have had great impact but their 
implementation on the ground is more by the ‘smart’ system rather than by the flag- 
state machinery which has largely failed as a system of regulation. Recent studies have 
examined these two forms of regulation (Sampson, 2004; Bloor et al, 2006) and have 
shown that ‘smart’ and ‘enforced self-regulation’ are supposed to force operators into
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proactive compliance with international conventions. In the ‘interview 22’ extract in 
page 139, the manager is describing a situation where operators are compelled to 
proactively comply with international conventions because, according to the manager, 
any operator who attempts to present a poorly maintained ship from a register of 
dubious reputation will, most likely, be driven out of the market by pressure from the 
ITF, Port State Control (PSC), insurers, classification societies and cargo owners, who 
are becoming increasingly sensitive to matters of safety and quality standards. In order 
to attract good business and remain profitable and competitive in the market, operators 
now have to provide a high quality, efficient and safe shipping service. In other words 
they are driven by a combination of pressure and incentives into ‘markets in virtue’ 
(Braithwaite, 2005), or ‘virtuous’ competition (Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000). 
Although these forms of regulation offer a potentially effective alternative to the flag- 
state regime, there potential is yet to be fully harnessed. At the present, they are not as 
effective as they could be. Furthermore, evidence of their application is so far restricted 
to the tanker sector (Sampson, 2004; Bloor et al, 2006).
Following popular perception, one would expect that this new wave of self regulation 
and competition based on quality rather than cost would influence a change in company 
recruitment policy to favour officers from Industrialised Maritime Nations with all their 
training facilities and their long standing seafaring traditions. Apparently this has not 
been the case. Companies are in search of both high quality and low costs. The move 
towards self regulation with regard to crewing matters has influenced many companies, 
according to the HR Managers participating in the study, to develop overseas labour 
sources to their required standards by investing in training infrastructures and 
programmes in various labour supply countries. Also by paying more attention and 
monitoring the recruitment process they are able to get “the best at a competitive price” 
[Shipping Company, Interview 15].
According to many of the industry managers I interviewed this still works out much 
cheaper than employing a British officer, as one explained:
It does not necessarily mean that we will, in that case, resort to employing 
the British. No, we put measures in place to ensure that we are getting the 
best. Let me tell you one thing, even after all the investment in recruiting 
and training Polish cadets, including all the internal company training 
programmes we offer, it still works out much cheaper for us at the end of
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the day. So, there you go, we kill two birds with one stone; we get quality at 
a good price [Shipping Company, Interview 1].
The impact of such argument is detrimental, not just to the employment of qualified 
British junior officers by UK based companies, but also, and most importantly, to cadet 
training. It raises many pertinent questions about the appropriateness, therefore, of the 
tonnage tax as the main strategy for the recovery of British shipping skills
6.2.3 Reliability of Supply.
The other determinant of company recruitment policies is the sustainability of labour 
supply. Many of the company Human Resource Managers I interviewed explained that, 
in addition to the main determinants (cost and quality), the sustainability of a source of 
labour is a major and important consideration. They explained that, apart from low 
wages, sustainable supply is the main attraction for companies to developing countries, 
accessing the huge reserves of skilled labour.
By contrast, this is increasingly becoming the discouraging factor for many companies 
when considering developing their labour in-high cost countries like Britain. According 
to many industry managers, the once rich and strong seafaring tradition in the UK is 
disappearing. One manager, who was a former master mariner, explained that over the 
years his company had noticed an increasing unwillingness among the new generation 
of British people to commit to seafaring, unlike other nationalities and the older 
generation of British officers. Thus:
It is not like the old days when your family was in seafaring and you just 
had to follow suit. The seafaring tradition was strong then and shipping was 
more visible on our shores. Now, that tradition is largely dead and young 
people want to join “sexier” professions than seafaring. Even those who join 
do not want to stay for long [Shipping Company, Interview 25].
This, according to him, means that, aside from the decline in the general supply of 
labour due to the demographic structure of the British labour market, attempting to rely 
on the British supply would be unwise because officers do not want to stay at sea for 
long. In the long run it would cost the company a lot to develop the source with little 
economic benefit. Another manager associated this trend to the increasing availability of 
a wide variety of career choices for the British youth and changing perception of sea 
careers among them. He explained:
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The British youth are spoilt with choice nowadays. They are unable to 
commit to the kind of lifestyle that seafaring offers because seafaring is not 
an easy life; it means many months away from family and friends doing 
very hard work for long hours, in dangerous situations. Our economy now 
offers many, much more comfortable and easier career choices ashore. 
Seafaring, like many other vocational careers, has also come to be perceived 
as a career for those who are not academically successful and this puts off 
many would be good quality officers [Shipping Company, Interview 5].
According to many employers, in the shipping industry, therefore, the British source of 
seafaring labour has become unreliable. Another manager compared the level of career 
commitment between officers from new labour supply countries and that of the British, 
and most of the developed high-cost Nations, and concluded that British junior officers 
no longer wanted to commit to a long career at sea, unlike previously when the average 
officer served between fifteen and twenty years at sea:
Those who are really interested in working in the maritime sector want to 
work ashore. Very few are willing to give the kind of commitment that the 
industry expects. The Polish, the Croatians and the Filipinos are more 
reliable in this sense. We are beginning to see the same lack of commitment 
from the Indians as well; they used to be a very reliable source [Shipping 
Company, Interview 1].
Of all the managers I interviewed for the study around 95 percent argued that British 
people are no longer willing to work at sea and therefore very few wanted to train as sea 
cadets. Looking at training trends in the UK over the past three decades, the intake 
levels dropped to less than 1000 in the mid 1990s from over 4000 cadets per year in the 
1970s. Many company managers used this decline to support the argument that British 
people are no longer interested in seafaring careers. They argued that this, combined 
with decreasing retention rates for qualified officers reinforced the industry view that 
British officers are not reliable (See Obando-Rojas, 1999; Gardner, et at, 2001). 
However in the absence of empirical evidence to support this supposed Tack of interest 
and commitment’, it is difficult to ascertain the correctness of the assertion. Indeed there 
is evidence to the contrary given that cadet intake has increased since the introduction of 
the MTO. Furthermore, considering that there is obvious preference for low-cost 
officers among operators, one wonders the extent to which this claim might actually be 
designed to make a case and create justification for companies’ preference for foreign 
officers. Whether the claim is true or not, the economic motivation for employers to 
invest in developing seafaring labour locally is clearly undermined by this perceived 
lack of reliability. As one manager explained:
- 144 -
What is the economic sense in investing in training and developing a labour 
source that is not going to last. British people no longer want to go to sea, 
period! We know it and we have seen their level of commitment decline 
over the years. When they join, they don’t stay for long. So it does not make 
for a viable economic undertaking [Shipping Company, Interview 17].
There are a number of possible explanations proffered for the increasing unreliability of 
the British source of shipping labour. These include: increasing alternative career 
options for the youth in land-based IT related industries, the perception that seafaring is 
a hard, stressful and emotionally draining occupation (what one manager described as, 
‘the disturbing false notion of comfortable lifestyle among the youth these days’ 
[Shipping Company Interview 17] and, the perception that “seafaring has become a 
third world occupation” [Recruitment Agency, Interview 8].
The issue of unreliability and Tack of interest’, which the employers here present to 
justify their recruitment policies, will be revisited in chapter seven in which the views of 
cadets will be analysed. What seems clear from this analysis of the factors driving 
company recruitment policies is that most of the UK-based employers prefer to recruit 
foreign officers. The next step is to try and understand how this affects cadet training 
activities and undermines the government’s efforts to increase the number of qualified 
junior officers in the UK.
6.3 Companies9 Commitment to Training
The accounts of shipping company managers on their commitment to cadet training 
seem to vary from one to the other and, seemingly, depend on a number of factors but, 
primarily they are influenced by individual companies’ recruitment policies and 
strategies. Some of the factors identified in the data include the size of the company, the 
trade specialisation of the company and to some extent the socio-historical roots of the 
company. Size is the most significant factor here because when talking about the 
number of officers employed by a company I am referring to the total company pool 
rather than on a ship-by-ship basis. In this way, the influence of larger companies is 
greater because they are able to draw on a large labour pool as opposed to smaller ones 
with fewer vessels.
Many of the big companies seem to have elaborate training programmes and train the 
largest number of cadets in the UK as well as elsewhere in the labour supply world. 
According to them, because of their size and the kind of services they offer, they cannot
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afford the ‘short-termist’ approach that the smaller and ‘general-trade’ operators follow. 
They further argued that, quality, reliability and efficiency are the greatest 
considerations which, in one way or the other, link with the quality and experience of 
crews running their vessels. This also explains the tendency towards ‘proactive 
compliance’ with regulations or ‘smart’ regulation on the part of some companies. 
According to company managers, companies go to great lengths to establish a 
prestigious market position in order to attract the best business and avoid unnecessary, 
costly delays and inconveniences caused by Port State Control and ITF inspections and 
detention.
In an interview with the commercial manager of one such company, he explained that 
the company’s rigorous training programme had nothing to do with any external 
training commitment. He explained that the company had its objectives and targets and 
did not need external pressure in order to act in any direction. He pointed out that his 
company was not in the tonnage tax but had always trained British cadets for its own 
projected future needs:
No, we are not in the tonnage tax We have always trained cadets in the
UK, even when all other companies stopped 20 years ago We are
committed to quality and we train for our needs and to our standards both 
here in the UK and in our other sources overseas[Shipping Company, 
Interview 5]
This does not, however, mean that cost is of no consequence. When I inquired about the 
cost factor and whether his company had moved to take advantage of low-wage labour 
from overseas, he said:
Of course we have, who wouldn’t? [But] we do not just go to the open 
market and ‘cherry-pick’. We are very careful and we prefer to train our 
own people so we invest a lot of money on training programmes in many 
countries....We are a big company  ^ our ships are registered in many 
countries and we develop and make use of local labour in all those countries 
[Shipping Company, Interview 5]
Most of the big companies aired more-or-less the same view. For the smaller companies, 
however, the story was different. Some of these companies claim that they face the 
brunt of global competition more than their bigger and wealthier counterparts who 
benefit greatly from economies of scale. Their reliance on foreign, low-wage, labour is 
therefore greater and, because of this, some said that the minimum training commitment 
is just a requirement they have to fulfil:
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To be honest with you, we train because we have to. As I said earlier, we 
don’t employ British junior officers at all so taking on British cadets is
rather meaningless to us we have always held the opinion that it is
unfair to train young people, give them career hopes then don’t give them 
jobs after their training. It is wrong, we don’t like to do it, but we do, what I 
can say... [Shipping Company, Interview 13]
Those companies with vessels operating in European coastal trades and ferry services 
are more likely to employ British than foreign officers hence they are likely to employ 
more of the cadets they train. According to the operations manger of one such company, 
if a training company needs British junior officers, it “gives the training commitment 
practical meaning” [Shipping Company, Interview 2].
Others who indicated a greater commitment to the training obligation included operators 
of highly specialised, high-tech vessels like Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) carriers, 
reefers and Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) carriers and chemical carriers, although, 
these were often affiliated to, or integral parts of, the larger companies discussed above. 
According to one manager most operators in these trades have more confidence in the 
training programmes and facilities in industrialised maritime nations like Britain than in 
developing non-maritime countries hence they recruit more from such markets for these 
specialised operations:
Although we are, of late, getting highly qualified people from less 
industrialised non-maritime countries like Poland, Croatia, and the 
Philippines, we have always relied on officers from developed countries 
because these trades are very sensitive and delicate and we have confidence
in the training facilities and programmes in countries like Britain There
is therefore some benefit for us to train British cadets [Shipping Company, 
Interview 5]
An interesting category of companies, who also expressed greater commitment to 
training British cadets, is that comprising family-owned companies. For these 
companies, although few in number, training and employing British cadets seems to be 
more for nostalgic and patriotic rather than economic reasons. The manager of one such 
company explained:
We continue to train British cadets and employ some, not because we 
heavily rely on the British pool anymore but, because being a family 
company which has used British seafarers for over a century and half, we 
feel an obligation to continue training and we have continued to do so even 
before the tonnage tax was introduced.... I guess it is a matter of tradition 
[Shipping Company, Interview 12].
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Such companies once dominated British shipping in the days when it was a family- 
owned and operated industry and they recruited seafarers locally and trained them 
though the traditional apprentice system. Their vessels were UK registered and mostly 
plied European coastal routes. Even when they started operating internationally, they 
still retained their traditional base in the UK and drew their crews from the local pool. 
From the 1980s onwards, though, such companies have experienced stiff international 
competition. With these have come cost pressures to flag out vessels and employ 
foreign crews. This pressure has driven many, either completely out of the market, or 
transformed them into the global outfits that now dominate global shipping through 
mergers and takeovers. Very few remain intact but are often small and exert little 
influence because they are unable to continue training and employing large numbers of 
British officers. The disappearance of these traditional family-owned British companies 
has obviously had a huge and negative impact on seafaring labour in the UK
It seems that, perhaps, the tonnage tax minimum training commitment is undermined by 
the lack o f that essential link which the manager quoted earlier describes as “practical 
meaning” (p. 152). Although, according to government officials, all the companies are 
indeed training, many do not have any real commitment to the training obligation 
because they do not require the cadets they train. Because of this, it has been suggested 
that there are many problems in the process of cadet intake and training which results in 
two outcomes: high drop-out rates and a poorer quality of the junior officers coming out 
of the process. Many of the training agencies attribute this to that ‘missing essential 
link’ -  employment -  as suggested in the following two quotes:
If companies needed British junior officers, they would train more and pay 
more attention to the process, unfortunately they don’t and it affects the 
whole exercise [Training Agency, Interview 9]
This view confirms the effect of the absence of the ‘practical meaning’ link and 
emphasises the difficulty o f the task of trying to increase local training activities without 
this link. According to another interviewee, this is possibly the link that is missing from 
the tonnage tax training commitment:
Many of the cadets soon realise that the sponsoring companies are not 
necessarily going to employ them. In addition to other factors this is a major 
reason for the high dropout rates and the overall failure of the strategy 
[Recruitment Agency, Interview 8].
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The view is that unless the sponsoring companies are able to assure their cadets of a 
future in the career they have embarked on dropout rates will continue to rise. 
Unfortunately the companies are not in a position to do this because they are not 
committed to employing their cadets. As the personnel manager of a company explained, 
“we do not want to lie to our young people, the fact is that we do not have jobs for them, 
saying otherwise would be a blatant lie” [Shipping Company, Interview 2].
6.4 Implications
The above outline of company recruitment policies should not be taken to mean that all 
UK-based companies no longer genuinely invest in the training of British cadets. I have 
explained earlier that those companies operating ships within the tonnage tax have a 
commitment to train as a qualifying pre-condition. There are companies which train on 
their own accord, for their specific manpower needs, irrespective of the tonnage tax 
training commitment. The important point to explore here is the extent to which the 
prevalent policy among companies is influenced by state efforts to increase cadet 
training in the UK.
Company recruitment and employment policies are, seemingly, linked with cadet 
training activity. Economic logic dictates that a company will only invest willingly in 
the training infrastructure and programmes of countries of interest as sources of labour. 
Unless, therefore, UK domiciled shipping companies have genuine recruitment and 
employment interests in the UK, they are less likely to, willingly and genuinely, commit 
substantial funds and energies to developing the British shipping labour force. How 
much commitment they put into training is therefore proportional to and dictated by 
their commercial interest in the UK seafaring labour force. Whereas the foregoing 
analysis of company recruitment policies does not show a complete lack of ‘manpower’ 
interest in the UK for ship operators, it does, however, suggest that interest in training 
activities by these companies is limited by the fact that they have no employment 
interest in the pool of British junior officers.
Those few companies which spend money and energy in training British cadets do so 
because they have a long term interest in the source. They therefore go to great lengths 
to make sure that their cadets are chosen well and treated well both in college and at sea. 
They are interested in training, employing and promoting their cadets through the ranks
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to senior positions on board and eventually ashore. The manager of one such company 
explained:
Apart from spending time, money and energies in developing and 
maintaining our labour sources worldwide, we are committed to maintaining 
a long-term core pool in the UK. It makes sense to us because we prefer to 
have a significant number of British senior officers on our ships....we feel 
confident so we must invest in training [Shipping Company, Interview 5].
This clearly indicates that those companies which train and retain most of the cadets 
they recruit are those whose recruitment policies support strong staff and skills 
development. Unfortunately, according to the evidence in the data, such companies are 
very few. The majority are mostly interested in seeking cheap labour and do not want to 
invest anything in developing it anywhere in the world. For such companies, the 
Minimum Training Obligation is just a criteria and not a genuine commitment to 
develop seafaring skills in the UK.
The analysis of the data in this chapter strongly suggests that the main driving factor 
behind company recruitment policies is cost. The other factors, of quality and supply, 
are secondary, though not insignificant, to most companies involved in the research. 
This has pushed many companies to invest in training officers in labour supply 
countries instead of reverting to their traditional sources in developed countries.
The same may be said about supply. Many companies have cited unreliable supply of 
shipping labour in developed countries as one of the reasons for seeking officers abroad. 
This may be so now but only to a very small extent. It is worth remembering that the 
diminishing supply of seafaring labour in the industrialised maritime countries has come 
about as a direct result of companies’ recruitment practices over the years. These 
practices are motivated by the quest for lower operations costs. It is therefore more 
correct to say that company policies have influenced diminishing labour supply in 
developed countries rather than otherwise. Companies however seem to quote these 
factors as a justification to their arguments on costs, most likely, because it mitigates 
their profit driven corporate practices which have led to the near demise of, once great, 
pools of highly qualified officers in industrialised countries while driving the wages for 
seafarers worldwide down.
In the next chapter I will revisit some of the issues raised and discussed here and 
examine further how company recruitment policies have affected training efforts in the
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UK. I will examine further some of the arguments introduced here about the wavering 
commitment of many UK-based companies regarding the training of British cadets and 
critically assess the claim by many of the industry managers that British people are no 
longer interested in sea careers.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
Cadet Training in the UK 
Introduction
Having looked at the companies, their officer recruitment policies, and general response 
to the tonnage tax in relation to cadet training, I will now focus on the actual 
organisation and process of cadet training and discuss the various issues which might be 
hindering the successful rebuilding of seafaring skills in the UK. This chapter also 
presents the ‘other side of the story’ and will focus on cadets, their expectations as 
trainees and their training experiences. It discusses the views of training college staff 
and those working for training agencies with reference to the cadet training approach, 
establishment and policy.
As a Traditional Maritime Nation, with a long shipping and seafaring tradition, the UK 
has a well established seafarer training programme. The structure and organisation of 
this programme is complex and involves many bodies and interest groups. The basic 
programme brings together five main bodies as detailed below:
• Training agencies advertise cadetships, recruit and allocate cadets to colleges 
and take care of them during their training programmes on behalf of 
“sponsoring” companies;
• Training colleges are responsible for designing and running training 
programmes, and maintaining equipment and facilities;
• Shipping companies are the main training sponsors in conjunction with the 
government and who may directly recruit cadets, allocate them to colleges and 
support them throughout their training;
• The Merchant Navy Training Board (MNTB) is the industry’s body 
responsible for coordinating the development and promotion of seafarer training 
and qualification, and works closely with the government and colleges in 
developing and promoting cadet training programmes and;
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• The Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) is the government agency 
responsible for monitoring the standard of training and certification of seafarers 
and operates a Seafarers Training and Certification branch which administers 
and regulates the training and certification of personnel in the Merchant Navy.
Although all these bodies play a vital role in the training of seafarers, the primary 
responsibility for recruitment and training rests with the colleges, shipping companies, 
and training agencies which make up the core training structure. These parties are meant 
to work together to ensure a high standard of training, good training experiences for 
cadets, and, ultimately, a high output of well qualified and competent junior officers. 
General evidence, however, suggests that the number of qualified junior officers has not 
increased sufficiently, as anticipated. The question as to why this is the case forms the 
main focus of this chapter.
The discussion in chapter five has shown that many companies lack the motivation to 
train cadets in the UK because they have no particular commercial interest in British 
junior officers. The data from ex-cadets, training agencies and cadet colleges show that, 
because of this lack of motivation, companies are not actively and positively 
underwriting cadet training hence not encouraging their retention in the industry. 
Instead, companies with a training commitment, as part of their obligations under the 
tonnage tax, are passing their ‘duties’ over to training agencies. Data collected from 
cadets, and the staff of training colleges, suggest that this is having a highly detrimental 
effect on the quality of training provision and is resulting in high dropout rates.
One of the problems is that cadets commit to training at a very young age, normally 
between 16 and 18, and require a great deal of support which many training agencies do 
not seem prepared to give. This, and the non-committal attitude from sponsoring 
companies, who are also potential employers, is driving increasing cadet wastage and 
frustrating government efforts to increase shipping skills. The problem, therefore, is not 
just that of demand and supply. Shifting patterns of international demand and supply for 
seafarers form part of a socio-economic vortex of factors which ultimately lead to the 
demoralisation surrounding the entire cadet training establishment in the UK and many 
other industrialised nations. Seemingly, the real problem is caused by a breakdown in 
the local shipping skills development system (Obando-Rojas et al, 1999).
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I will argue in this chapter that the industry has ‘conveniently’ adopted the mantra that 
seafaring is no longer attractive to the British people and that youth in Britain are no 
longer enthusiastic about sea careers. This discourse serves to perpetuate and legitimise 
companies’ unwillingness to train and employ British junior officers for their economic 
expedience. The chapter is organised in six sections. Section one describes how cadets 
are selected and allocated to colleges and highlights the role of training companies, 
while section two examines the role of training colleges and describes the various cadet 
schemes they offer. Section three explores the main problems which affect the entire 
process of selection, allocation and training after which section four discusses the 
resulting training atmosphere and cadet training experiences and assesses the 
implication on training outputs. Section five describes the dilemma presented by the 
conflict between the interests of labour and capital interests and suggests that this 
dilemma creates structural failures in the cadet training system which undermine cadet 
retention. Section six critically assesses the arguments developed in earlier sections in 
relation to the ‘myth’ of ‘diminishing career attractiveness’ as presented by the industry.
7.1 Cadet Selection and Allocation
The cadet selection and allocation process primarily involves three actors, shipping 
companies, training agencies, and cadet training colleges. Mainly, however, it is 
shipping companies and their training agents which coordinate the selection exercise. 
On the surface, the process appears simple. Shipping companies and/or training agents 
advertise training positions in accordance with either their manpower needs or their 
training obligation under the tonnage tax. They then process applications and allocate 
successful candidates to the various colleges to begin their training. In recent years, 
however, it appears that this role is being taken over by training agencies and shipping 
companies are taking on a more background and supervisory role.
In the UK merchant shipping training establishment, shipping companies are the main 
sponsors of cadets under the Minimum Training Obligation established under the 
tonnage tax regime. These companies, however, often fulfil their training obligations 
through specialist training agencies who take over most of the responsibility for cadet 
training, as agents, on behalf of their ‘principals’. Once the shipping company has 
indicated the number of cadetships available to fulfil its training quota, the training 
agency advertises them, mainly targeting O-level and A-level school leavers. They then
- 154 -
sieve through the applications and select the most eligible candidates for the cadetships 
who are subsequently put through a rigorous selection process until the desired number 
and quality of cadets are picked.
During the training process the agencies continue to play an important role in 
representing the shipping companies in areas such as managing cadets’ subsistence 
remittances. They allocate trainees to training berths for practical sea training and all 
other duties necessary for the successful completion of the cadets’ training, although 
this latter role may be closely supervised by some companies. Training agents are 
therefore very important and their role is key and central to the entire training equation.
The role of training agencies does not begin and end with recruitment and training. It 
has become their responsibility to actively promote careers at sea as well as market the 
various cadetships offered by their principals. Whereas formerly individuals used to 
apply directly to shipping companies for training positions, now they often apply 
directly to training agencies who advertise such positions on behalf of the shipping 
companies. Their role is clearly summarised in the interview extract below:
Our duties are many. In addition to recruiting and allocating cadets to 
colleges on behalf of our clients, it is our responsibility to promote and 
market seafaring careers and therefore we have an important role to play in 
keeping the seafaring tradition alive [Training Agency, Interview 21]
There are many such training agencies in the UK but only three stand out as the major 
players and command about 90% of the cadet recruitment and training market amongst 
them. Two of the agencies I interviewed represent a clientele of eighty-two companies 
and the third which doubles in ship management as well as training has established its 
own training institutions in a number of labour supply countries in order to enhance its 
capacity to train and supply seafarers on a global scale. Though based in the UK all the 
major agencies operate internationally and, because of the nature of their role, some of 
them are gradually evolving into training-come-officer recruitment companies.
My interviews with training colleges and shipping companies confirmed the central role 
played by such agencies by revealing that nearly all cadets in the UK are recruited by 
training companies. The following interview with a college source demonstrates this:
We do not recruit any cadets directly; all our cadets are allocated to us by 
training companies acting on behalf of shipping companies.... It is mostly
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the training companies we tend to deal with rather than the main sponsors 
on matters directly relating to cadets and their training [College Interview 2].
Apparently the reason why most shipping companies prefer to delegate most of their 
training responsibilities to agencies is that it is a big task for which they have no 
capacity in terms of time and personnel. Furthermore, as the following interview extract 
from a company source indicates, they feel that the more specialised agencies are better 
placed for this kind of work:
We simply do not have sufficient resources to enable us get directly 
involved in the whole exercise. It is too time consuming so we leave it to the 
training companies who are better placed to do it [Shipping Company, 
Interview 15].
Although data from training agents and cadet college staff might suggest that all 
companies delegate the entire training responsibility to their agents, it appears, from 
company interview data, that some of them do get involved in some or most of the 
training process. Seemingly such companies often vet the qualifications of their cadets 
and take an active supervisory role in the entire training process. This second company 
source demonstrates this clearly:
We are involved from the first step all the way to the end. We use training 
companies, alright, but that is just because they have the facilities and the 
know-how. They are much better equipped for this role than we are but that 
does not mean that we let then run a free show [Shipping Company, 
Interview 5].
As suggested in chapter six, some companies, such as the one represented by the quote 
above, have adopted such active involvement in training because they are more likely to 
employ their cadets at the end of the training as junior officers on their ships. One 
company executive in charge of cadet training explained:
These are our cadets and people who we are likely to employ as officers on­
board our ships, so we monitor closely and give all the support necessary 
[Shipping Company, Interview 10]
The executive quoted above explained that the company has an active training 
programme aimed at developing a sustainable pool of sea-staff and they, almost always, 
employ their cadets as long as they perform well in their training. Because of this they 
find it in their best interests to ensure that they get the best quality cadets and that the 
cadets get the best training possible.
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Many companies, however, have no such long term interest in the cadets they recruit 
hence see little benefit in getting so involved. The quality of cadets recruited and the 
quality of training they get is therefore of no immediate consequence to them. 
Unfortunately this kind o f company attitude engenders an unsupportive approach on the 
part of their training agents which, as I will explain in later sections, leads to poor 
training experiences for cadets many of whom decide to drop out of training. In this 
respect, it is perhaps easy to imagine that the training agencies representing such 
principals, would similarly adopt a non-committal approach towards the cadets in 
question. The training agent’s attitude will, in most cases, be as ‘good’ as that of its 
principal as the following extract from an interview with a training agency source 
demonstrates:
We represent many types of companies, some of which are more 
responsible than others. I know many training companies have been accused 
of not taking good care of cadets but I want you to understand that we can 
only be as good as the company we represent. Ultimately we are only agents - 
[Training Agency, Interview 9]
As I have already indicated, cadet recruitment in the UK is mostly carried out by 
training agencies. Training colleges do not get involved in the selection process and 
only a few shipping companies get directly involved in actual selection. Some shipping 
companies may advertise training positions and colleges routinely advertise the training 
programmes they offer but there is always reference to training companies for further 
information on application and sponsorship.
Training companies attract applications by vigorously advertising and promoting the 
cadetships offered by their principals through the media and career promotion activities 
organised in colleges, schools and career centres around the country as the following 
extract shows:
We run advertisements of the programmes we offer through both print and 
electronic media and we try to invent innovative ways of attracting the 
attention of the appropriate age and quality of people in our adverts. 
[Training Agency, Interview 21].
There are some sponsoring companies which take a more active role in this process and 
they will often dictate the selection process to ensure that they get the type of cadets 
they want. One company personnel manager described his involvement in this process 
as follows:
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We like to make sure that we are getting the best candidates so we set some 
guidelines for our agents to follow and also monitor the process closely. The 
final selection stage is here at our offices where we invite the candidates, 
talk to them show them around and make them feel at home ... it is 
important to establish that relationship right from the start and begin to build 
confidence in the lads [Shipping Company, Interview 5]
After the selection process is completed, the cadets are allocated to various training 
colleges to begin their training. In the next section I will describe the role of training 
colleges in the UK and outline and describe the various cadet schemes they offer as well 
as describe the various training paths available to British Cadets.
7.2 Training Colleges and Cadet Schemes
Training colleges form the central units in the cadet training establishment and are 
responsible for the actual design and running of training programmes and schemes as 
well as examinations in conjunction with the MCA. Their responsibility is to acquire 
and maintain high quality training equipment and facilities and to provide training for 
cadets. Although there are many training outfits in the UK, there are only five main 
recognised institutions spread across the country and they run a range of training 
programmes which cover a wide spectrum of maritime education and training from 
‘deck’ and ‘engine-room’ officer cadets.
The fact that most o f these institutions are associated, and collaborate, with fully 
fledged and well established universities is an indication of their aspiration for 
excellence in cadet training. According to the staff of the various colleges participating 
in the study, this collaboration enables them to tap into the advanced facilities and wide 
range of expertise available in these universities in order to strengthen the development 
and administration of their education and training programmes.
Once the trainees have been allocated, the colleges take up the responsibility of 
transforming them into qualified junior officers through a number of training schemes. 
Throughout the training the college administration works closely with the other 
responsible parties, shipping companies, training agencies and the MCA in order to 
ensure the smooth running of the training programme. For instance the MCA and the 
colleges work closely together, monitoring and assessing the cadets’ ship-board 
practical training, administering final examinations and conferring qualifications to 
those who pass.
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The colleges run a variety of schemes for cadets whose general structure and content 
depends on the cadets’ entry point and training path. These are all designed to prepare 
the trainees for the MCA Officer of the Watch (0 0 W) examinations. There are also 
other parallel support courses provided by the colleges for serving officers who wish to 
advance their careers as well as independent shore side programmes for shore-side 
management personnel (see appendix 6).
The mainstream seafaring courses cover the whole spectrum of marine education 
including navigation, operations, mechanical and electrical engineering, 
communications, safety and catering. The entire cadet programme is organised in such a 
way that trainees cover theoretical courses and practical college-based programmes, 
using simulators, and sea-based practical training on-board various merchant vessels. 
All the training schemes offered in all the colleges operate mainly under the auspices of 
the International Maritime Organisation Standards of Training and Certification of 
Watchkeepers (STCW 95).
The average period for whole cadet training course is three years from the beginning to 
the point of qualification with a third mate’s 0 0 W ticket. During this period cadets go 
through five to seven training phases which are divided into college and sea-based 
training alternately. By the time they qualify, cadets are deemed to have acquired 
sufficient theoretical knowledge, and ship-board practical skills, to enable them to 
perform their duties as competent junior officers at sea.
There are three routes to the final officer qualification and certification: the Higher 
National Diploma (HND) in nautical studies, the newly introduced Foundation Degree 
(FD) in maritime studies (from September 2006) and the Bachelor of Science (B. Sc) 
degree in maritime studies. In order to equip cadets with both academic knowledge and 
practical ship-operation skills the HND and the B.Sc courses are accompanied by NVQ 
(National Vocational Qualification) qualifications such that, while HND and B.SC are 
college-based and provide the academic and theoretical knowledge, the NVQ is ship- 
based and provides practical skills and is based on successful completion of an MCA 
portfolio of practical assignments. This portfolio which, in the end, is an indication of 
the ship-board skills the cadet has acquired is monitored and assessed by the training 
officer on-board and forms the basis for MCA certification at the end of the programme. 
On successful completion of the course, cadets are awarded NVQ level three in addition
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to their HND or B.Sc (Hons). The Foundation Degree is slightly different in the respect 
that the MNTB has introduced an emphasis on management as well as practical 
seafaring skills.
Though the structure of the courses offered may vary slightly from one institution to 
another, the general schemes follow the structure described above and, for every path 
(HND, B.Sc and FD), there are both deck and engineering schemes. In addition to the 
mainstream cadet training programme outlined above, nautical colleges have, in recent 
years, started offering an increasing number of other courses designed to develop skills 
for the shore-based maritime sector. It appears that the reason for this, as one cadet 
administrator explained, is that:
There is need to respond to changing market requirements. There is a big 
demand for qualified people to work in these shore-side management and 
operations firms, people who do not necessarily need seafaring skills, so we 
are trying to tailor our programmes to reflect this demand [College 
Interview 1]
It seems that, as the maritime sector grows and becomes more complex, there is a need 
for expansion and greater sophistication in training programmes to cater for the 
changing requirements. One important development in the past two decades is a gradual 
move away from absolute dependency on overspill from shipping skills to cater for the 
needs of the wider shore-side maritime sector. Because the shortage in shore-side 
maritime skills is becoming more evident and the flow of seafaring skills to the shore is 
becoming less reliable, the industry is beginning to experiment with alternative and 
shore-based ways of raising the required labour. This is being achieved by designing 
training programmes which are ‘tailor-made’ for shore-side maritime technical and 
commercial operations and management personnel. In the words of the personnel 
manager of one shipping company:
People working ashore need not necessarily be holders of masters’ tickets.
We can train people specifically for the jobs ashore by developing tailored 
courses complemented by stints at sea for some practical sea experience.
Who said that you have to be a qualified and experienced ships officer in 
order to manage ships.... Not necessarily [Shipping Company, Interview 22]
However, because the shore-side maritime sector still continues to rely on skills 
developed ‘at sea’ and, as an indication of the changing times and the growing 
sophistication of the industry, there are extra courses designed to equip serving ships’
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officers with management skills. As the training administrator of one training company 
explained:
The time when seafarers were considered simply as ‘deck’ and ‘engine- 
room hands’ is gone; the work of an officer is very demanding and 
complicated. Officers are managers of the ship and the ship is a complete 
and complicated establishment; there are HR issues, cargo management, IT 
and communication management and so forth. Training schemes are 
changing to accommodate these aspects which were never considered before 
[Training Agency, Interview 21]
Such officers are therefore supposed to be well prepared for their eventual role as shore- 
side ship managers. An MNTB official explained that apart from raising the 
professional standing of seafaring, these changes are also in response to the high 
demand for people with seafaring experience to work in management positions ashore. 
Officers coming through these new training schemes are well equipped with the 
appropriate skills so that when they want to move ashore, they are able to fit in without 
the necessity for extensive retraining. They do not just possess seafaring skills but also 
the enhanced maritime as well as academic qualifications to match those of other 
management personnel ashore. As noted by an MNTB official:
Officer training now has a higher academic and management skills content 
which means that we are equipping the cadets with essential knowledge and 
competencies necessary for the shore-side management positions they will 
eventually fill... At the end of the day they have the same degree 
qualifications as their counterparts in IT related firms but with the added 
advantage of being highly skilled in their specific field of maritime 
management [MNTB Interview]
The end result of these innovations, it seems, is to make the training more ‘meaningful’ 
and appealing and ultimately rewarding for both the individuals and the industry while 
at the same time meeting the changing skills demands in the industry as well as the 
wider maritime sector.
Such courses are designed either as full-time management programmes or as part-time 
and on-going courses for continuous in-service skills enhancement for officers. Some of 
them include maritime safety management training, cargo and ship handling, security 
training, engine-room systems and management short courses. Some companies have 
even introduced Computer Based Training Programmes (CBT) on-board for both deck 
and engine-room personnel in order to ensure that their personnel are continuously 
engaged in training so as to keep their skills updated.
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7.3 Cadet Selection and Training
There are a number of issues which are likely to affect cadet selection, training and, 
ultimately, the overall training output. It appears that these are problems relating largely 
to the prevailing training and employment environment in the UK, although, views on 
what the main problem is seems to depend on perspective. In this section, I will present 
and discuss data showing how the various main ‘actors’ in the training structure 
(training colleges, training agencies, shipping companies and cadets) interpret and 
understand the problems hindering successful seafarer skills development and 
replenishment in the UK.
7.3.1 The Corporate Perspective
A majority of shipping companies and training agencies seem to believe that the 
problem is created by a combination of three factors, that is, lack of interest in seafaring 
careers, the young age of cadet trainees and a generally low academic aptitude of 
applicants to cadetships. The overall corporate argument, therefore, presents the image 
of a society in which the youth are both incapable and unwilling to undertake sea 
careers.
According to many of the Human Resource Managers of shipping companies interest in 
seafaring careers among the youth in the UK has declined to a level whereby the society 
can no longer supply merchant navy officers. As I have already indicated in chapter six, 
about 95% of those interviewed expressed this concern. In the view of one training 
agency manager, it is becoming increasingly difficult to attract young people to work at 
sea. He said:
....but it is so difficult to attract enough [candidates] to pick and choose 
from. We just get a handful of applications each year because it is no longer 
a particularly attractive career. People are no longer interested to work at sea; 
it is a real difficulty [Training Agency, Interview 9].
A HR Manager of one company seemed to share the same view that British youth do 
not want to go to sea and went ahead to explain that:
Very few British youngsters want to go to sea as a career... it is very 
difficult to make a life at sea. It is quite remote when you are at sea even 
with the internet and the e-mail systems being set up on board. There is that 
need to be in contact with friends and family [Shipping Company, Interview 
13].
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From the data, it appears that almost all shipping companies and training agencies 
support this argument and some of them came out very strongly to defend it as the 
following extract from an interview with one company manager indicates:
Our company is involved in cadet training and recruits cadets from the UK 
but this has been decreasing with time mainly because the number of British 
people wanting to go to sea seems to be drying up. Seafaring is simply not 
an interesting career anymore. I wouldn’t go back to sea whatever it paid, 
and even if  you paid me double what I am paid here I wouldn’t consider it.
There are many other better and less stressful alternatives for the young 
people in Britain and they are clearly taking them [Shipping Company, 
Interview 22].
Another HR Manager described his company’s frustrations in the process of trying to 
meet the Minimum Training Obligation as follows:
It is difficult, I tell you, and it is frustrating. Getting people who want to join 
the merchant navy is proving to be very difficult. It seems that most of our 
young people would prefer a career ashore rather than go to sea and maybe 
one can understand but it is hurting our efforts to recruit British cadets 
[Shipping Company, Interview 14]
What is interesting to note is that most of these interviewees started their careers as 
officers at sea and many of them hold masters’ or chief engineers’ tickets with many 
years of seafaring experience. The strong belief in the diminishing attractiveness of 
seafaring as a career for British youth therefore seems to be based on their personal 
experiences or in a comparison to the times of their service. However, the near 
unanimous and ‘sweeping’ declaration that British people do not want to go to sea 
anymore, is not backed by any concrete evidence. It sounds like a well rehearsed 
popular ‘tune’ among corporate industry practitioners.
There were some managers, albeit few, whose views on the matter did not fit in with 
this wider corporate perspective. These strongly dismissed the idea that seafaring was 
no longer attractive and suggested that the problem lies elsewhere. In the following 
extract, for instance, the manager clearly thinks that the view is incorrect:
The view that a career at sea is not interesting is rubbish, I don’t agree with 
it. Our business is so interesting and so diverse but the job is as interesting 
as you make it and so we have tried, over the years, to make the jobs of our 
officers rewarding [Shipping Company, Interview 2]
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On the issue of attracting young people to sea careers a few of these companies and 
agencies were of the view that there were many people wanting to go to sea but that 
getting them in, as the following extract suggests, depended on the efforts of individual 
companies to reach them:
Everything needs hard work, a lot of hard work. So, you can not sit and 
expect good cadets to come to you. We go out, work hard and get the cadets 
and we don’t complain [Shipping Company, Interview 5]
This view is in line with that of yet another company manager who explained that he 
believed that there is still a lot of seafaring potential and interest which companies could 
cultivate. His view was based on the experiences of his company in the process of 
recruiting and training cadets during what has come to be termed as the ‘bad years’, the 
1970s and 1980s, when cadet training in the UK ground to a stop. He said:
I think there are still a lot of people out there who would like to go to sea.
You will still find a nucleus of interested people out there but I think the 
problem is that the profession is not well advertised and promoted.... It is 
traditionally promoted and sold as a romantic career involving lots of 
travelling and adventure but you will find that much of that is gone and we 
need to change our promotion strategy and portray it as a worthwhile, 
rewarding professional career; that is what people want [Shipping Company, 
Interview 2]
Another company manager explained that, although the level of interest seafaring 
attracts, from the youth today, might not be as high as three decades ago, it is not the 
case that there is completely no interest:
We always get letters asking for apprenticeship so I think that there are still 
many people out there who want to go to sea. It might not be as it used to be 
years ago but speaking from our perspective, we do not seem to struggle to 
get them [cadets]. It is not a problem that affects us at the moment [Shipping 
Company, Interview 16].
It is both interesting and revealing to note that the companies which do not seem to 
promote the view that seafaring is no longer interesting to the British are those which 
have been identified by some agencies, colleges and seafarers’ unions as being actively 
committed to training and employing British officers. A senior union official said of 
such companies:
A few companies have stuck to a strict training programme over the years, 
even in the bad years. What is even better is that they are committed to
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employing British officers.... We know them and we thank them [Union 
Interview].
This might be an indication that those companies which truly want to train and employ 
are bound to be more enthusiastic and optimistic in their view of the training situation 
whereas the rest will often project this bleak image of the situation. It is therefore likely 
that this popular misconception is for the implicit convenience of those who do not wish 
to continue training and employing British officers. The senior union official summed 
this argument as follows:
It is a very convenient but, unfortunately, wishful and infectious thinking on 
the part of employers; imagine who would be happy if indeed no British 
youth signed up for cadetships... It is a very convenient argument and it is 
meant to justify their lack of commitment to train and employ British 
officers [Union Interview]
A particularly strong argument, on the same lines, was presented by one training agency 
manager who explained that his company was not facing any difficulties in attracting 
people to their cadetships. In his comments, the manager suggested that the problem lies 
more in a failure to retain cadets rather than to attract young people into the training 
programme:
There is no evidence to suggest that young people are not interested in these 
cadetships, I must say that each year we are inundated with applications; we 
are receiving an average of 3000 enquiries each year, I don’t see that a sign 
that young people are not interested [Training Agency, Interview 21].
This argument was also supported by a few shipping company managers.
Therefore it seems as if the general view of shipping companies and training agencies is 
that efforts to increase the numbers of British junior officers are being frustrated by, 
among other factors, but mainly, a growing lack of interest in sea careers among the 
youth in Britain. Although the majority of these corporate actors hold this view there are 
some who do not agree with it. Instead they suggest that the problem lies elsewhere.
Another factor that has been identified by shipping companies and training agencies as 
contributing to the failure to increase British junior officers is the average age of 
applicants to cadetships in recent years which, they argue, is too young. Most of the 
interviewees in this category clearly held the view that seafaring is a difficult profession
- 1 6 5  -
whose training requires a lot of patience, determination and endurance. One company 
manager and ex-mariner explained:
The work of a ships’ officer is not easy; there are many difficulties and 
challenges and one should be ready and willing to endure long hours on the 
job. This is something that demands both mental and physical capabilities 
which most of the cadets nowadays do not seem to have [Shipping 
Company, Interview 16]
Many therefore argue that the age at which most British cadets commence training, that 
is, between 16 and 19, is too young hence; many of them lack the physical capacity, and 
the discipline, to successfully complete the programme. One training agency member of 
staff explained:
Because of the young age of the cadets, many are unable to cope with the 
difficult and demanding training programme, especially at sea but also you 
will find that some lack the patience and discipline to study hard and master 
some of the difficult subjects of the course [Training Agency, Interview 9]
Considering the average age of my cadet interviewees it was clear to me that the 
average age of cadets falls between 16 and 19 but, whether or not this necessarily means 
that most of them are physically and intellectually incapable to withstand the training is 
debatable and would require a lot more evidence. The shipping companies and their 
training agents, however, seem convinced of this and, to further prove their point, they 
point to yet another factor, low academic aptitude, which, according to many of them, 
contributes significantly to the difficulty in increasing shipping skills in the UK.
Many training agency managers argued that, in addition to the age problem, many of the 
candidates who apply into the cadet programme, nowadays, lack the academic 
qualifications and general aptitude to successfully complete the course. Their view is 
that for one to successfully go through the officer training programme and qualify with 
the right level of skills, they must have the ability to handle such subjects as 
mathematics, physics, chemistry and geography. Whereas it might be correct to say that 
the cadets need the ability to handle these essential subjects, there is no evidence 
presented to show that, with proper coaching, the cadets in question cannot muster 
sufficient competencies.
The companies and agencies continue to argue that the problem is two-fold. Firstly, they 
are being forced, by circumstances created by government policy, to target school
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leavers with lower, specific subject and overall, grades than they normally would 
consider, and, secondly, only those school leavers with low grades are targeting 
seafaring because they are locked out of university and are considered unsuitable by 
other middle-level professional training institutions.
Both the shipping companies and training agencies believe that this has come about as a 
result of government policies which are aimed at promoting university education at the 
expense of middle level colleges and vocational courses like seafaring. One Manager 
explained:
Because of the government’s keenness to get more people to undergo 
university degree courses we have very much reduced the number of people 
that traditionally might have looked at a sea going career, because you are 
looking at group of people that are essentially practical but have a certain 
amount o f academic talent but are not interested in going away to take a 
degree. So, that pool of people that used to be there has shrunk very much 
because they are being pushed to take degree courses [Shipping Company, 
Interview 25].
A training agency manager also supported this view. He explained that over the past 
few years the government had drastically lowered university entry points in order to 
make more people go through universities and obtain degree qualifications in pursuit of 
the government policy objective that at least 50% of the population should have 
university education. As a result, all the other middle and lower level colleges have had 
to lower their entry points:
We have lowered our entry qualifications very much because the 
government has decided to drastically cut down university entry 
points...this is a political thing, just to be seen to be putting more people 
through universities, so they have come up with this policy that at least 50% 
of the population should have university education. Many of the candidates 
we take can hardly cope with the course content, especially the sciences, 
which are compulsory for all. We have had a few dropping out as a result. It 
makes work harder for us and reduces the quality of the officers we produce 
in the country [Training Agency, Interview 21].
The shipping companies’ managers further claimed that they were hard pressed to get 
the right numbers of good quality cadets because of the combined effect of reduced 
applicants and the prevailing academic aptitude. As noted in the extract below from a 
company source:
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For example, this year we were requested to train eleven cadets. I was only 
able to find nine. Also, those nine cadets were only lower GCSC grade. 
Normally, company requirement will be A-level or top GCSC grades. So, 
it’s extremely difficult to find suitable candidates. Also the numbers which 
are requested [Shipping Company, Interview 10].
It, therefore, seems that there are two parts to the corporate perspective described here; 
the first one is that there are not enough people coming in because the career has lost its 
appeal to the general British society, and the other is that the British youth of today are 
not of a seafaring quality either because of the average age at which they join cadet 
training or because of the prevailing academic aptitude of the available applicants.
These two parts to the argument seem like two parallel and contradictory views. One is 
that there are no people interested in the career and the other is that there are people but 
they are not of the required quality. However, the message that runs through the two is 
that the number o f people interested in sea careers has decreased drastically such that it 
is not easy to get enough cadets to meet shipping companies’ Minimum Training 
Obligations. Moreover, the few that are available are not of the right quality which 
implies two things: first that many o f them will not be able to complete their training 
and, second, those who finish are not necessarily good officer quality. Either way, the 
companies are arguing that the British source of officers in not reliable both in terms of 
numbers and quality, an argument that has been dismissed by training colleges. As we 
shall see in the next sub-sections the credibility of this claim is challenged by cadet data.
7.3.2 The Training Colleges Perspective
The training college perspective is interesting because, while it concurs with that of 
companies and agencies in relation to age and academic aptitude, it disagrees with the 
argument that British people no longer want to go to sea. Most importantly, the training 
colleges disagree with the way the corporate industry presents its argument which, one 
college staff described as “clearly inaccurate” [College Interview 2].
Primarily, the training administrators in these colleges take the view that there is a 
strong interest in sea careers among British youth. One cadet administrator made it clear 
that there was no problem with getting cadets:
Numbers wise, in the last three to four years, we have had no problems; we 
have done very well [College Interview 2].
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Another college staff member reiterated this view and emphasised the point that the UK 
still had a lot of seafaring potential and people in many regions still considered 
seafaring a good career:
We get as many trainees as we can handle every year so we cannot say that 
our training programmes have become less attractive. There are still many 
people out there who see seafaring as a good career and lately there are even 
more because conditions are improving and it now offers many possibilities 
beyond the sea... The majority of the people doing the course come from a 
seafaring background or a member of the family is a seafarer ... They are 
there because they want to be officer of the watch, you can offer them a 
degree, master’s certificate but what they are concerned with is that they 
want to go to sea, so that is why they are there [College Interview 1].
Concerning the age of cadets, the staff I interviewed, at the various colleges, agreed that 
many of the cadets they were receiving in recent years were much younger and 
explained that this sometimes created discipline problems because some of them still 
carried the ‘high-school mentality’. One of the interviewees explained:
Our biggest problem with the age of the cadets is discipline. First of all you 
are talking about students, just out of high-school, some of whom are quite
young getting the message across to them that they are now in a
disciplined environment....that is a problem because of the way our 
schooling and our education system is, there is not enough discipline; we 
expect them to be on time and dressed properly, that can be a big challenge 
[College Interview 2]
However, it does not seem as if the age is a big hindrance to the cadets’ training 
performance. Nonetheless, a cadet training officer in one of the colleges explained that 
in very few cases a cadet might be too young and physically incapable of completing 
the course, especially at sea. This interviewee however seemed inclined to think that 
such cadets would be able to complete the programme successfully if given the 
appropriate support from their sponsors:
Age only becomes a problem when there is no proper support for the cadets.
Some are clearly too young and it shows from their physical build and their 
behaviour. In college we can handle the discipline part but out there at sea 
some senior officers might not have the patience. These are the ones who 
cannot complete the course, it is not such a big problem, I don’t think 
[College Interview 1]
Regarding academic aptitude the college staff who participated in the study agreed that 
over the years the colleges have been forced to take people with lower school grades
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with the consequence that many have difficulties in handling certain aspects of the 
academic content in the course, especially, subjects like navigation (for deck cadets), 
mathematics and physics which are essential and compulsory for all cadets and 
important to the training. One administrator explained:
This is a big problem; many of the cadets simply do not have the academic 
capability for the course and it is something that has to be considered 
seriously because it makes our work difficult and might, inevitably, affect 
the general quality of officers that come out of the system [College 
Interview 3].
This quote suggests the possibility that, as a training agency manager quoted earlier said, 
government policy has pushed down university entry requirements so much so that 
training programmes like seafaring have been forced to take candidates with very low 
grades in essential subjects. It does not suggest, however, that nothing can be done to 
improve cadets’ abilities in the problem areas of the course content. Clearly, the 
interviewee implies that with more effort and hard work, this should not be a problem of 
the magnitude implied by some training managers and shipping company executives. It 
is therefore possible to argue that the training programme needs revising so that those 
cadets whose competency in certain essential subjects requires improvement can be 
supported with extra coaching in order to bring them to up to the appropriate standard.
According to one cadet training officer in one of the colleges, in order to solve this 
problem, the college had designed a bridging course meant for those cadets whose 
qualifications need upgrading:
For example, to do the HND programme they now need five GCSEs, C 
grade and above but if you are looking at C grade maths it is a very low pass 
mark and it is not sufficient for them to take on the content of a deck officer 
or an engineer training. This is why many of them struggle. So we now have 
built in an academic ramp into our course which we have done successfully 
but still tutors have to work very hard with students to get them through 
some of their course work and exams [College Interview 2].
This indicates that what is required is an overall upgrading of the training programme so 
that low schools grades will not be a problem big enough to push cadets out of the 
system prematurely.
So, from the data, it appears that colleges are not in agreement with the general 
argument presented by the corporate industry to explain the failure in increasing British
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junior officers. They particularly do not seem inclined to support the argument that 
British youth are not interested in sea careers and, although they agree that there are 
challenges arising from the cadets’ young age and low school grades, they do not 
consider these fundamental problems. What, then, do they consider to be the main 
problem?
The few shipping companies and training agencies that were quoted earlier as opposing 
the general corporate Tack of interest’ argument suggested that the problem might lie 
elsewhere. Indeed, one training agency manager, also quoted earlier, indicated that the 
problem lay in retention rather than attraction. The cadet administrators I interviewed in 
the various colleges are convinced that this is the case. Many explained that their 
colleges were experiencing as much as twenty to 30% wastage rates per cohort. One 
such interviewee explained:
We have not failed to bring people in. I don’t think that is where the 
problem is: I think that there needs to be measures to ensure greater 
retention to ensure that most o f the cadets actually complete their training.
At the moment we are, unfortunately losing between 20 and 30% of the 
cadets in every cohort. So you see, I don’t think that is the problem at all 
[College Interview 3]
Apparently, most of the dropout cases happen when the cadets go to sea for their first 
sea training phase after the initial college phase. Some, however, stay on after the first 
sea-phase but subsequently drop out either during the second college phase or the 
second sea-phase. In any case, the majority of dropout cases happen between the first 
and second sea-phases as one cadet administrator explained:
Most of the cadets leave during the first sea-phase. Some come back to 
college after the sea-phase and declare that they are quitting or simply don’t 
turn up so we only get to know from the companies that they have quit. A 
few leave during or immediately after the second sea-phase [College 
Interview 1].
Many of the shipping companies and training agencies have used such statistics to 
conclude that the high wastage rates are due to the fact that the cadets are either too 
young or too ‘soft’ to cope with life at sea. College staff, on the other hand, suggest that, 
although some cadets might be too young or too ‘soft’, premature termination of the 
course would not occur if  the sponsoring companies and their agents established 
effective follow-up and support systems for their cadets to provide them with necessary 
help and encouragement. The training officer of one college said:
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Yes, many of them drop out in their first sea-time. It is possible that they 
find sea-life different and perhaps more difficult than the life they are used 
to, but, I think, this could be solved if sponsors took more care of their
cadets, take pains to break them in gently, if you see what I mean We
get reports from students about training officers who are impatient and treat 
the cadets badly and of poor working conditions on some of the ships, this 
does not help at all [College Interview 2].
Some of the areas that college cadet administrators think need attention in order to 
improve cadet retention rates include: careful selection of training berths, improved 
training and living conditions on-board ship and establishment of an elaborate support 
mechanism to help cadets through the training period.
7.4 The Cadet Perspective: Training Experiences and Implications for 
Training
The cadets participating in the study had already dropped out of the programme. The 
aim of interviewing them was, therefore, to try and establish their reasons for 
terminating their training prematurely. This allows me to critically assess the various 
arguments offered by the corporate industry and the training colleges. All the 
interviewees were in the age bracket of sixteen to twenty-one and all of them had 
dropped out within one year of the interview date. I was also able to establish, through 
the interviews, that the majority o f them dropped out during their first sea-phase but a 
few left in the second sea phase, and that, although, a few of them dropped out due to 
personal reasons, the majority quit due to reasons related to the nature and conditions of 
training.
According to the corporate industry low officer outputs levels are due to a lack of 
interest in sea careers in the UK combined with high cadet wastage rates caused by a 
lack of capacity, both physical and academic, on the part of cadets. The training 
colleges, on the other hand, believe that the problem is caused by a lack of genuine 
commitment, on the part o f companies, to train UK cadets. In dismissing the corporate 
argument that the British are not interested in sea careers, the college staff argued that 
many cadets are admitted into the programme, but shipping companies and their 
training agents have failed to actively support them during training thereby prompting 
many of them to drop out and seek other career alternatives.
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After careful analysis of cadet interview data, on why they decided to terminate their 
training, I have isolated two broad themes: the first one relates to training experiences, 
especially at sea, and their influence on cadets’ decision to quit, and, the second one 
relates to cadets’ career anxiety and uncertainty. Both will be dealt with in turn.
7.4.1 Cadet Training Experiences at College
The training o f cadets is divided between college and sea time but always begins with a 
college phase. The quality of cadets’ experiences during this phase largely depends on 
the quality of living and training facilities available in the colleges and the nature of 
support that the colleges offer, academically and socially. Most of the cadets I spoke 
with expressed satisfaction with their training experiences at college and all of them 
thought that the training facilities in their colleges were particularly good. One cadet 
explained:
The training facilities in [...] are superb, very good, which makes learning 
interesting and the lecturers are superb guys. Many are master mariners and 
they know their stuff. About facilities in college I have no complaint at all 
[Cadet Interview 3]
Some of the facilities praised by the cadets include well equipped libraries, engineering 
workshops, modem simulators and classrooms and lecture theatres equipped with 
modem communication technology. The cadets felt that the quality and adequacy of the 
facilities made the learning process easier and more enjoyable.
With regard to the living experiences the views were mixed. Some found life in college 
good while some did not. Careful analysis of the data reveals that a big part of the 
reason for this difference in experiences was influenced by the nature the relationship 
between cadets and their sponsors and the type of support each cadet received from 
them. Some cadets received sufficient support including generous allowances and 
continuous emotional support while others were largely left to their own means and 
therefore did not have a particularly good living experience. Cadets in the latter 
category experienced problems with basic subsistence as one such cadets explained:
The money I got for upkeep was not enough so I had to get cheap 
accommodation outside college but still I could not get anything decent and 
have enough money left for food and other things. It was tough. Some of the 
other cadets were well treated; they got good money for accommodation in 
college, books and all and lived well....I think it is just my company that 
was mean [Cadet Interview 7]
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Another cadet explained:
I honestly think they should increase the money. There is no point 
promoting it as a fully sponsored opportunity if we can hardly get by on the 
allowance. [Cadet Interview 4]
A few of the cadets I spoke with, on the other hand, expressed satisfaction with their 
overall college experience and cited reasonable subsistence allowances and adequate 
support and encouragement from their sponsors. One such cadet explained:
My sponsoring company was good to me; I received a lot of support It
was three of us with the same company and we had direct telephone contact 
with a personnel person in the company itself and we were treated very 
well.... [Cadet Interview 6]
There was one particular aspect of college life which many cadets identified as 
presenting a problem, that is, difficulties with certain aspects of the course content. 
Many cadets, it seems, have difficulties in coping with subjects like Navigation, Physics, 
Mathematics and Chemistry. One cadet explained:
Some subjects were very difficult, I found maths and physics very
difficult  I was never good at these subjects even in school so I found
them quite hard [Cadet Interview 1]
One deck cadet described navigation and ‘charting’ as “nightmare”:
Navigation is very complicated but all deck cadets must be good at it I
had to struggle and maybe it is because I am a little slow.... It was a real 
nightmare [Cadet Interview 10]
The issue of problems with the course content is one which came up in several 
interviews with both training administrators and managers who expressed a general 
view that the academic aptitude of the cadets recruited was not up to the required 
standard. However, as I have argued earlier in this chapter, it is not clear, from the 
colleges and companies’ interview data, whether this is a problem caused by cadets’ 
academic ineptitude or the structure of the courses and general training standards. 
Nonetheless, a few college staff implied that with hard work and appropriate course 
structure, most of the weaker cadets can be helped to gain competency and confidence:
In my view many of the problems are just due to lack of confidence. Many 
of the lads lack confidence at the beginning but, with time and proper 
coaching, many eventually do catch on [College Interview 2]
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Ultimately, such issues contribute to a generally poor training experience for many 
cadets at college leading to far reaching consequences for the industry as we shall see in 
the next section. The overall assessment of the cadets’ views on their experiences at 
college, however, indicates that the majority were fairly satisfied with college life as 
opposed to life and training at sea which many described as difficult and unpleasant.
7.5.2 Cadet experiences at Sea
The accounts by shipping executives taking part in the study suggest that there have 
been great improvements on-board recently built merchant ships which have improved 
the living and working conditions for the crews on-board. However, accounts of 
experienced seafarers indicate that newer ships are not necessarily better than older 
ships in terms of the facilities and conditions they offer. For example, the much talked 
of e-mail and satellite communication facilities on-board modem ships are, in most 
cases, only available for the master and senior officers and often for official 
communication purposes.
Not all new vessels are equipped with satellite television facilities and where they are 
available; the programmes will not always be in a language understandable by all. In 
times of increasing work pressure and fatigue (Smith et al, 2006), due to reduced crews 
on-board, the television plays an important role as a means of relaxation and recreation 
on-board after work. The accounts of many experienced seafarers, many of whom are 
now shore-side company managers, revealed that, furthermore, the increasing 
sophistication of ships, and shipping in general, has robbed crews of the camaraderie 
social atmosphere which characterised life on-board older ships. Ships are now manned 
by only a handful of people often from different parts of the world, working under 
enormous pressure and only meant to be together for a brief period in most cases (Ellis, 
N, 2007).
Moreover, the same age-old and ongoing company quest for lower costs is leading ship­
owners to install smaller accommodation cabins and, generally, poor quality living 
facilities. The result is that the improvements often hailed as changing life on-board 
ships for the better are largely cosmetic. The manager of one shipping company, a 
former captain, wondered:
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How [can] a ship owner, who has spent so many millions of pounds 
building a modem ship settle for the cheapest facilities for his crews? It 
surely beats me, but they do, all the time [Shipping Company, Interview 13].
It appears, therefore that the living and working conditions for seafarers on-board have 
not necessarily become better with newer vessels. On the contrary, because there is 
evidence of growing work pressure and increasing fatigue on board modem ships the 
importance of having good accommodation and facilities on-board is underwritten 
(Smith et alf 2006).
It is into such a high pressure, and often difficult working environment, that cadets are 
often suddenly introduced in their first sea training phase. Data from interviews with 
training agencies and college staff, discussed earlier, has shown that it is during this sea- 
phase that many cadets drop out. Cadet data suggests that many of them find their first 
sea-experience unbearable. Furthermore, the training experience at sea is created by a 
combination of factors, of which the quality of living and working facilities on-board 
are one. Other factors include crew composition, the nature of work, loneliness and 
isolation during the long periods away from home and the general suitability of the ship 
for training purposes.
One college training administrator, an ex-mariner, observed that many cadets found sea 
training hard because, “The shipboard environment is basically and primarily a 
workplace which no amount of improvement can turn into a home” [College Interview 
1]. This, unfortunately, seems to suggest that the general lifestyle on-board ship, 
however improved the facilities, will always remain alien to even the longest serving 
officer and difficult even for the most enduring person. This however, should not be 
taken to mean that nothing can, or should, be done to improve conditions on-board. It 
should, on the contrary, be an impetus for ship-owners to try harder to make the lives of 
seafarers more comfortable.
Considering the poor living and working conditions on-board some of the ships, the sea 
training experiences for cadets, most of who are very young as described previously, are 
often unpleasant. It appears, from my interviews with ex-cadets that the first sea phase 
is the major test of the ability of one to survive the training. For many, the type of life 
they encounter on-board is a total surprise irrespective of how much the college 
prepares them. This further confirms the observation by a training administrator that “no
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amount of instruction in college can really prepare the cadets for their first experience of 
life at sea” [College Interview 2]. Cadet interviews confirm this because they reveal that 
most of the cadets are not prepared for the type of lifestyle they encounter when they 
first go to sea. One of them explained:
I knew it would be a tough lifestyle but I also expected it to be a lot of fun, 
you know, but it was much too tough [Cadet Interview 7]
With regard to training and living experiences at sea, for cadets, a number of themes 
have emerged from my analysis of the cadet data. These themes represent the issues 
brought up and identified as contributing to poor sea training experiences for cadets. 
They include; inappropriate nature of work, loneliness and isolation, insensitive and 
unsupportive behaviour of senior officers on-board and the shore-side management and 
a generally difficult lifestyle.
(i) The Nature of Work
One of the main issues raised by the cadets was the nature of work they were expected 
to perform while on-board which, many considered difficult and inappropriate. Many of 
the cadets seemed to feel that they were being used by the companies as extra labour 
rather than trainees. One cadet explained:
It did not feel like training at all on that ship, we were working like slaves...
So I was all the time with the crews doing hard work and receiving no 
instruction relevant to my training [Cadet Interview 2].
In an interview with a training company manager, however, such complaints were 
dismissed, h/she said that cadets expected to be “in white gloves on deck handing down 
instruction to others and looking out of the bridge window since they are training to be 
officers” [Training Agency, Interview 21]. Whereas it might be true that some cadets 
might go to sea with this notion, it seems unlikely that there were so many of them as to 
warrant the kind of generalised and strong views that the manager expressed. One 
college cadet administrator explained that although cadets are expected to work hard, as 
part of their hands-on training process, they were not to be taken as “extra deck or 
engine-room hands to be used and exploited” [College Interview 1]. This, according to 
this training administrator, is what many ship-owners put cadets through on-board their 
ships at sea. Furthermore, the “white gloves” views of the training manager might 
perhaps be an illustration of the type of unsupportive attitude that seems to be emerging
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strongly as a characteristic of some of the sponsoring companies and their training 
agents.
It certainly did not appear to me that any of the cadets I interviewed could have joined 
with the ‘white glove’ illusion as suggested by the training manager. They might have 
been young, and some might have looked physically small, but all of them explained 
that, when they went to college and eventually to sea, they knew it would be tough. One 
cadet described this as follows:
I expected that I would be assigned to various officers in different sections 
at different times to work with, practise skills and be assessed by the 
training officer, but no, I was there mainly as part of the crew and did not 
know what was going on with my training and when I approached the 
training officer about it he got very cross [Cadet Interview 1].
(ii) Lack of care and Support both from Senior Sea Staff and Shore-side Management
The issue of insensitive and unsupportive attitudes from senior officers on-board came 
up frequently as one of the main reasons behind cadets’ decision to drop out of training. 
Many of the cadets complained about impatient and insensitive officers. One cadet, for 
example, described his situation as follows:
I did not enjoy the training, especially at sea... it was hard work and I did 
my best but the chief officer kept threatening to send me away...that I was 
lazy. When I complained to the training company they just did nothing, not 
even respond [Cadet Interview 3]
The cadet interview data confirm that while many cadets are prepared to do hard work, 
they are not prepared for the unsupportive training atmosphere in which they find 
themselves. The following extract demonstrates this:
Oh no, I went in knowing well what to expect.... I would be stupid to expect 
it to be easy. It is just the attitude of my training company and the other 
officers on-board that discouraged me [Cadet Interview 7]
The issue of poor relationships between cadets and their training officers came up in a 
majority of the interviews. According to one cadet the training officer on his ship 
“behaved as if I was an inconvenience on-board if I was not somewhere out of sight 
washing and scraping” [Cadet Interview 1].
Perhaps the worst account of this lack of concern for the welfare of cadets came from 
one cadet who was forced to quit because the master could not let him take time off to
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be with his fiance who had just miscarried and the company ashore offered no 
assistance in spite of the fact that the cadet appealed for intervention:
I had many problems after I started the training but it was clear to me that 
no one cared; my father died while I was away at sea the first time...the 
captain complained that I had overstayed when I rejoined the ship... I was 
really unfortunate because during the next sea phase I was told that my 
girlfriend had miscarried. This time I was told I could not go...when I 
complained to the training company they said if I left I should not come 
back... [Cadet Interview 9].
Although there were few similarly extreme accounts of insensitivity from sponsoring 
and training companies, there were many more descriptions of less serious scenarios 
which, cumulatively, indicate a bigger problem with the way these companies relate to 
their cadets.
(iii) Loneliness and Isolation
One big problem which cadets face at sea seems to be loneliness and isolation. This 
could be partly because, as the data across the board indicates, many of them are young 
and have not been exposed to life away from home before. But it could also be because 
the conditions under which they have to live and work are stressful and, as much of the 
data suggests, because there are not sufficient support mechanisms for those who need it. 
Looking at the cadets participating in the study it was clear to me that many were 
clearly capable of handling the strain of the long periods away from home while some 
could, clearly, only do so with support. Whatever the case, loneliness is a major 
problem but one which can be easily solved with support from sponsors, including 
constant counselling for those cadets who would benefit from it. One such cadet gave 
the following account:
You don’t have anyone to talk with and everybody is busy and you miss 
home.... I missed home....everything, my family my friends, everything, 
hanging out with my mates.. ..I just missed it all [Cadet Interview 10]
Another cadet explained:
At college it was easier because you make friends and you go out and it is
like home but at sea, it is not the same....you can’t really make friends
and it is not the same [Cadet Interview 3].
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This sense of isolation came out very strongly in the account of one cadet who 
described how his cousin passed away while he was at sea and, when he came home 
after the funeral, he just felt afraid to go back to sea. Although he went back, he decided 
to quit soon after because he could not shake off that feeling of dread:
I was not able to get off in time to attend the funeral and when I came home 
I just imagined if  it had been someone closer to me, say, like a sister, a 
brother or a parent [Cadet interview 6].
This is clearly a drop-out case which might have been prevented with proper 
counselling and emotional support. As the cadet put it himself:
There was no other problem about the training which I cold not handle.
After my cousin’s death I just felt too far away from home [Cadet Interview 
6].
Seemingly, one main factor which causes this loneliness and a feeling of isolation is the 
lack of adequate communication facilities on-board. In some accounts the ships had 
telephone and e-mail facilities which the crew and the cadets could use to communicate 
home. In most cases, however, such facilities were only available for official 
communication and, for the crew, only in cases of emergency. Many cadets who were 
on such ships had no way o f communicating with their families which increased their 
sense of isolation and enhanced the feeling of loneliness. One cadet explained:
The telephone, you could only use it in emergency cases, not to just talk to 
your parents unless in an emergency....e-mail as well. They were only for 
official communication but if you are friends with the master or chief officer 
you might get to make frequent calls home [Cadet Interview 1].
In other cases the loneliness and isolation came out as a sense of frustration arising from 
work pressure and lack of shore leave at the ports of call. Many cadets expressed the 
constant hope that they would be given some time off to, as one cadet put it, “go into 
town, make a phone call or just walk around and get some fresh air” [Cadet Interview 5]. 
The cadets, however, described situations where, port calls were dreaded because there 
was always too much pressure to either finish loading or discharging activities within 
the shortest time possible:
The port was probably the worst point because you knew you were in port 
but you could not get off the ship....this is where the work was hardest, I 
guess, because the clock was ticking.... It would have been a great relief to 
go ashore even for an hour or so [Cadet Interview 10].
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Loneliness, isolation and work pressure are some of the problems that have been 
identified elsewhere as causing depression in many seafarers worldwide (Ellis, 2007; 
Kahveci, 2007). It is, therefore, not surprising that cadets should find it even harder to 
cope with the pressure at sea.
(iv) Difficult Lifestyle On-Board
Difficulty of lifestyle at sea is a problem that was identified by all cadets although 
different cadets had different reasons for finding it so. The majority of them raised 
issues related with food, accommodation and recreational facilities as the main reasons 
they found life unbearable on-board. One cadet described his ship as “old and run­
down” and described poor living conditions on board:
My first sea-phase was on-board an, old rundown, ship with the worst 
conditions, honestly.... The accommodation cabins were few and horrible 
and we had to share. There were basically no decent facilities of any sort on
board that ship, no entertainment, no communication, nothing!  It was
very hard for me [Cadet Interview 1].
Even where cadets were placed on-board relatively new ships, still issues of small 
sleeping cabins and a generally uncomfortable atmosphere came up.
However, contrary to popular ‘myth’ that the multinational nature of present-day crews 
discourages British cadets, there were no accounts indicating that this was a problem in 
spite of the fact that I put this question to my cadet interviewees directly. Apart from a 
few accounts of difficulties with language, conflicting cultural perspectives and 
practices, there was not much to indicate that cadets were particularly put off by 
working with foreign nationals. Certainly there was no indication that it led to cadets 
choosing to terminate their training programmes. In fact one cadet described the 
multinational composition of the crew as “probably the only good thing on that 
ship...makes it all more exciting” [Cadet Interview 1].
Another cadet said:
Most of the people on that ship were from different countries but many 
could speak English so language was not a problem and many o f them were 
really friendly and fun [Cadet Interview 3]
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It seemingly only becomes a problem when the sponsors are not careful with the 
process of assigning cadets to ships such that a cadet ends up being the only British, or 
indeed, the only English speaking person on-board, as in the case described below:
They put us on an all [foreign] crewed ship and not many of them could 
speak English. Initially there were two of us [British cadets] and so I had 
someone I could speak with.... It was very difficult to relate to the others 
because we just could not understand each other. But the other British cadet 
left after a few weeks and so I was all alone and it became very lonely 
[Cadet Interview 4].
In another account a cadet found himself as the only English speaking person on-board 
a ship with a predominantly Eastern European crew. After complaining he was 
transferred to another ship and although he eventually quit, the decision had nothing to 
do with that incident. It was rather a combination of many factors which created a bad 
experience for him.
Cadet experiences, both at college and at sea, have a big impact on the quality and 
quantity of skills produced at the end o f the training process. As I have already 
indicated earlier in this chapter, there seems to be a large number of cadets who become 
discouraged along the way and prematurely drop out to seek other options ashore while 
some stay on to the end of the training but one might put a question mark on the 
competency of many o f those who complete considering how much the general 
atmosphere might undermine their confidence in the profession. It is important to note 
that the problems discussed above relate to all, if not most of the cadets, including those 
who felt well cared for by their sponsoring companies. The difference only lay in the 
way such problems were addressed. Whereas some companies and their training agents 
took pains to solve cadets’ problems and make them as comfortable as possible, the 
majority left them to their own devices. It is the cadets of companies in the latter group 
who dropped out the most as confirmed by one training manager:
From my experience here I can tell you that the companies which take good 
care of their cadets and consequently experience less incidences of cadet 
dropout are those that take good care of their cadets. Cadets require a lot of 
support and encouragement because, to be honest, the training is tough, 
especially at sea and most of the cadets are very young. Some companies 
are willing to give this support but the rest just don’t care [Training Agency, 
Interview 11]
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It is therefore fair to conclude that the overall problem is mainly one of lack of support 
rather than any of the reasons presented by many shipping companies and training 
agencies, which would not lead to increased dropout rates if such support were available 
to all cadets.
7.4.3 Employment Prospects
According to the Mckinnon Report “Junior Officers Employment Study” (2006), the 
industry, and the government, argues that there is no lack of employment for British 
junior officers. However, the evidence from my research indicates diminishing 
confidence among cadets about their future career prospects. Many cadets were clearly 
anxious about whether or not they were going to get jobs at sea and the data show that 
the situation is directly contributing towards high cadet wastage rates in the UK. 
Furthermore, the Mckinnon Report, which is based on a questionnaire survey involving 
UK based shipping companies, draws its conclusions from company statements of 
expectation rather than a solid commitment by companies to employ British junior 
officers.
Employment prospects are one of the problems affecting skills development in the UK 
and this might happen in four different ways. Firstly, cadets are anxious about their 
career prospects after completion of training and, considering all the other factors 
discussed earlier, may decide to drop out and seek other more promising career options. 
Secondly, and less directly, the fact that UK based shipping companies are not 
interested in employing British junior officers means that they are not genuinely 
interested in training cadets from the UK. This is certainly a major contributing factor to 
the deteriorating cadet training experiences since the sponsors are not keen to actively 
support their cadets during training. Thirdly, many years of diminishing employment 
opportunities might have created a negative perception towards seafaring which might 
discourage many eligible candidates. Finally, if newly qualified officers do not get jobs, 
they miss out on the essential post-training experience building opportunities. From my 
cadet interview data and data from sponsoring company managers I am in a position to 
discuss the first and second possible effects of this phenomenon but I can only comment 
on the third and fourth effects deductively since it is outside the general scope of the 
study.
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Many of the cadets clearly explained that they were uncomfortable with stories about 
lack of jobs for British officers. One such cadet was convinced that it would be hard to 
get a job because, as he put it, “seafaring jobs are going to foreign people who are 
cheaper” [Cadet Interview 3]. Such fear, according to many cadets, was influenced by 
media reports and stories from other sources that the profession is becoming a ‘third 
world occupation’ (Nautilus-UK Telegraph, 2006; Cargo Security International 
Magazine, 2006). The following three extracts clearly show the effect of career anxiety 
on cadets:
I started hearing stories from other crews that the company was really bad 
and one senior officer— they said the company only employed foreigners, 
said I was wasting time if I expected a job with them, he said. I could not 
take the risk [Cadet Interview 10].
And
People are talking about lack o f jobs and, of course, it is discouraging.... I 
did not want to sit around and take chances [Cadet Interview 11]
And
They say that there are no jobs for British officers, not anymore; everybody
is talking about it and it is discouraging  Companies are employing
foreigners they claim that the British want too much money.... Too
expensive....it is very discouraging....better to find something more 
promising [Cadet Interview 3]
Many of the cadets taking part in the interviews explained that such fears formed a big 
part of the major reasons for their dropping out as the above extracts further show. 
Another one concluded much the same by saying:
I thought I would lose other opportunities if I waited around, so I quit and 
joined university instead to study engineering. Maybe I will work for a ship 
management company when I finish [Cadet Interview 7]
It also seems as if this scepticism about the future is encouraged by some training agents. 
These agents made it clear to the cadets, on recruitment, that they could not guarantee 
them any jobs with the sponsoring companies at the end of the training. One such cadet 
explained:
My company made it very clear from the beginning that there were no job 
guarantees.... I stayed on because my aim was to become an officer of the 
watch.... I was aware of some of these problems but then all other
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professions have their own problems. I was willing to give it a go because I 
was interested. [Cadet Interview 2]
Another one added:
No, there were no guarantees but if  you are interested in something, you go 
for it. Sometimes you don’t pause to think all these things but they become 
too much when you are in and actually living them, I guess that is what 
happened here [Cadet Interview 4].
One might wonder why such cadets choose to take up the cadetships but, it appears that 
many do so because of the pay received for training. However, many of them explained 
that they held hopes that eventually they would get jobs, if not at sea, then on-shore. 
Many saw the programme as a good opportunity for receiving training and acquiring 
valuable transferable skills, particularly engineer cadets. As the following extract 
suggests:
The good thing about it was that that it was fully paid for opportunity to get
good training, so I didn’t have to worry about loan repayments I was not
too worried then; I thought I would eventually get a job, if not at sea then 
ashore [Cadet Interview 2]
Unfortunately, as with the issue o f limited training support discussed earlier, few of the 
cadets were guaranteed jobs by their sponsors. Some of the cadets explained that their 
sponsors made it clear that they would give them jobs but, as one such cadet put it “they 
made it clear that we would get jobs but depending on performance; only the best 
performing cadets would be given jobs” [Cadet Interview 6]. Only a very small number 
of the cadets, however, fell in this category. For the majority no jobs were offered and, 
seemingly, there were never clear indications of job possibilities on-board the ships of 
their sponsors. The following interview from a company HR source shows this clearly:
That is a promise we cannot guarantee to keep and so we do not make the 
mistake of giving one. I honestly don’t know of any industry in which 
companies promise and guarantee employment to trainees in colleges. 
[Shipping Company, Interview 10].
Clearly, this exacerbated cadets’ career anxieties and forced some to reconsider their 
decisions to join.
So, the data shows that there is a problem caused by lack o f ‘positive support’ and 
encouragement for cadets from sponsoring companies. This was clearly demonstrated 
by the views of many HR Managers on cadet training and employment which
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constituted strong evidence o f a reluctance, on the part of UK based shipping companies, 
towards employing British junior officers.
The main argument presented by these managers was that British junior officers were 
too costly as compared to many other nationalities from low-cost labour supply 
countries. Thus, one company source explained that the issue of cost is still a big 
problem and that the company could not afford to employ British officers when there 
was a cheaper and equally suitable supply elsewhere:
I don’t need to tell you that we are in business for profit, otherwise what 
would be the use... we cannot employ British officers, or any others for that 
matter, if it is not profitable for us....cost is still an issue and it would be 
plain stupid to employ British simply because we are based in the UK when 
we can do better with many other cheaper sources [Shipping Company, 
Interview 16]
There are three main consequences o f this lack of employment opportunities for 
qualified junior officers on-board British ships: firstly, it is a discouraging factor to 
prospective candidates for cadetships; secondly, the fact that UK based employers do 
not rely on the British officer labour market undermines their commitment to genuinely 
underwrite its development in terms o f training and thirdly, it has a negative impact on 
the confidence of cadets and could ultimately undermine the general competency of 
British shipping skills.
Over the years deteriorating employment prospects for British junior officers have 
created a bleak image of the seafaring career. In the 1970s and 1980s, when many ship­
owners flagged out and employed foreign crews, many British officers were made 
redundant and left jobless. Many of the officers who went through this period still 
narrate stories of neglect and abandonment by both the government and the industry. 
The following interview extract from such a source shows this clearly:
The seventies and eighties those were very bad years... we were in very
pessimistic times... I wasn’t offered a job when I qualified and got my 
second mate’s certificate...that wasn’t a unique experience, it was 
happening all over the UK shipping industry. People were being laid off and 
made redundant all over. Some were being sacked and re-employed the 
following week under completely different and certainly lower conditions 
because their ship had ceased to be British over-night—  I can tell you this, I 
wouldn’t encourage my son or anybody I know to join seafaring, and it is 
just not worth it with all the indifference you see around from both the 
government and the industry [Shipping Company, Interview 2].
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It is such accounts which have shaped the view that the seafaring career is not 
rewarding such that although a lot of ground has been gained in terms of creating 
awareness and calling people to sea, the overall response is still much lower than would 
be expected twenty years ago. As noted by one training manager:
We are now getting many more applicants but I must say that there is still 
less enthusiasm among young eligible British people than, say, twenty to 
twenty-five years ago [Training Agency, Interview 21].
Many of the cadets I interviewed expressed lack o f confidence in the system and feared 
that they would not get employment after training, and this is perhaps a good indication 
of the discouraging effect poor employment prospects have on young people as they 
contemplate taking up training for sea careers.
With regard to undermining companies’ motivation and commitment to train British 
cadets, the data here show that because companies are not interested in employing 
British junior officers they lack the essential economic motivation to invest in their 
training. This is in line with the basic economic reasoning which dictates that the level 
of an industry’s motivation to develop a certain labour segment is directly proportional 
to its economic interest and expectation o f profit from that particular segment. The 
following interview extract from a company source best illustrates this connection, or 
lack of it:
.... since we stopped relying on British officers, the whole training thing 
does not mean very much to us. We train because we have to under the 
minimum training commitment to be honest. If British officers formed a 
major part of our labour force then it would mean something but it doesn’t.
This might sound arrogant but that is the way it is; it is the reality on the 
ground [Shipping Company, Interview 17].
This approach has a great bearing on both the training and the overall output because, as 
I have suggested in previous sections of the chapter, poor employment prospects can 
discourage prospective candidates but, perhaps more importantly, it also leads to high 
drop-out rates as a result of companies’ lack of motivation to train, considering that they 
are not interested in British junior officers. This has a direct and immediate impact on 
how cadets experience their training.
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7.5 Structural Failures
According to the government and its maritime training agencies, all the tonnage tax 
companies are engaged in cadet training. What does this mean however in terms of 
actually producing qualified junior officers? Does this say anything about their actual 
commitment to training? Evidence shows that the annual drop-out rate, in cadet training 
institutions, is very high at 8% (BIMCO/ISF, 2005). The college administrators 
participating in the study quoted a figure of between twenty to 30% annual cohort 
dropout rate. Such evidence indicates a big problem with cadet retention. Steps towards 
improved living and working conditions on-board, creating a friendly and productive 
training atmosphere for cadet on-board ships and better employment terms could 
increase retention rates significantly. Many o f the ex-cadets I interviewed mentioned 
difficult lifestyle on-board and overall poor training experiences as the main reason for 
quitting the training. One explained that:
Cadet: It is really the lifestyle, it is really hard life and it was my first time 
so it was very tough. Maybe it is the particular ship that I went on but living 
conditions were very poor and communication was by e-mail for which you 
had to get the permission of the captain who was not very friendly most of 
the time....no social amenities of any kind and accommodation facilities 
were very bad
Interviewer: Why do you say ‘maybe it was the particular ship’?
Cadet: Some of my friends said that their ships were very good and the 
facilities were good. They even had TV and DVDs and gymnasium on­
board [Cadet Interview 6].
The accounts of ex-cadets and training staff in colleges suggest that many cadets drop 
out during or soon after the first sea phase. It seems that the sudden change from the 
relatively comfortable lifestyle at home and at college with proper accommodation, 
good food and friends and family around is traumatic for many of these young people 
mainly, sixteen to eighteen years of age.
Another issue which seemingly contributes to cadet attrition is the suitability of many of 
the ships that offer training berths. A few of the ex-cadets explained that they found 
their training experience on-board frustrating and it seems that this could be partly 
because the ship they were allocated to was not suitable. This, as the following quote 
will suggest, not only refers to the physical conditions of the ship and the standard of 
living facilities but also the temperament of the senior officers in charge of the cadets.
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There were many accounts in which cadets had to put up with impatient and intolerant 
senior officers. One such cadet explained that he felt like an inconvenience on-board 
because of the impatience with which most of the senior officers treated him:
There was two o f us, cadets, on-board and almost everybody was impatient 
with us. We felt like we were a nuisance and an inconvenience. The worst 
of all was our training officer who simply did not have any time for us at
all it was a frustrating waste of time and I was not enjoying it so when
we got to the next port, I asked to leave [Cadet Interview 4]
Not all vessels are suitable for training and great care has to be taken to ensure that 
cadets are put onboard ships that will give them encouraging first-time sea experiences, 
according to one college training officer. Unfortunately, it seems as if, many of the 
sponsoring companies do not pay much attention to this. My interviews with cadet 
training colleges and training agencies also revealed another problem: only a few 
companies have any actual involvement in the process of training. Seemingly, once they 
have delegated the training duty to agencies, many do not have any interest at all 
beyond the funding, according to the manager of one training agency:
Some of these companies have no interest whatsoever in the cadets they 
sponsor. You will be surprised to know how many ever have any contact 
with their cadets. Their involvement rarely goes beyond delegation and 
cheque-book sponsorship. [Training Agency, Interview 21]
This lack of close contact between sponsoring companies and their cadets could be a 
discouraging factor leading to the poor cadet retention rates. The age at which cadets 
enter training in the UK is very young; as early as sixteen years. Such young people 
require great attention, reassurance and encouragement which, according to the manager 
in the quote above, is lacking. One of the ex-cadets I spoke with confirmed this:
Interviewer. In what ways did this [lack of contact with sponsor] affect you 
during training?
Cadet: I guess it would have made a difference to know that the sponsoring 
company cared and valued me. We knew that (...) was only an agent and we 
knew our sponsoring company but never met them and never heard from
them I guess it is also, you know, discouraging, you know, because
some of the guys were treated very well by their companies. They were paid
well, they were paid visits and encouraged, you know it was just
discouraging (Cadet Interview 3)
Because of such issues, some training administrators in both training agencies and 
colleges seem to have reached the conclusion that the commitment of some of the
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companies to train cadets is only as a fulfilment of the requirement for entry into the 
tonnage tax, as illustrated by the quote below:
Unfortunately the training commitment is no commitment at all. It is simply 
a requirement for companies to fulfil so that they may benefit from the 
tonnage tax and that is how it is being treated. These companies do not care 
about the quality of cadets admitted on their behalf, they do not care 
whether or not they complete the course and, unfortunately, many of the 
training companies out there do not care much since they are in business and 
it does not cost them a penny if  a cadet drops out or not [College Interview 
1]
This conclusion may not be too far off-the-mark considering that, according to the 
nature of company employment policies discussed in chapter six, many of the 
companies are not interested in employing from the British pool of junior officers. In 
the view of the manager of a training agency I visited, operators are not genuinely 
committed to training because they are not interested in the final product, the qualified 
junior officers:
If the companies were interested in the final outcome of the training, i.e. 
wanted to employ them when they qualify, they would be more
involved I can tell you this, the few companies which genuinely train and
want to employ always follow-up. They get involved in the selection and 
they monitor the training through college and sea phases. The rest just don’t 
care [Training Agency, Interview 9]
A greater part of the issue here might be driven by what was described by government 
officials, taking part in the study, as a ‘short-termisf mentality by many operators, 
which means that their recruitment strategies do not focus on any long term labour 
agenda. They are happy to reap the ‘here-and-now’ benefits of cheaper labour in one 
part of the world while preparing to move to the next area once it is exhausted. This 
view was confirmed by the manager of one of the largest recruitment agencies in the 
UK who explained that:
Owners are always looking for cheaper labour and are not interested in 
long-term investment in any long-term labour source. Once they exhaust 
one source they quickly move to the next [Recruitment Agency, Interview 8]
This research and, especially, the data generated with ex-cadets, their colleges and 
training agencies, directly challenge the popular industry mantra that the failure to 
increase the number of officers in the UK is because seafaring is no longer attractive to 
the youth of Britain. Instead the data indicate a much more disturbing problem - poor
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training experiences, disillusionment and failed cadet retention - which is caused by the 
discouraging attitude of the majority of UK-based employers and their apparently 
negative view towards cadets and the training process.
7.6 Assessment
For the tonnage tax strategy to succeed in its contribution to the recovery of UK 
shipping, the commitment to train cadets must be understood not only as a call for 
financial support for cadets and their training but also as a commitment by companies to 
encourage and care for cadets throughout their training. It should be understood as a 
continuing obligation to support and promote a training tradition. It must be a 
commitment to positively and continuously underwrite cadet training in the UK. Such 
training would involve designing effective marketing and promotion activities to 
positively sell sea careers, developing elaborate mechanisms for supporting cadets 
through their training which cater for both the material and emotional needs of the 
cadets and creating job opportunities for British junior officers on-board British ships.
The data presented in this chapter has shown that shipping companies and their training 
agents, and, the training companies do not agree on the explanation for the failure to 
increase seafaring skills in the UK. While a majority of the companies argue that the 
unwillingness of British youth to go to sea is frustrating their efforts to recruit and train 
cadets, the training colleges, as well as some companies and training agencies, are 
convinced that there are many young people in the UK who would like to become 
seafarers. They insist that companies’ failure to actively support and encourage cadets 
during training is the main problem because many cadets who face difficulties and 
problems during training are left without support and have no choice but to drop out. 
Their argument, therefore, is that the problem hindering seafaring skills development in 
the UK is one of high dropout rates rather than a failure to attract people into the 
programme.
Perhaps the most overwhelming evidence on this issue is in cadet interview data which 
confirms that many cadets are being forced to drop out of training because of the 
unsupportive and discouraging attitudes of their sponsors. Though it is not directly 
obvious from the data, careful interpretation, leads to the conclusion that diminishing 
employment opportunities for British junior officers on-board British ships might be the 
main force influencing low training output levels. There seems to be a correlation
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between poor employment opportunities and companies’ unwillingness to genuinely 
underwrite cadet training and, by extension, high dropout rates. Companies are not 
commercially interested in British junior officers and, it is not necessarily in their best 
interest to actively promote their training.
The importance of boosting employment opportunities, as the best way of encouraging 
seafarer skills development is clearly acknowledged by both the government and the 
unions. This is clearly spelt out in the shipping policy document British Shipping: 
Charting a New Course:
...promote the employment and training of British seafarers in order to keep 
open a wide range o f job opportunities for young people and to maintain the 
supply of skills and experience vital to the economy [Charting a New 
Course, p.3]
According to the seafarers’ unions the design of the tonnage tax does not show a serious 
commitment, by the government, to promote seafaring skills building because there is 
not enough emphasis on job creation. One union official argues that:
The government does not really care very much about UK seafarers. If they 
had been concerned about seagoing staff, they would have acted a long time 
ago [Union Interview]
In their submissions to the House o f Commons Sub-Committee on Transport, while 
pushing for the introduction of an employment commitment, the unions argued that:
If the legislation is seriously aimed at the increase in UK based seafarers, 
there is clearly a case for establishing a method whereby these cadets are 
able to secure stable employment within the UK fleet [Employment Link, 
2004].
Shipping companies are however, clearly unwilling to enter into any binding 
employment commitment because, they argue, British junior officers are too costly to 
employ and still remain competitive on the international shipping market. Considering 
that any hopes of increasing UK based junior officers are dependent on companies’ 
willingness to employ them, the important question is: how can the government 
convince employers, who clearly have cheaper alternative labour sources, on the 
international open market, to start employing more British junior officers whom they 
consider too expensive? Chapter eight will attempt to answer this question.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
Assessment; Limitations to the Tonnage Tax Response 
Introduction
The purpose of this thesis is to assess the extent to which states retain the capacity to 
effectively respond to economic globalisation and mitigate its negative impacts. The 
specific focus is the British seafaring labour market where the number of qualified 
merchant navy officers has diminished over the past three decades thus affecting the 
supply of seafaring skills as well as essential technical skills to the wider shore-side 
maritime industry.
The rapid and extensive globalisation o f the world economy, in the past four decades, 
has had a big impact on states and their capacity to regulate the economic activities of 
giant global corporate businesses. This has come about as a result of the 
deterritorialisation process driven by multinational businesses and the growing 
influence of corporate capital on the politics o f national governments. Increasingly, due 
to the growing international mobility of corporate capital and finance and the associated 
threat of ‘capital flight’, national governments have been forced to adopt policies which 
promote free market ideologies and corporate capital interests, often at the expense of 
other important social obligations like employment and social welfare, in order to attract 
and retain capital investment (Hall, 2003; Harvey, 2005).
The emergence and rapid growth of globalisation and the influence of neoliberal 
ideologies has rendered national borders highly porous and opened up national 
economies to free market practices and influences (Beck, 2005; Wolf, 2005). As a result 
multinational business enterprises have spread their activities world-wide and acquired 
immense economic and political influence. A situation has arisen, therefore, where most 
national restrictions on the international movement of trade, finance and capital have 
been eliminated with the result that the world economy is now largely controlled by few 
but very wealthy, highly mobile and powerful business corporations. This has triggered 
the argument that the nation state is no longer capable of effectively regulating the 
economic activities of global corporate markets. Susan Strange (1996: 4) observes that
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“where states were once the masters of markets, now it is the markets which, on many 
crucial issues, are the masters of states”.
The problem for national governments operating within a neoliberal paradigm is that 
globalisation presents two constant threats; capital flight and loss of employment. 
Capital and labour are both important elements of national economies but under 
neoliberal politics, governments have made the case for promoting capital markets over 
domestic labour with the argument that it is good for economic growth and that it 
eventually leads to employment (see Chomsky, 1999; Harvey, 2005). Furthermore, they 
argue that the option o f promoting local labour is a difficult one in a free market 
economy which fosters free enterprise and encourages businesses to make the most 
profitable factor combinations for production (see Chomsky, 1999). They would 
therefore argue that to interfere with capital’s global exploitation of cheap labour is to 
‘strangle’ free enterprise and undermine economic growth. This follows the 
abandonment of the Keynesian approach to economic management through ‘full 
employment’ policies, in the 1970s and the adoption of Neoliberal policies of capital 
accumulation (Harvey, 2005).
Global corporations have, as a result, managed to exploit cheap labour, world wide, for 
profit maximisation, by the enabling free-market policies which have, over the past few 
decades, deregulated national labour markets. States have, in addition, introduced 
legislation which undermines the bargaining capacity of labour and enhanced the power 
of employers. In a highly deregulated market situation like this, the national labour 
markets of high-wage countries like Britain have become increasingly prone to decline 
as corporations seek cheaper labour elsewhere in the low-wage developing world. The 
overall effect has been that wage rates have been kept low worldwide. This argument 
essentially suggests that neoliberal governments have actively and intentionally 
promoted the free capital market agenda and further enhanced the ‘symbiotic 
relationship’ concept that I have alluded to in previous chapters (See chapters two, three 
and six). The down-side of the neoliberal paradigm, for states, especially, economically 
advanced and high-wage states, is that it has led to a huge decline in the skills base of 
many sectors. The question for these states is: having initially committed to 
neoliberalism and free markets and entered into this symbiotic relationship with global 
capital, how do they respond to this consequent skill erosion?
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The problem is that, over the years, especially, in the last three decades, global 
corporate capital has acquired considerable influence over national governments which 
they effectively use to guarantee and maintain their position of advantage with regard to 
resource exploitation. Furthermore, because of their global mobility, and the uneven 
structure of the global economic landscape, their greatest and most effective tool for 
controlling state intervention in the market is the threat of capital flight. Any 
government that attempts to intervene in the market and apply strict regulation to 
corporate activity risks the loss o f capital investment.
The shipping industry is a good example of such developments. As a result of the 
extensive deregulation of the global shipping labour market and national governments’ 
anxieties about loss of tonnage, ship-owners have acquired considerable influence with 
states which gives them a ‘free-hand’ in the exploitation of global seafaring labour. 
Corporate capital in the shipping industry has a particularly high capacity for 
‘international flight’ due to the mobile nature of its primary capital assets, ships, and its 
labour force. Furthermore, the international structure and organisation of the industry 
allows companies to move capital assets to, and set up operations in, any country of 
choice with few restrictions from national governments (See chapter three for a full 
discussion). Because shipping assets are mobile and cheap labour is readily available on 
the seafarers’ global labour market, the process of relocating operations from place to 
place is relatively inexpensive, especially when compared with land-based industries.
As a result of this global capital ‘buoyancy’ in the shipping industry and the resultant 
threat of tonnage flight, states have engaged in fierce competition with each other, for 
the better part of the 20th century, over shares in the international shipping industry. 
While emerging maritime nations have worked hard to attract as much of world tonnage 
as possible, Traditional Maritime Nations have fought to regain and retain ‘their’ ships. 
Unfortunately, as explained in chapter three, the struggle for tonnage has been based 
mainly on a strategy of reducing regulations in order to attract tonnage leading to a 
situation of overall deregulation (Selkou and Roe, 2004; DeSombre, 2006). In the past 
three decades Traditional Maritime Nations have been losing the battle for tonnage 
because, despite their efforts to relax regulation, many ship-owners and operators have 
preferred to operate under the very lax and less costly regulatory regimes of Flags of 
Convenience (Lillie, 2006).
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High rates of corporate tax, stricter labour laws and stronger safety and environmental 
protection regulations, enforced by industrialised maritime flag-regimes like the UK, 
coupled with increasing competition from companies operating under less regulated and 
low-cost Open Registers, have increased ship operation costs and reduced profits. 
Consequently, many operators have relocated their assets and operations to Open 
Registers leading to a rapid and drastic decline in the shipping industries of Traditional 
Maritime Nations (Lillie, 2006; DeSombre, 2006).
One of the main reasons for ship-owners’ and operators’ decisions to flag out was to 
have access to cheap crews from labour supply countries in the developing world. 
Because operating costs are high and most o f the major ship operation cost items are 
fixed, operators often look to crewing costs when seeking to cut overall costs. Crewing 
costs are seen by many to be easily manipulated by operators via a move from one 
source of labour to another (Klikauer, 2003).
Unfortunately in the years before the 1980s, strict crew nationality regulations imposed 
by traditional flag-regimes, keen to protect their domestic seafaring labour markets, 
meant that the ship-owners could not employ the less costly foreign seafarers available 
on the international market without flagging out. By flagging out to open registers, 
companies also avoided officer training and employment obligations imposed by their 
national governments. Both the training level and employment opportunities for 
seafarers in developed countries therefore diminished leading to a rapid and drastic 
decline in local seafarer labour markets. Countries like the UK and other Traditional 
Maritime Nations of Europe including France, Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands, 
therefore, lost both significant quantities of registered shipping tonnage and their 
seafaring skills base. Furthermore, they subsequently found that they had lost the 
capacity to effectively enforce environmental regulation protecting their coastal waters 
and marine economy because most of their own (beneficially) tonnage, and the largest 
percentage of the world fleet, were effectively under the legislative jurisdiction of the 
Open Registry regime.
This highly competitive atmosphere between flag-states led to a general deregulation of 
the industry (Alderton and Winchester, 2002; Selkou and Roe, 2004; DeSombre, 2006). 
Traditional Maritime Nations were forced to abandon their rigid regulatory stance vis-a- 
vis shipping labour and capital in order to stop the tonnage ‘haemorrhage’ and the
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related skills decline. Some o f the major deregulatory measures that national 
governments like the UK introduced included: tax concessions for shipping companies, 
elimination of regulations prohibiting, or restricting, the employment of foreign 
seafarers by ship-owners and a relaxation of ship registration conditions. Effectively, 
these formally strictly ‘closed’ registers took on an increasingly ‘open’ outlook.
That the growing power o f corporate capital has greatly undermined the capacity of 
national governments to adopt and effectively implement strategies and policies which 
are not in their interest is, perhaps, best illustrated by the inadequacy of the UK 
government’s response to the decline in the local seafarer labour market. After decades 
of decline, the UK government decided to respond with a recovery strategy aimed at 
rebuilding both the UK register (in tonnage terms) and seafaring skills. The response 
took the form of the UK Tonnage Tax and was introduced in 2000. The tonnage tax is 
basically a tax policy initiative which is meant to encourage ship-owners, both British 
and others, to register and commercially manage their ships from the UK. In return for 
the generous tax concessions ship operators are required to recruit and train UK cadets 
or to make a compensatory payment towards training in order to replenish the depleted 
pool of qualified UK officers.
The main motivation behind the government’s response and efforts to rebuild the 
seafaring labour pool seems to have been the need to replenish diminishing essential 
technical skills for the shore-side maritime sector. Operations like, marine survey, 
marine insurance, ports and harbours, marine law and technical ship management, 
require people with seafaring skills and experience but the number of such people has 
diminished, over the past three decades. The UK shore-side maritime sector is thus 
currently facing a shortage of such skills (Brewer, 2007).
According to the government the best way to replenish such skills is through the 
increased recruitment and training of UK cadets who, after some years of experience at 
sea as officers, are expected to transfer their skills ashore. To this end, ship-owners and 
operators must bear direct responsibility as financial sponsors and trainers. In its 
response strategy, the government therefore set out to:
1. Stop and reverse the decline in the UK fleet;
2. Stop and reverse the decline in maritime skills, and;
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3. Boost growth in the shore-side maritime cluster of firms.
Unfortunately, although the strategy has succeeded reasonably well in increasing the 
UK fleet, it has not been an effective stimulus in increasing the numbers of qualified 
British junior officers. As explained earlier, growth in the shore-side cluster was 
expected to come as an extension of growth in the fleet. Although there has not been 
any study on how much the shore-side cluster has grown, my interviews with 
government officials and industry managers indicated that the number of ships managed 
from the UK has increased as a result o f the requirement that all tonnage tax ships must 
be commercially and strategically managed from the UK, thus expanding the sector 
significantly. The output o f junior officers from UK cadet training programme remains 
low and the pool of officers has generally continued to decline in spite of the tonnage 
tax strategy (BIMCO/ISF, 2005; Glen, 2006). The possible reasons for this have been 
analysed and discussed extensively in chapters six and seven.
The question here, as described in chapter three with regard to the main research 
question is: having initially committed themselves to the neoliberal paradigm and 
deregulated local seafaring in order to promote free markets and enhance the 
competitiveness of global shipping capital, how successfully can governments turn 
around and mitigate negative effects of capital flight such as the erosion of local 
seafaring and shore-side maritime skills? This chapter presents a data-based assessment 
of the themes emerging out of the data analysis in chapters five, six and seven. It 
consolidates the narratives developed and addresses the various research questions 
guiding the study. The main focus is on the obstacles and possibilities in the process of 
state response and it discusses some of the main reasons for the state’s inadequate 
response (through the tonnage tax) and explores some possibilities.
8.1 Government Responses to the Globalisation of Shipping
As highlighted above and discussed in chapter three, the main strategy adopted by the 
government, to respond to the decline in the shipping industry, was the introduction of 
the tonnage tax. All companies operating their ships under the UK tonnage tax are 
subjected to a flat rate tax which is not only much lower than the normal corporation tax 
but also offers predictability and stability and thus creates an investment friendly 
atmosphere for ship-owners. Moreover, it was not only the immediate ships’ earnings
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which would benefit from the tax reductions but all of the company’s businesses 
reasonably related to the management and employment of the ships.
Prior to the introduction of the tonnage tax, however, the government had introduced 
the SMarT scheme which was meant to increase funding for cadet training. This scheme, 
which was introduced in 1998, is divided into five different categories with the 
objective of covering all the possible areas in the training process including recruitment, 
training and funding of cadet programmes and also covering all possible paths of 
seafarer skills development (See chapter five for a detailed description). Another 
important initiative introduced prior to the tonnage tax was a scheme through which the 
government subsidised some o f the national social security contributions and income 
tax for British officers employed on deep-sea vessels in order to reduce some of the 
companies’ non-wage crewing costs. It was hoped that, as a result of such reduction in 
non-wage crewing costs, UK based companies would find it cheaper and therefore 
consider employing more British seafarers.
Alongside the Minimum Training Obligation the government, together with the industry, 
also introduced the sea vision initiative which was specifically aimed at promoting 
seafaring careers to young people in order to increase awareness and encourage more 
interest in seafaring careers. In addition, the government also introduced the B.Sc 
Nautical sciences and the Foundation degree training paths for cadets as a way of 
raising the profile of seafaring training and encouraging more people with good school 
qualifications to join seafaring (See chapter seven for a more detailed description). All 
these initiatives, plus the tonnage tax, form what I have referred to as the tonnage tax 
package of initiatives and make-up the government’s response to the decline in UK 
shipping.
All the major stakeholders, among them, the government, the corporate industry and the 
unions, were concerned about the decline in UK tonnage and welcomed the introduction 
of the tax measures to encourage growth. The government was concerned about the 
negative impact of the decline on the UK economy while the unions were concerned 
about the huge decline in membership due to loss of employment and hoped that 
rebuilding the fleet and boosting expansion in the shore-side maritime cluster, through 
the reduced corporation tax, would eventually lead to an increase in jobs for British 
officers.
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To promote the recovery o f seafaring and the general maritime skills base the 
government included a training commitment into the tonnage tax with the specific aim 
of boosting cadet training activities in the UK and increasing the supply of qualified 
junior officers. This was done in recognition of the fact that, for almost two and half 
decades, UK shipping companies had stopped training UK cadets. It was therefore 
deemed essential to encourage companies to start training again in order to boost 
training opportunities for school leavers.
As explained in chapter three, the training commitment, known as the Minimum 
Training Obligation is unique. Although many other EU member-states have introduced 
variations of the tonnage tax, none o f them has got such an element which, in the UK’s 
case, binds participating ship-owners into a commitment to train national cadets. It is 
tied into the tax incentives offered by the scheme as a condition which must be met by 
all those companies who wish to participate in it and benefit from the reduced tax rates.
Under the minimum training commitment ship-owners are required to train at least one 
cadet for every fifteen officer positions entered on the ‘manning’ certificate of every 
participating vessel. This commitment is strictly implemented by the government and 
failure to fulfil the requirement can lead to a company being expelled from the regime 
and, possibly, being charged with a criminal offence for defrauding the government 
(HMSO, 2000). This is because the government is giving shipping companies big tax 
reductions on the understanding that they will undertake to train British cadets. Failure 
to train could therefore be construed as defrauding the government. Furthermore, the 
government subsidises the companies’ training costs by paying 50% of the total training 
costs per cadet. In ‘very exceptional’ circumstances a company is allowed to make a 
payment of £550 per cadet position per month instead of undertaking the actual training. 
According to government sources these ‘exceptional circumstances’ are very difficult to 
meet. This ‘window o f opportunity’ was provided in order to make sure that all 
participating companies, even single-ship companies which lack sufficient training 
capacity in the form o f berths, still make some contribution to developing seafaring 
skills.
Through the Minimum Training Obligation the government’s intention was to address 
two skills problems; declining number o f junior officers to work at sea and the decline 
in the number of people with seafaring skills and experience to work in the shore-side
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maritime cluster of firms. Following the huge decline in the pool of qualified British 
officers between the 1970s and 1990s, a seafaring skills gap had been created whereby 
there were no qualified officers to take over the positions of retiring senior officers on­
board British ships. The government wanted to fill this gap by increasing the supply of 
qualified British junior officers with the intention that they should quickly rise up the 
ship-board ranks and replenish the depleted seafaring skills. Apparently this aim was 
driven by the fact that many UK-based shipping companies, as well as some foreign 
ones, still preferred to employ officers from OECD countries, but especially British, 
because of the added advantage o f language, in senior positions on-board their vessels. 
Seemingly, the tendency was thought to be a combination of crews from developed and 
developing countries such that the senior-most positions are filled with officers from 
developed countries and the rest with those from developing countries.
The government’s aim was, therefore, to encourage the growth of the UK pool of 
qualified junior officers by encouraging ship-owners and operators to undertake to train 
more British cadets and employ more o f the qualified junior officers in order to provide 
them with the essential experience. However, although the tonnage tax strategy 
contained the Minimum Training Obligation, it lacked an essential employment element 
which had been identified, in the shipping policy paper, Charting a New Course, 
specifically as one of the two most important requirements for the strategy to succeed in 
recovering seafaring skills, the other being training. The training commitment was 
essential because it would increase the supply of qualified junior officers but an 
employment commitment was also important because, having trained the cadets, they 
needed jobs in order to gain the experience required to effectively replace the retiring 
senior officers at sea and replenish the shore-side maritime skills.
Generally, the government strategy (the SMarT scheme, the sea vision and the degree 
training paths introduced) is a demand-side response. It has mainly focussed on 
increasing awareness and boosting cadet recruitment but not in boosting employment 
opportunities for the junior officers who would come out o f the training. This is 
somewhat surprising considering that, clearly, the skills problem can be traced to 
reduced demand for British officers as a result of ship-owners opting to employ foreign 
officers. In the following section I will explore and assess some of the factors which 
shaped such a response.
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8.2 What Shaped the Government Response?
As already explained elsewhere in the thesis (See chapters three and five) the design and 
adoption of the UK tonnage tax, although involving several interested parties, was 
primarily a project o f the government. The government’s approach to finding solutions 
for the decline in the shipping industry involved a tripartite consultative process 
involving the main maritime stakeholders, shipping companies and the labour unions. 
Other parties, like the ports and harbours, were involved but to a lesser extent. This 
approach was necessary considering the complexity of the industry and the nature of the 
problem itself but it was also a difficult approach because of the divergence of the 
interests and limitations of the different stakeholders.
The government’s intention was to stop and reverse the decline, in both tonnage and 
skills, and prevent a total collapse of the shipping industry because of its importance to 
the national economy. It was essential, in this respect, to attract ship-owners to bring 
back their ships into the UK register and to encourage them to locate their management 
operations in the UK thus expanding both the registered tonnage and the shore-side 
maritime sector. It was also essential to boost growth in the pool of British seafarers so 
as to ensure a steady and reliable supply of skills, both at sea and ashore. The main 
constraint for the government was its commitment to the neoliberal ideology which 
somewhat limited the extent of its response and made the response to both labour and 
capital a delicate ‘balancing act’. Clearly, the government did not want to upset ship­
owners because of the importance of capital to the economy while, on the other, it was 
aware of its social responsibility to protect and expand the pool of national seafaring 
officer labour.
Considering the complex consultative approach that the government used to arrive at its 
response strategy, it is no surprise that the final shape of the response was heavily 
influenced by the different parties involved. The government was faced with different 
and largely conflicting arguments from the unions and companies and it clearly decided 
to go for a strategy which it was hoped could address all interests. Nonetheless, the 
strategy supported the corporate position on costs.
The government had to take into consideration the unions’ argument about employment 
loss, wage issues and working conditions for seafarers. There was a lot of pressure from 
seafarers unions, especially NUMAST, for measures which would increase training,
- 2 0 2 -
boost employment and improve the general working conditions of seafarers. Some of 
the proposals put forward by the unions included introducing employment legislation 
that would make employers provide more employment opportunities for British junior 
officers and less for foreigners. Alternatively, they suggested the introduction of 
employment subsidies for those companies willing to employ British officers so as to 
help cover the extra cost o f doing so. Their main argument was that employment was 
the missing essential link that would ensure rapid and sustainable growth in the number 
of qualified British officers. This argument was largely based on the fact that the huge 
decline in the number o f UK seafarers was, in the first place, caused by employment 
loss. This was an argument whose strength the government could not ignore because, as 
explained in chapter six, the government had also arrived at the same conclusion about 
the causes of the decline. The unions also further argued that improved employment 
prospects for junior officers would raise the professional profile o f seafaring and 
‘repair’ the negative perception that had been created through the long years of decline 
and ensure that seafaring attracts more young people with high academic qualifications.
The companies’ main interest, on the other hand, was a more business and investment 
friendly atmosphere to enhance international competitiveness and profitability. They 
were, therefore, especially concerned with high seafarer wages and high corporate 
taxation and wanted the government to secure their continued freedom to recruit 
seafarers from anywhere in the world and also to introduce a more friendly tax system. 
Their argument was based on the fact that, because of high rates of taxation at home and 
stringent and costly regulations, they were disadvantaged vis-a-vis their competitors 
operating under less costly flag-regimes. They therefore called on the government to 
introduce measures which would effectively enhance their competitive capacity on the 
international shipping market.
Their other argument was about rising crewing costs and the need to reduce and 
maintain them at an acceptable level. Some of the proposals in this regard included 
government subsidies on cadet training, national insurance contributions for seafarers 
and National Social Security contributions. By the late 1990s, when the government 
was considering its response strategy, all shipping companies, including those which 
had not flagged their vessels out of the UK, were recruiting and employing, 
predominantly, foreign crews and they were comfortable with the fact that the 
government had, in the 1980s, succumbed to pressure to eliminate all crew nationality
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requirements. The government was therefore under pressure from the companies to 
maintain the status as it was, guaranteeing this freedom of companies to employ foreign 
seafarers on UK flagged vessels.
The government was aware o f the position of the corporate industry but, more 
importantly, they were wary of the possibility that in case the companies did not get 
their way, they would not bring their business back into the UK. Worse still, many 
companies could easily ‘sail away’ to other flags and thus plunge the UK shipping 
industry into final collapse. It is against this background of complex conflict of 
interests that the government designed and adopted the tonnage tax, as its main strategy 
for the recovery of both tonnage and seafaring skills. My interviews with the various 
stakeholders, particularly the government and unions, show that this complex setting 
heavily influenced the shape of the response with regard to its design and eventual 
performance.
The government acknowledged the validity of the arguments from both sides and was 
keen on introducing a strategy that could address the issues presented but there were 
concerns about how to balance the interests of unions and those of the corporate 
industry. A government policy official participating in the study observed:
These are not simple issues, they are complicated We have to remember
how many flag regimes there are and think how easy it is for the companies 
to simply pack and leave, overnight, ... The government has to be very 
careful in these matters and ultimately the objective is to protect the 
economy [Government Interview],
This observation was made in reaction to the discussion about the unions’ proposals 
about introducing legislation to increase employment for British junior officers on­
board UK flagged ships. The government’s concern was that introducing such 
legislation would put them on a collision course with the companies and risk another 
long decline in registered tonnage from which the country might never recover. As the 
official continued to explain:
We have been down this road before, don’t forget that we had such
legislation before and the companies flagged out in massive numbers.....
Now, we have made huge strides towards rectifying the decline and many
owners are coming back  It is a very delicate issue and people must
understand that if  we experience the same decline that we are now emerging 
from, it might be the last [Government Interview].
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What this essentially means is that the government was more inclined to respond to the 
demands of shipping companies but not those of seafarer unions. This is clearly evident 
from the design of the tonnage tax which offers enormous tax concessions for ship­
owners but does nothing towards boosting employment for UK junior officers. The 
tonnage tax, therefore, comes in a design that raises many important questions about 
globalisation, neoliberalism and state intervention in economic management, especially 
with regard to protecting local labour. The structure of the tonnage tax suggests caution, 
on the part of the state, and reveals a bias, in government thinking, towards corporate 
capital and therefore illustrates the immense influence of capital over the state that I 
have referred to earlier in the thesis.
A close examination of the training obligation, which is the only element included for 
the benefit of seafarers, shows that even this was designed in such a way that it did not 
‘hurt’ capital interests. In the first place, companies are not expected to ‘shoulder’ the 
entire training burden because the government bears half of the cost. Secondly, the 
benefits that the companies get from the tax reductions offered by the strategy are so 
great that paying for half o f the training obligation is no sacrifice at all. One company 
HR Manager said:
Obviously the tax savings very much outweigh the cost of training 
otherwise it will not be worth it commercially. We budget for the number of 
cadets that we require and obviously the saving are there. The tonnage tax is 
very generous to companies which is a good thing because we can now 
compete [Shipping Company, Interview 14]
Another manager explained, on the same issue:
You only have to look at the overall expenses of training and don’t forget 
that the government is paying almost half and the remaining is paid by the 
company so the financial burden is not very heavy. You really need to look 
at the figures; our company saved (£ ...) in 2005 on tax savings compared to 
the normal tax which we would pay so it is not too much to ask the 
companies to invest just a little of these huge tax savings into cadet training 
[Shipping Company, Interview 10].
Furthermore, the need for more cadet training was presented in such a way as to 
strongly suggest that, in the long-run, it would be to the benefit of the companies 
because of the rising demand for people with seafaring skills to work in various 
technical positions ashore including technical ship managers, marine superintendents 
and ISM managers. The whole strategy was therefore packaged in such a way that it
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appealed to and gave maximum benefit to the companies and very little of substance to 
the UK pool o f seafarers.
Another important influence in the government response was the EU. It is important to 
understand that, although the tonnage tax was a national tool for combating the decline 
in the UK shipping industry, it had to fit in with the wider regional policy on the 
recovery of EU shipping. The UK tonnage tax, as I already explained in chapter three, is 
just one national adaptation o f an EU strategy recommended by the European 
Commission (EC) for the harmonization o f the attempts, by member-states, to rebuild 
their domestic shipping industries. Although individual states were given the freedom to 
adopt the strategy to their local circumstances, all measures introduced had to be 
approved by the EC.
One area that the government would have been particularly cautious in was the 
introduction of any additional subsidies because of the strict rules introduced by the EU 
to govern the amount of financial support an individual private sector can receive from 
the government, the EU State Aid Guidelines (Haralambides, 2006). In order to 
introduce the tax measure in the tonnage tax, for example, the government had to seek 
express approval from the EC:
The need to permit a low tax environment in the form of tonnage tax to help 
the European shipping industry be more competitive has been clearly 
endorsed by the European Union in its Maritime State Aid guidelines. The 
maritime transport industry is considered a special sector for the 
consideration of state aid [Alexander Report, p. 14]
Therefore, while the tax reductions offered by the tonnage tax are provided for in EU 
State Aide Policy as a way of encouraging growth in EU fleets, introducing 
employment legislation to restrict, in anyway, the nationality of crews working on­
board UK ships, or providing subsidies to UK shipping companies in order to employ 
British officers, would distort the employment market even within the EU. Therefore, 
even if the UK government had been in a position to introduce such measures, there 
would have been wider regional restrictions. A government policy official explained:
The government operates within a regional policy framework and any 
measures we introduce must be in line with this wider framework. The 
tonnage tax, for example, is approved by the EC and the training 
commitment is within the wider EU skills development agenda. Introducing 
nationality restrictions for crews on UK ships would however be difficult
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because it would mean that even officers from other EU states are 
excluded.... It is hard... even if we wanted to take that route which.... as I 
said earlier... is very complicated [Government Interview].
The design of the strategy, as discussed in chapter three and five, therefore strongly 
suggests that the government was faced with many different interests and many 
arguments and that the attempt to sort them out led to the design of a strategy which 
takes on a particular shape. As explained earlier, it is a strategy which is heavily biased 
towards capital interests. Furthermore, nothing in the entire process of designing it, as 
described in chapters three and five, suggests that the government was genuinely 
committed to increasing the number of merchant navy officers. Considering that in 
chapter six government officials were quoted as expressing doubt in the likelihood of 
effectively rebuilding the pool o f seagoing officers, there is a strong indication that the 
government was aware of the enormity of the international competition for the supply of 
officers and the apparent futility o f trying to turn the tide of globalization in the 
seafarers’ labour market.
There is, however, one more interesting deduction from the analysis in chapters two and 
five which indicates the immense influence of the companies on the final shape of the 
strategy. Their influence was such that even the unions were in no position to exert 
significant force on the government in order to achieve their objective of creating more 
employment opportunity for UK junior officers on-board UK ships. The unions were, 
clearly, wary of the devastating consequences of a possible massive wave of ‘flagging 
out’ as a result of the imposition of the kind of employment legislation that would 
achieve this objective. They saw the danger of a further reduction in the few remaining 
jobs for their members and, by extension, a further, and possibly, a final blow to their 
capacity. This could explain why, although there were two major arguments that the 
government had to take into account, it is the companies’ argument which finally 
prevailed and defined the shape of the government response.
The data therefore indicate that the tonnage tax was the product of a delicate negotiation 
between governments, the unions and shipping companies, and, one whose design was 
also heavily influenced by EU regulation. In the end, it seems to have addressed the 
interests of the companies but not fully taken on those of labour and the unions. The 
important point here, and one in which the shape of the tonnage tax illustrates the 
powerful influence o f global capital on national policies, is that both the government
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and the unions were overwhelmed by shipping corporate companies because of the fear 
of tonnage flight. As much as the government might have wished to address the issues 
raised by unions and protect seafaring labour, it was not willing to upset capital interests, 
by pushing through strict employment legislation which might have triggered a renewal 
of flagging-out and further tonnage ‘haemorrhage’. Furthermore, the assessment 
strongly suggests that, having committed to the neoliberal paradigm and promoted free 
capital markets to the extent that global capital wielded such immense powers, the 
government was unable to break free of this commitment or deliver half-fulfilment of its 
neoliberal bargain with capital (See Hall, 2003).
8.3 The Effectiveness of the Response
As a result of the complex setting described above and the resulting nature and shape of 
the strategy, its adequacy and/or effectiveness is debatable and whether or not it has 
succeeded largely depends on perspective. On one hand, the number of UK registered 
ships has increased from GT 5,531,986 in 2000 to GT 12,149,988 in 2006 (Lloyd’s 
Register -  Fairplay: World Fleet Statistics, 2006) as a result of improved investment 
and tax conditions due to the tonnage tax. The corporate community is therefore likely 
to say that the strategy has been successful. On the other hand, however, the output of 
qualified junior officers from UK cadet colleges has not improved and this is in spite of 
an apparently significant increase in cadet intake levels since the introduction of the 
tonnage tax; cadet intake rose from 450 in 2000 to 630 in 2006 but this translated into a 
dismal increase in training levels with an increase in the number of cadets in training 
from 981 to 1090 (Glen, 2006) within the same period.
The government’s original projection for the increase in cadet intake levels was between 
1000 and 1200 in 2005. This figure was the one suggested by the University of Wales 
Cardiff study of 1996 as being the intake level required to maintain the minimum skills 
level (Gardner and Pettit, 1996). A subsequent follow-up study by the same university, 
however, lowered this figure to around 700 cadets (Gardner et al, 2004). The combined 
force of the Minimum Training Obligation and the other initiatives like SMarT and Sea 
Vision have certainly led to a significant increase in cadet intake levels as illustrated by 
the figures described above. The fact that this increase in intake has not translated into 
an increased supply o f qualified junior officers, however, raises one important question: 
Is it that the strategy is ineffective or simply inadequate in its design?
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What the evidence clearly shows is that, the popular industry mantra that young people 
in the UK are no longer interested in seafaring careers is not correct. It shows that there 
is still a lot of seafaring potential in many parts of the UK which, with the right 
publicity and positive promotion, could be cultivated and developed leading to a full 
recovery of the British pool of officers.
Unfortunately, the data analysis in chapters six and seven suggest a weakness in the 
design of the strategy; the fact that it contains only a training commitment but excludes 
an employment element makes it inherently weak. The discussion in these chapters 
indicates that, for the strategy to succeed, it needed to have both elements. Increased 
employment would not only restore the society’s faith in the profession as valuable and 
suitable for the British people but also, and more importantly, provide the essential 
motivation for companies to train UK cadets thus giving the training commitment 
practical meaning for ship-owners.
Chapters six and seven have identified a problem of cadet wastage whereby many 
cadets withdraw from the training programme prematurely during, or soon after their 
first sea phase. The analysis strongly suggests that these cadets are in effect forced to 
quit because of poor training experiences, especially at sea. Furthermore, chapter seven 
revealed strong evidence to suggest a strong link between the fact that UK-based 
employers are not interested in British junior officers and the poor training experiences.
The data suggest that at the moment many ship-owners and operators, who are the main 
training sponsors, do not have the motivation and do not see any meaning in training 
UK cadets because they do not rely on the UK supply of junior officers. For this reason, 
they have failed to put in place an elaborate support mechanism to provide both 
emotional and material support for some o f the vulnerable cadets during their training. 
They have also failed to create conducive and cadet friendly on-board training 
conditions. Consequently the increase in intake is seriously undermined by high cadet 
dropout rates which reduce the output of qualified junior officers.
Considering that one of the important conclusions from the data analysis, as indicated 
above, was that there are many young people still interested in working at sea as officers, 
the message from this assessment is that the government has failed to effectively exploit 
the seafaring potential within the country. The key to effectively exploiting this
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potential is increased employment for British junior officers and, although it might not 
have been obvious that failure to provide employment opportunities would lead to poor 
training experiences, the government, nevertheless was aware o f the fact that effective 
development of seafaring and maritime skills could only be achieved if  UK-based ship­
owners increased employment opportunities for UK officers. It would have been 
reasonably obvious, to the policy makers involved in the design of the strategy, that 
increasing training opportunities without finding ways of absorbing the qualified 
officers would only perpetuate the negative impression created by the long decline.
8.4 Possibilities of a more Effective Response.
As I have indicated earlier, the data strongly suggest that the main problem with the 
government response is inadequacy in design rather than ineffectiveness. There is no 
problem with the implementation of the tonnage tax because, so far, it is achieving 
those objectives that it can be reasonably expected to achieve, that is, an increase in UK 
registered tonnage and increased cadet intake levels. What it has not done and can not 
be expected to do is increase job opportunities for British junior officers because, 
clearly, it was not designed to achieve this goal. However, interviews with government 
officials reveal that the government hoped that, by boosting growth in the number of 
ships registered in the UK, the number o f UK-based employers would increase and that 
this would have a knock on effect on UK officer recruitment. This, coupled with an 
increased supply of qualified junior officers, as a result of the training element, would, 
hopefully, lead to better employment prospects for British seafarers.
This was a very ‘loose’ anticipation because the essential link between increased 
tonnage and increased training, on one hand, and employment, on the other, could not 
be realised. The strategy fails to give the companies any incentive to employ British 
officers because, while they might opt to register their vessels in the UK, they have no 
obligation to employ British seafarers. Moreover, companies find foreign seafarers 
much cheaper and therefore cost effective. The strategy therefore provided no incentive, 
no motivation and no compulsion to employ seafarers from the UK.
Increasing employment opportunities for British junior officers was important because, 
as I have mentioned earlier, once UK-based ship-owners started to rely on British junior 
officers, they would have a strong incentive to train UK cadets and would, therefore, put 
in place structures and mechanisms to ensure that their cadets received the best training
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because they would employ them afterwards. It would also mean that they created a 
training atmosphere, both in college and at sea, which would be both conducive and 
productive so as to encourage more cadets to complete the training programme and join 
the officer ranks at sea. An employment link was therefore required to provide the 
essential missing piece in the tonnage tax in order to make the training commitment 
more meaningful and effective.
It seems to me that, in developing the case for a stronger state response that would 
effectively address the problem o f declining seafaring skills, the government needed to 
introduce more radical measures. The aim of such measures would be to make 
companies employ more British junior officers. To this end, there are two options that 
the government could have pursued but each would mean either breaking away from the 
neoliberal commitment or moving against the EU state aid requirements. The first 
option would have been to introduce strict employment legislation to force UK-based 
shipping companies to cut down on employing foreigners and begin employing more 
British junior officers. The second one was to introduce employment subsidies to 
provide the companies with a cushion for the increased cost burden they would have to 
incur for employing the more expensive British officers.
With regard to the first option, there are three obvious problems for the government. 
First, the companies were taking advantage of cheaper foreign labour world-wide and 
making profits and did not want to change the status quo. Second, they had the power 
and freedom to relocate to any other country, if  need be, to maintain the status quo. 
Third, the government had tried imposing restrictions on the employment of foreign 
crews on-board British ships before, in the form of crew nationality restrictions, and 
witnessed a worsening decline in tonnage and would not be willing to go down the same 
route. From the interview data collected from government sources it is clear that this is 
not a route that the government was willing to take. Having abandoned the ‘full 
employment’ approach to economic development since the 1970s, it would take a 
complete overhaul of the economic paradigm in order to break free from the neoliberal 
commitment. Unfortunately, in this era of economic globalisation, the UK is not an 
‘economic island’ and can not simply decide to break away from the neoliberal 
paradigm without devastating economic consequences. The government was in no 
doubt about how the companies would respond to legislation restricting crew nationality.
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The other alternative of subsidising the employment of British junior officers on-board 
UK ships presents a number of complications and the analysis in chapters five, six and 
seven indicates three possible reasons why the government did not go down that route. 
First the government was concerned about budgetary constraints and public policy 
considerations and second, the government’s ability to offer such subsidies was limited 
under the EU anti-competitions laws and the State Aid Guidelines. Thirdly, such 
subsidies would be break with the neo-liberal project which government had nurtured 
over many decades.
The shipping industry is just one among many in the UK experiencing decline. As I 
have already pointed out earlier on in chapters two and three, a number of sectors are 
experiencing decline due to capital flight, notably, the manufacturing sector, in part as a 
result of job export and off-shoring. Public policy on support for ailing industries in 
such sectors demands that support measures be reasonable and well justified. The 
benefits of such support, to the British economy and society, must be sufficient enough 
to justify the support or outweigh the cost (Haralambides, 2006).
Although the government considers shipping an essential industry for the UK economy 
(DETR, 1998), any support measures to individual shipping companies must be well 
justified and this is why the government insists that:
... the amount of support an industry asks for and expects to receive must be
reasonable and delicately assessed [Government Interview].
Considering the number of industries in need of support, the government argues that the 
shipping industry has been in receipt of enormous state subsidies, for a long time. Ship­
owners in the UK have been in receipt of tax related incentives meant to enhance their 
international competitive capacity, investment incentives to encourage shipbuilding, 
ship depreciation allowances, seafarer training support and support for research and 
development in the industry (Brownrigg et al, 2001; Marlow, 2002; Joon, 2002). 
Seemingly, the challenge that the state faces in formulating its support policy is that, 
first, such support should not be seen to favour one sector more than others and, second, 
given that it operates within a neo-liberal agenda, it should not unduly distort the 
principles of free competition and free markets. As much as shipping is viewed as 
essential and deserving such support, therefore, according to a government official:
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— other industries could argue that the economy can as well still thrive 
relying on non-UK ships and seafarers [Government Interview].
Even the argument for the strategic importance of the merchant navy in times of war, 
which the government often presents, does not seem enough to justify more radical 
government responses. It seems to me that, if  the commercial importance of shipping 
did not justify special treatment, the strategic and defence argument might have been 
sufficient justification for the government to introduce whatever measures necessary to 
ensure that the pool of qualified merchant navy officers is rebuilt. The fact that this did 
not happen shows the extent to which the government’s capacity to respond effectively 
is limited.
The support for cadet training, in contrast, is relatively easy to justify because it falls 
under the government’s general programme for manpower and skills development 
which is geared towards enhancing skills in various sectors and industries (Leitch 
Review of Skills, 2006). However, as my interviews with policy officials reveal, the 
government is reluctant to extend this support for skills development as far as 
supporting employment through subsidies. A government source explained:
What justification is there for the government to use public money to pay 
ship-owners to employ British officers if it can not do the same in all other 
sectors? Soon car companies will demand the same, and the service sector 
and the manufacturing sector, and then we will have created a monster 
[Government Interview].
Another constraining factor is the limited nature of government resources vis-a-vis the 
unlimited demand.
This is something that the government has to contend with while designing its policies 
for ‘positive measures’, namely support for declining industries and optimising the 
distribution of limited resources amongst a growing amount of budgetary demands. The 
government finds it difficult to introduce employment subsidies because as one policy 
official explained:
The budget is overstretched and has been for a long time now. It is difficult 
to meet all the financial demands on the treasury from all the departments.
The government can therefore not pledge to the industry, any industry for 
that matter, more than it can afford to give. Delicate balancing and 
prioritisation is called for and those calling for the subsidisation of officer 
employment must understand this [Government Interview]
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Their argument is that this is a period of squeezed government spending during which 
the government cannot afford any more financial support for the industry because, apart 
from the lack of funds:
There is no rational justification for paying companies to employ UK 
officers when the government is already incurring huge expenses in support 
of training for the industry on top of all the tax and investment related 
support that they already get [Government Interview].
Considering that the UK is operating within a neoliberal economic paradigm, this 
argument about ‘no rational justification’ is understandable considering the commitment 
to promote free competition and free markets. The argument ties in with yet another of 
the factors restricting government response in this direction; the EU State Aid 
Guidelines and the rules on anti-competitive practices as set out in the treaty of Rome. 
These rules have been introduced in recognition of the fact that the consequence of state 
subsidies is distortion of free markets and therefore strictly regulate the amount of 
support that a government can give to private companies (Haralambides, 2006). The tax 
measures introduced for shipping companies, under the tonnage tax, were, however, 
approved by the EC (DETR, 1998) because they were in line with the EU’s policy for 
the recovery of the EU shipping.
To introduce employment subsidies, just in the UK, would give British officers ‘unfair’ 
advantage over, officers, in the rest of the EU member countries which would lead to 
market distortion. In the absence o f all the other obstacles, the only way employment 
subsidies can be successfully introduced is if European Commission included them as 
an EU policy for skills development so that all member states can introduce the same. 
Unfortunately it is unlikely that the other obstacles, such as budgetary constraints within 
individual states and public policy issues, will be easily overcome. The same argument 
can be made for employment legislation. It is not just the state’s commitment to the 
neoliberal paradigm that limits the government’s ‘hand’ in this direction. As the 
government official quoted earlier explained, there are regional policy considerations 
involved; it would be against the general EU commitment to free movement and 
participation of labour within the region if individual states introduced legislation that 
would effectively lock out other EU nationals from participation in their local shipping 
job market. A possible radical step would have been to break away from this EU 
regulatory framework and proceed to introduce subsidies but the fact that the
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govemment did not do this makes a strong statement about its commitment to regional 
economic integration and the impact of such commitment on the national policy 
framework.
This assessment strongly indicates a situation whereby the government’s ‘hands’ are 
tied and its options are greatly limited, so that there is no possible way that the pool of 
qualified merchant navy officers can be recovered because, clearly, the government is 
unable to break its neoliberal commitments or unwilling to challenge the ‘threat of 
tonnage flight’. At the same time, however, the state is also bound by its commitment to 
regional integration and must therefore operate within the EU policy framework.
There are, therefore, no easy answers on how the response could have been more 
effective, if at all. The Minimum Training Obligation was an inadequate ‘half-measure’ 
which could not address the problem from all necessary angles, that is, the demand and 
supply angles. The forces against the kind of response which would effectively address 
the problems and increase the supply of junior officers are many and complex. Mainly, 
however, the ability of the state to effectively respond is, clearly, limited because of the 
international nature of the problem and the localised scope of the strategy. This does not 
necessarily mean that the state is unable to respond or that it has no options, it only 
points to a complex question of choice. To return to Beck’s (2005) argument, how 
effective the state is in managing globalisation and its associated economic and social 
implication on local labour depends on the choices that the state makes. In the case of 
the response via the tonnage tax the state clearly chose to give more consideration to the 
plight of ‘tonnage flight’ than the loss of national seafarer labour. An effective solution 
to the problem facing UK shipping labour (as, indeed, many other industries) would 
mean a conscious choice to reassess state commitment to neo-liberal project and a break 
with cross-border EU policy commitments on state aid guidelines. However, both these 
options, in the current highly globalised economic setting, are difficult as explained in 
the next, conclusion chapter.
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CHAPTER NINE
Conclusions
In this thesis I have explored and tried to understand the role of the state in the 
management of domestic economies within the currently highly globalised context. The 
aim has been to assess the effectiveness of the state in responding to the growing 
influence of global corporate capital within a neoliberal paradigm and to determine 
whether or not national governments retain their capacity as relevant actors in the 
management of domestic economies for the benefit of local industries in the new 
globalised economic order. Most importantly, I wanted to understand whether states are 
able to effectively protect local labour from the erosive impact of globalisation and 
corporate exploitation.
Using the highly globalised, complex and dynamic, shipping industry, as an example, I 
have highlighted and discussed some o f the negative impacts of globalisation on local 
labour markets and tried to address the question of whether national governments have 
an adequate answer to the challenges presented by globalisation. Shipping is an 
appropriate industry to study in this regard because, as Lillie (2006:4) has observed, it is 
“the archetype of unbridled free-market capitalism”. It is one of those industries whose 
companies have effectively broken through state economic barriers and attained an 
unequalled level of ‘footlooseness’ in their transborder economic activities. It is also an 
important example because, in no other industry is labour as internationally organised as 
shipping. It is for this reason that the extent of globalisation in the shipping industry is 
unequalled by any other. It therefore presents a good illustration of the impact of 
globalisation on states and their response to its impacts on domestic economies.
Specifically, UK shipping provides an excellent illustration in this assessment because 
of a number of reasons. First, as one of the major Traditional Maritime Nations of 
Europe, Britain has a long history of shipping and seafaring. It has a history of 
commanding a large trading fleet for many years and maintaining an equally large and 
highly qualified merchant navy labour force. Second, the UK shipping industry, 
including both the fleet and the seafaring labour force, went through a period of drastic 
and steady decline between the mid-1970s and late 1990s which left behind a depleted
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merchant fleet and a shrunken pool of seafarers. Third, as one of the countries that have 
actively cultivated and promoted neoliberal economic politics and the concept of free 
capital markets, it is both interesting and revealing to examine its response to the 
growing strength and influence o f global corporate capital and assess the adequacy and 
effectiveness of its attempt to protect local seafarer labour from decline.
This concluding chapter applies the findings of the study to try and answer the umbrella 
research question introduced in chapter one, relating to the capacity of the state as an 
important actor in economic management in the era of globalisation, from the following 
specific angles:
(i) The paradox presented by the strategy’s effectiveness in addressing capital
decline and the failure on the side of seafaring labour.
(ii) The ability of the state to design effective demand-side strategies within a
neoliberal paradigm.
The general conclusion arising from the assessment of the adequacy of UK tonnage tax 
as the state’s main response strategy is that whereas governments are able to promote 
and enhance the interests of global corporate capital, their capacity to protect and 
promote local labour is highly limited by their commitment to neoliberalism and the 
concept of free markets. As explained in the next section, the British government finds 
itself in a dilemma with regard to protecting the local seafarer labour by making UK- 
based shipping companies commit to mandatory employment for junior officers. The 
reason for this dilemma is that whilst they want to stimulate seafarer employment and 
protect the maritime skills base, they are fearful of capital flight on the one hand and 
opposed to state subsidy on the other. As noted in chapter two, the problem of declining 
labour markets as a result o f companies seeking cheaper sources of production factors is 
not unique to the maritime sector. Labour in many other sectors including 
manufacturing and banking has faced similar problems over the past three decades 
(Chomsky, 1999; Turok and Edge, 1999). Governments have allowed this as part of a 
wider neoliberal project in the believe that encouraging growth and expansion in the 
corporate sector and increasing capital accumulation, through liberalisation and free 
market policies, will lead to increased economic growth (see Chomsky, 1999; Jessop, 
2002; Harvey, 2005; Clarke et al, 2006; Fairbrother and Rainnie, 2006).
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9.1 Ambiguities and Complexities in the State’s Neoliberal 
Commitment
This thesis has demonstrated that the state is unable to design and implement demand- 
side strategies, partly because o f its commitment to the neoliberal economic paradigm 
and partly because o f the fear o f capital flight. A review of the literature, in chapter two, 
and the subsequent assessment o f the data, in chapter eight, demonstrates that since the 
late 1970s, the UK government has actively promoted the neoliberal project and 
supported the growth of a free global capital market. Consequently, the government is 
in a dilemma with regard to responding to, and dealing with, the negative impact of 
unregulated capital markets, on local seafaring labour. The shape of the UK tonnage tax, 
and the fact that it contains a training commitment but omits the employment element, 
is testimony to this dilemma. In the White Paper, Charting a New Course, the 
government clearly recognises the necessity of increasing employment opportunities for 
British junior officers, on-board UK ships, in order to encourage cadet retention and 
thus increase the number of qualified junior officers in the UK.
One way that the government could have achieved an increase in officer numbers was 
through the introduction of employment legislation which could have forced UK-based 
ship-owners and operators to employ more British junior officers and fewer foreigners. 
The other was to introduce employment subsidies, whereby, ship-owners and operators 
would be reimbursed the cost o f the difference between employing more expensive 
British junior officers instead o f less costly foreign counterparts (see chapter eight for 
more discussion). Both o f these options were proposed by the unions, who have 
consistently called for the introduction of an ‘employment link’, and, while companies 
were strongly opposed to any employment legislation, they were more receptive to the 
idea of employment subsidies. If the government felt unable to introduce employment 
legislation for the fear of tonnage flight, why did they not introduce employment 
subsidies, which were acceptable to all stakeholders and could have been effective? The 
answer to this question, as explained in chapter eight is the state’s commitment to the 
EU policy framework which strictly regulates government aide to individual private 
companies in order to maintain a free regional market and the resolute commitment to a 
free market economy.
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Having tolerated and, in part (through relaxation of protective seafarer employment 
legislation) encouraged British ship-owners to employ foreign seafarers for a long time, 
it is difficult to suddenly turn round and ask them to start employing British seafarers. 
The main task for the government, therefore, is how to convince UK-based shipping 
companies to, not only train UK cadets but also, offer employment to more British 
junior officers. The analysis o f company recruitment policies, in chapter six shows that 
the companies are not interested in British junior officers. The companies’ foremost 
consideration is the cost of crewing and the data indicate that they are prepared to keep 
it low by recruiting seafarers from low-wage countries irrespective of the impact on 
local skills. For this reason, they will not agree to any attempt by government to 
introduce employment regulations which could bind them to a mandatory employment 
commitment. Instead they are prepared to relocate their operations to other less costly 
and less regulated flag-regimes. The data, however, also show that, in addition to low 
cost, the companies want good quality officers but, instead of looking to their traditional 
‘home’ supply where quality of training and examination is assured, they would rather 
establish ‘tailored’ training programmes based in low-cost labour supply countries. This 
raises important questions about the power relations between nation states and capital 
markets with regard to the ability o f the state to introduce policies that are not 
influenced by the fear o f capital flight (Beck, 2005).
From the discussion on states and markets in chapter two, it seems as if the relationship 
between national governments, especially in developed countries, and global corporate 
capital is one of constant and continuous power struggle (Beck, 2005). It is a highly 
complex relationship involving constant negotiations and reconfiguration. Seemingly, it 
has evolved, over the past three decades, from one of symbiotic partnership in national 
economic development, for the state, and profitable enterprise for corporate capital, to 
one whereby many national governments are held ‘hostage’ by the giant multinational 
corporations using the threat of capital flight. The ‘ransom’ demands include lower 
taxes, reduced and lax economic regulations and no employment laws which might 
prevent easy exploitation of labour globally.
The picture, however, is not simple, especially considering that many developed 
countries have actively promoted, and still continue to promote, partnership with global 
corporate capital in pursuance of the neo-liberal economic project. The case of the UK 
shipping industry, its decline and the introduction of the tonnage tax, provides an
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excellent illustration. Seemingly the corporate threat of capital flight is preventing the 
British government from enacting legislation which would effectively achieve policy in 
relation to employment. Considering the government’s neoliberal commitment and the 
strong desire to attract tonnage and rebuild the UK merchant fleet, it is easy to see why 
it has actively sought to create (through the tonnage tax) an atmosphere conducive for 
corporate shipping businesses rather than promote seafaring labour interests. In other 
words, there are elements of state-capital ‘conspiracy’, in the design of the tonnage tax, 
whereby the state deliberately avoids the discussion on employment opportunities for 
British junior officers. The inclusion of the training element, supposedly designed to 
increase cadet recruitment and training, seems calculated to pacify labour, as suggested 
in chapter eight. Ironically, labour is also afraid of ‘tonnage flight’ and is therefore 
somehow collusive in the wider capital orchestrated scheme.
Judging from the tonnage tax example, therefore, the government’s response to 
globalisation and the decline in local labour is ineffective, partly because of corporate 
pressure but also because of a conscious decision, on the part of the state, to work in 
partnership with corporate capital rather than take any steps to regulate its activities and 
protect labour. This, as Chomsky (1999) suggests, is because neoliberal governments 
believe in this kind of partnership as the key to economic growth. The tonnage tax 
example also illustrates the point that, in relations between labour and capital, labour 
carries no decisive influence with governments. What appears to be the government’s 
commitment to the neoliberal paradigm and dependence on the wealth generating 
activities of capital, as the means to national economic development, means that labour 
interests and any desire to protect employment markets, on the part of the state, are 
secondary.
This conclusion is based on the fact that, having acknowledged that creating more 
employment opportunities for UK junior officers was key to effectively encouraging 
growth in the pool of officers (DETR, 1998), the government could have introduced two 
possible measures into the tonnage tax to address the lack of such opportunities, as 
demonstrated in chapter eight. An analysis of the process of strategy design, in chapter 
five, clearly indicates that the government knew, from the outset, that the declining 
number of British junior officers was directly linked with declining demand for their 
services by UK-based employers and their declining attractiveness to employers 
internationally, mainly because of their high prices. Furthermore, the shipping policy
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paper Charting a New Course clearly spells out the need to boost employment for 
British junior officers as a way of encouraging growth in the pool of UK officers.
The overall conclusion, therefore, is that the tonnage tax, in its present shape, does not 
constitute an adequate response to the negative impact of globalisation on the British 
pool of seafarer labour. This is because, as demonstrated throughout the thesis, the state 
seems unable to respond with effective supply-side strategies because of its 
commitment to the neoliberal paradigm and the concept of free markets. At the same 
time, the state’s capacity to pursue alternative response options is limited by its 
commitment to the EU regulatory framework which, as demonstrated in chapter eight, 
constrains the extent to which an individual state may explore and experiment with 
economic policy strategies. In this era of economic globalisation, and growing corporate 
influence, individual states’ capacity to design effective strategies for the protection of 
labour markets is highly compromised. Whereas it is not correct to pronounce that states 
have become irrelevant as economic regulators, their role has been transformed 
significantly over the past forty years. The capacity to manage domestic economies and 
protect them as individual localised entities has declined as a result of globalisation 
which has rendered national borders highly porous and eliminated most economic and 
social barriers. The study therefore indicates that, far from Beck’s argument that ‘the 
state has the potential capacity to act and transform itself (2005:9) in this era of 
globalisation, the ability and/or will to realise this potential is limited by the fact that 
states have been placed in the precarious position of having to compete for favourable 
consideration by global capital as the key to wealth generation and economic growth.
9.2 The Research Process: Deficiencies and Mitigation
As already indicated in the methods chapter (Chapter four), my research methods and 
the research process were relatively straightforward and did not present many problems. 
The limited nature of time due to the fixed nature of the funding for the project, 
however, put the study under considerable time pressure although with proper planning 
and meticulous organisation of my work schedule I was able to successfully and 
productively manage the limited time. It is possible that with more time I might have 
interviewed more people and expanded the scope of the research to include more 
organisations and interviewee groups but the depth and quality of the data collected
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within the given space and time was excellent and sufficiently mitigated any 
shortcomings arising from time pressure.
There are, however, a number o f deficiencies in the research design and conduct which 
might have undermined the strength o f the data. However, conscious steps to address 
any gaps, during the research process, ensured that the study generated valid, rich data. 
One major deficiency was the failure to include cadets as one of the target interviewee 
group in the original research design. As it turned out, interviews with company 
managers and training staff raised issues which called for interviews with ex-cadets. An 
earlier inclusion might have enabled me to contact and interview many more ex-cadets 
but, nevertheless, the few that I interviewed generated rich qualitative data which 
provided useful first-person accounts on cadet training experiences.
As a researcher with no prior seafaring experience, it would have been enlightening to 
go on one voyage on a merchant vessel in order to experience, first-hand, life at sea. 
This would have given me the opportunity to mix with, and talk to, seafarers at work 
and learn about the living and working conditions at sea. However, to mitigate this 
shortcoming I held discussions with many former mariners, some of who were fellow 
students and colleagues and managed to a relatively good understanding of the 
structures and lifestyle on-board ship. Furthermore, during the research process and data 
analysis I constantly consulted with these ex-seafarers on matters, concerning living and 
working at sea, on which I needed more understanding.
It would also have been useful to interview a few of the cadets who stayed on the 
programme and successfully completed their training. This could have provided the 
other side of the ‘drop-out’ story by exploring some of the reasons why they remained 
and completed. Some of the questions would have included whether they too faced 
some of the challenges described by those who left and how they overcame them. It 
would have provided an opportunity to explore further the cadet-sponsor relationship. 
Considering, however, that the interviews with ex-cadets were very deep and 
comprehensive and the fact that I conducted many interviews with training 
administrators and staff in colleges, training personnel in both shipping companies and 
training agencies, the conclusions would not have been different.
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The conclusions arrived at in this chapter and chapter eight are therefore based on rich 
data which was collected through a research process which, though not completely free 
from deficiencies, was well designed and executed.
9.3 Future Research Agenda
Following the review o f the literature and the analysis of the data in which the 
conclusion points towards the inability of the state to effectively respond to 
globalisation and protect local industries and labour, the study has opened new avenues 
for further research. There is room here for further consideration of the role of trade 
unions and their capacity to promote and protect local labour. Although the study seems 
to suggest that the seafarers’ unions were not able to effectively push for an 
employment element for British officers in the tonnage tax, it is important to examine 
their strategy, since then, given that the tonnage tax has been found wanting in its 
representation of seafarers’ interests and protection of the local labour market from 
further decline. Projections by the UK Seafarers Analysis (Glen, 2006) indicate that the 
number of officers in the UK will have halved over the next decade. The important 
questions for further investigation include:
1. Can unions provide an answer to the decline in local seafarers labour markets?
2. What is the union strategy for doing this?
3. Can unions influence a favourable government policy response for seafaring 
labour?
This investigation would involve a critical analysis of the declining capacity of unions 
over the past three and a half decades and their ability to consolidate and rejuvenate 
their capacity to influence state policy.
Another avenue for further research is the study of an EU ‘answer’ to the decline in the 
seafarer pools of member-states. So far the idea of harmonised EU strategy for the 
recovery of EU shipping, which was initiated in the mid 1990s and forms the basis for 
the tonnage tax strategy adopted in various EU states, seems to have succeeded in 
promoting recovery in the national registered fleets of some of the member states 
including the UK and the Netherlands. However, this has clearly not resulted in the 
recovery of local seafaring labour. Considering the finding in this thesis that the EU
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regulatory framework for state aid is one of the obstacles to effective state response to 
the decline in local seafaring labour markets, the important question is whether or not 
this framework can be redefined to form part of the solution rather than the obstacle. 
The thesis opens up an interesting debate about labour markets with regard to general 
arguments about globalisation; an area which has not been explored in the literature and 
is overdue.
One area which this thesis has considered but not explored in detail is the possibility of 
separating seafarer skills development from the replenishment of essential shore-side 
maritime skills. From the arguments of a large number of managers participating in the 
study there is an indication that many companies are beginning to think that many of the 
shore-side positions do not necessarily require extensive seafaring training and 
experience. There is therefore room for further research into the coordination of 
industry needs and training programmes in order to investigate whether training 
institutions and maritime authorities have, in any way, attempted to adjust their training 
approaches to the needs of the industry in the 21st century.
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APPENDICES
Appendix One: Research Access Letter
Victor Oyaro Gekara
C/o The Seafarers’ International Research Centre 
52 Park Place 
Cardiff 
CF10 3AT
Tel: +44 (0)29 2087 4620 
Fax: +44 (0)29 2087 4619 
www.sirc.cf.ac.uk
Dear Sir/Madam,
RE: REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE
I am writing to request your kind assistance with a research project I am engaged in as 
part of my PhD at the Seafarers International Research centre in Cardiff University.
The Study is on the impact of globalisation on the shipping industry, especially 
seafaring labour, and the government’s response to the decline in the number of 
qualified British officers.
In order to undertake the research I am carrying out a series of confidential and
anonymous interviews w ith ................................................... and would be very grateful if
you could spare an hour of your valuable time to help me. The kinds of things I am 
interested in discussing with you include:
As one of (the).............................. in the UK I feel your participation is essential and
central to my research. I would therefore be very grateful if you could possibly manage 
to meet with me. My data collection is scheduled for the period between January and 
June of 2006. An appointment for any time during this period would be highly 
appreciated.
I hope to hear from you soon and let me take this opportunity to wish you a merry 
Christmas and a happy new year.
With very many thanks.
Victor Gekara
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Appendix Two: Research Participant Information Form
Project title: Globalisation and the Transformation of Shipping Labour; a UK case 
study of state response
The main objective o f this project is to analyse and examine the international demand 
and supply of seafarers, especially officer, and to look at how the changing patterns of 
demand and supply globally have affected the pool of British merchant navy officers in 
the past few decades. One o f the problems facing the UK in its attempt to rebuild and 
retain a significant pool o f well trained, qualified and experienced officers for its 
shipping industry is the high drop-out rates of cadets in the cadet training colleges.
In order to understand why this is the case I am holding a series of strictly confidential 
and anonymous interviews with a few cadets who have dropped out of training in the 
past few years with the purpose o f exploring the reasons for their abandoning training. 
Hopefully this will help inform future government and industry strategies towards 
increased and sustainable recruitment and training o f cadets in the UK and hence 
preserve significant core British maritime skills for both the deep sea and shore side 
maritime industries.
Thank you very much for agreeing to participate.
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Appendix Three: Research Informed Consent Form
Project title: Globalisation and the Transformation of Shipping Labour; a UK case 
study of state response
I................................................................................................. (Name)
of ....................................................................................... (Company) have agreed to
participate in this research project voluntarily and of my own accord.
I have / have not agreed to a voice recording of this interview between me and the 
researcher.
The objectives and purpose of the exercise have been clearly explained to me and I have 
been assured of the confidentiality and anonymity of the interviews. I therefore give 
permission for any appropriate use o f the information I give in any subsequent writings 
and publications.
Signed Dated
Appendix Four: Ethics Committee Approval Letter
Cardiff School of Social S ciences
Direct©* P ro fesso r  Huw Beynon
Cyfat wydtiwr Yr Amro Haw B&ynon
Ysgol Gwyddorau Cymdeithasoi Caerdydd
Our ref: SREC/60
Victor Gekara 
SOCSI
13th March 2006
C a r d i f f  u n i v e r s i t y
K in g  i::n-.va?d VM AVv-niK-; 
O n .'U ir i C F 1 0  8W T  
SOKS Uh
l e i  f ' f o n  ■■ 4 4 ( 0 2 9  2 0 8 7  51.  
r e x  F ’O ic.r <• ' V g G i e g  2 0 8 7  11  
w w x v . r a i v i i f  f . a e . u k /
P n fy S f- \c i  C a v r d y t l J  
A t l t t i ’&i7 M(ir(>;tr->nwy 
R h v a 'B  B r e n i f )  t d v v S i d  VI' 
a e r d v G U  C V lO  3 'A 'T  
C y n v - J  'V Q & y r n n s  G y in n o !
Dear Victor
Your project entitled i4G lo b a lisa tio n , the  tra n s fo rm a tio n  o f  sh ip p in g  labour, a n d  
B ritish  m a r itim e  sk ills  a ttr it io n ” has been approved by the School o f  Social Sciences 
Research Ethics Com m ittee o f  Cardiff University at its meeting on 8lh March 2006 
and you can now  com m ence the project.
If you make any substantial changes with ethical implications to the project as it 
progresses you need to inform the SREC about the nature o f  these changes. Such 
changes could be: 1) changes in the type o f  participants recruited (e.g. inclusion o f  a 
group o f  potentially vulnerable participants), 2) changes to questionnaires, interview 
guides etc. (e.g. including new  questions on sensitive issues), 3) changes to the way 
data are handled (e.g. sharing o f  non-anonym ised data with other researchers).
All ongoing projects w ill be monitored every 12 months and it is a condition o f 
continued approval that you com plete the monitoring form.
Please inform the SREC when the project has ended.
Please use the SREC’s project reference number above in any future correspondence. 
Yours sincerely
Professor Soren Holm
Chair o f  the School o f  Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee
cc: E Renton
Supervisors: H Sam pson & P Fairbrother
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Appendix Five: Interview Guides 
I
CADET TRAINING INSTITUTIONS
Training Administrators/Teachers
Key Topics:
Part One: Biographical Details
Part Two: Cadet Recruitment
Part Three: The Training Process
Part Four: The Training Programme
Part Five: Training Facilities
Part Six: Cadet Enrolment and Training Trends
Part Seven: Cadet Drop-out
Part Eight: Cadet Sponsorship Arrangements
Part Nine: The Tonnage Tax Training Obligation
Part Ten: Career Prospects for Graduating Junior Officers
Part Eleven: State Support
Part Twelve: Concluding Remarks
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II
EX-CADETS
Part One: Biographical
Part Two: Motivation to Join Seafaring
Part Three: Expectations from the Training Programme
Part Four: Application. Recruitment and Admission Process
Part Five: Sponsorship Arrangement
Part Six: Views on the Training Programme in College
Part Seven: Views on the Training Programme at Sea
Part Eight: Reasons for Withdrawing from Training
Part Nine: Concluding Remarks
- 2 4 5 -
III
SHIPPING COMPANY HRMS
Part One: Personal Biographical Details
Part Two: Company Profile and Vessels Details
Part Three: Crewing for Company Vessels
Part Four: Officer Shortage in the UK
Part Five: Company Training Structures for Officers
Part Six: Cadet Recruitment and Training
Part Seven: Low Training Levels in the UK
Part Eight: Cadet Training Sponsorship Arrangements
Part Nine: Views on the Tonnage Tax and the MTO
Part Ten: State Support
Part Eleven: Views on UK Officers
Part Twelve: Future Sources of Officers
Part Thirteen: Concluding Remarks
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IV
GOVERNMENT POLICY OFFICIALS
Part One: Biographical Details
Part Two: Government’s Interpretation of the Decline in the Industry
Part Three: The Impact of Declining British Seafarers
Part Four: Government Response to the Decline
Part Five: Motivation for Government Response
Part Six: Impact o f Government Response
Part Seven: Constraints to Government Response
Part Eight: Future Plans for British Maritime Skills
Part Nine: Concluding Remarks
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V
Part One: 
Part Two: 
Part Three: 
Part Four: 
Part Five: 
Part Six: 
Part Seven: 
Part Eight: 
Part Nine:
UNIONS
Biographical Details
Unions’ Interpretation of the Decline in the Industry
The Impact of Declining British Seafarers
Unions’ Intervention
Constraints to Union Intervention
Views on Government Response to the Decline
Impact of Government Response
Future Plans for the Future of British Officers
Concluding Remarks
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Appendix Six: Cadet Training Course Outlines
Deck HND Programme Structure
Phase Location Duration Phase Objective
Phase 1 
At College
6/8 weeks Introduction, safety, general ship knowledge, 
and underpinning knowledge for N/SVQ 
(Level 2).
Phase 2 
At Sea
24 weeks Introduction to life at sea. Practical training 
and collection of performance evidence for 
N/SVQ (Level 2).
Phase 3 
At College
23 weeks Review of progress, assessment for N/SVQ 
(Level 2). HND Part 1 studies and 
underpinning knowledge for N/SVQ (Level
3).
Phase 4 
At Sea
32 weeks Practical training and collection of 
performance evidence for N/SVQ (Level 3). 
Navigational bridge watchkeeping.
Phase 5 
At College
13 weeks Interim review and assessment and 
completion of underpinning knowledge of 
N/SVQ (Level 3).
Phase 6 
At Sea
32 weeks Completion of N/SVQ performance 
evidence. Completion of bridge 
watchkeeping.
Phase 7 
At College
28 weeks Final assessment of N/SVQ (Level 3), 
completion of HND Part 2, and preparation 
for MCA OOW Oral Examination.
Source Safe Training Group http://www.sstg.org/
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Engineering HND Programme Structure
Phase Location Duration Phase Objective
Phase 1 
At College
15/26 weeks Introduction, safety, general ship knowledge, 
and initial underpinning knowledge for 
N/SVQ (Level 3) and workshop training.
Phase 2 
At Sea
24 weeks Introduction to life at sea. Practical training 
and collection of performance evidence for 
N/SVQ (Level 3).
Phase 3 
At College
40 weeks Review of progress, and further underpinning 
knowledge for N/SVQ (Level 3).
Phase 4 
At Sea
24 weeks Practical training and completion of 
performance evidence for N/SVQ (Level 3). 
Engineering watchkeeping.
Phase 5 
At College
24 weeks Final assessment of N/SVQ (Level 3), 
completion of HND Part 2, and preparation 
for MCA 0 0 W Oral Examination.
Source . Ship Safe Training Group http://www.sstg.org/
Deck FD Programme Structure
Phase Location Duration Phase Objective
Introduction 
At College
3 weeks Introduction to foundation degree, safety, 
general ship knowledge.
Phase 1 
At College
15 weeks Foundation degree studies.
Phase 2 
At Sea
35 weeks Introduction to life at sea. Work based 
learning (Operational Level), mntb deck 
record book.
Phase 3 
At College
30 weeks Further Foundation Degree studies.
Phase 4 
At Sea
47 weeks Work based learning (Management Level) 
and completion of mntb deck record book.
Phase 5 
At College
15 weeks Completion of N/SVQ performance 
evidence. Completion of bridge 
watchkeeping.
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** Phase 6 
At College
12 weeks Additional B.Sc units.
**Phase 7 
At College
36 weeks Completion of self-study, usually at sea and 
dissertation.
Source. Ship Safe Training Group http://www.sstg.org/
On completion o f the FD certificate at phase five the cadet can upgrade it to a B.Sc 
(Hons) by completing phases six and seven.
Engineering FD Programme Structure
Phase Location Duration Phase Objective
Introduction 
At College
3 weeks Introduction to foundation degree, safety and 
general ship knowledge
Phase 1 
At College
25 weeks Foundation degree studies
Phase 2 
At Sea
24 weeks Introduction to life at sea. Work based 
learning (Operational Level). MNTB 
engineer training record 
book.
Phase 3 
At College
30 weeks Further Foundation Degree studies.
Phase 4 
At Sea
24 weeks Work based learning (Management Level) 
and completion of mntb engineer training 
record book.
Phase 5 
At College
25 weeks Completion of N/SVQ performance 
evidence. Completion of bridge 
watchkeeping
**Phase 6 
At Sea
12 weeks Additional B.Sc units.
**Phase 7
At College
36 weeks Completion of self-study, usually at sea and 
dissertation
Source .Ship Safe Training Group http://www.sstg.org/
On completion o f the FD certificate at phase five the cadet can upgrade it to a B.Sc 
(Hons) by completing phases six and seven
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Deck B.Sc (Hons) Programme Structure
Phase Location Duration Phase Objective
Year 1 
At College
39 weeks Introduction, safety, general ship knowledge, 
and underpinning knowledge for N/SVQ 
(Level 2) and degree studies.
Phase 1 
At College
25 weeks Foundation degree studies
Summer Vacation 
At Sea
12 weeks Introduction to life at sea. Practical training 
and collection of performance evidence for 
N/SVQ (Level 2/3).
Year 2 
At College
39 weeks Review of progress, assessment for N/SVQ 
(Level 2) and further degree studies.
Year Out 
At Sea
56 weeks Practical training and completion of N/SVQ 
performance evidence. Bridge watchkeeping.
Year 3 
At College
39 weeks Final assessment of N/SVQ (Level 3), 
completion of degree studies, and preparation 
for MCA OOW Oral Examination
Source: Ship Safe Training Group http://www.sstg.org/
Engineering B.Sc (Hons) Programme Structure
Phase Location Duration Phase Objective
Year 1 
At College
39 weeks Introduction, safety, general ship knowledge, 
and underpinning knowledge for N/SVQ 
(Level 3) and degree studies.
Summer Vacation 
At Sea
12 weeks Introduction to life at sea. Practical training 
and collection of performance evidence for 
N/SVQ (Level 3).
Year 2 
At College
39 weeks review of progress and further degree studies
Year Out 
At Sea
56 weeks Practical training and completion of N/SVQ 
performance evidence. Engineer room 
watchkeeping.
Year 3 
At College
39 weeks Final assessment of N/SVQ (Level 3), 
completion of degree studies, and preparation 
for MCA OOW Oral Examination.
Source: Ship Safe Training Group http://www.sstg.org/
